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Introduction
When a jury in Ventura County, California acquitted the four Los
Angeles police officers charged with beating Rodney King, it reaffirmed
that victims of police brutality must look beyond the criminal process to
secure their rights of personal safety.' Successful government prosecu-
tions would hold police accountable for unlawful violence and, as a re-
sult, would effectively deter it. It would be foolhardy to place much faith
in local prosecutors' capabilities in such cases, however, until substantial
reforms are instituted.2 In addition, federal prosecutors, though empow-
1. In People v. Powell, an all-white (but for one Hispanic) jury acquitted four white Los
Angeles police officers of state charges that they used excessive force in striking African-Amer-
ican motorist Rodney King 56 times with their batons, even though the jury viewed a by-
stander's videotape of much of the beating. Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in
Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, D22 [hereinafter Mydans, Los Angeles
Policemen Acquitted]. The police suspected Mr. King of violating state traffic laws, and appre-
hended him after he led them on a high-speed chase. Id. Violence erupted following the
verdict, resulting in substantial loss of life and property damage. Seth Mydans, Verdicts Set
Off a Wave of Shock and Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at D22; infra notes 9, 265.
2. Because of the close working relationship between local district attorneys and police
departments, it is extraordinarily rare for a prosecutor to charge a police officer with using
excessive force, and rarer still for the prosecution to obtain a conviction. To avoid conflicts of
interest in cases alleging police brutality, states should use independent prosecutors to investi-
gate and to prosecute such charges. See Douglas L. Colbert, How Do We Police the Police?,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 2, 1983, at 35; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM 91-94 (1975). In addition, the creation of civilian boards to review allegations of
misconduct would likely renew the public's confidence in the police, and would detail the
extent of serious police violence. See Police Misconduct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 22-23 (1983)
(statement of Eileen Luna-Gordinier, Investigator, Berkeley Police Review Comm'n) (describ-
ing the benefits of independent, civilian review processes in Berkeley, Cal.); Douglas L. Col-
bert, Civilian Review Board Should Be Civilian, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1983, § 1, at 22 (letter);
Jennifer Vogel, The Pro-Police Review Board, 254 NATION 18 (1992). Such boards, rather than
internal police units, should be empowered to conduct full investigations into charges of exces-
sive force and to make appropriate recommendations to local police commissioners and dis-
trict attorneys. See generally Kenneth J. Garcia, Law Enforcement: Panel Investigating
Complaints of Excessive Force Is Told of Need for Civilian Review, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992,
at B1, B8 (describing a proposal by a police watchdog group that complaints about excessive
force be examined by civilian review boards and independent prosecutors whose sole purpose is
to press charges in this area); Martin Gottlieb, Like Clockwork, A Police Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1992, § 1, at 27 (describing problems of police corruption and review in New York
City); David Kocieniewski & Leonard Levitt, Turning A Blind Eye to Misconduct, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 13, 1991, at 5 (revealing that 98% of brutality allegations in New York City end with no
disciplinary action by the police department). Until such reforms are instituted, victims of
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ered to intervene in such "local" matters, 3 rarely opt to prosecute police
officers accused of violating citizens' constitutional rights.4
police brutality can only secure effective redress through civil rights remedies. See infra notes
5-9 and accompanying text. Federal prosecutors, for example, have the independence that is
needed to effectively investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of police brutality-a role that
was reinforced by the federal convictions of two of the four officers who beat Rodney King-
but they have thus far failed to use their powers in this area on any significant level. See infra
note 4.
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (reenacted by the Enforce-
ment Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 17-18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1988)). This statute allows federal criminal prosecution of "whoever, under color of
any law ... or custom" subjects any inhabitant of a state to the deprivation of "any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). Similarly, section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114,
16 Stat. 140, 141 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988)), provides the federal govern-
ment with authority to prosecute state officials that conspire to deprive citizens of constitu-
tional or statutory rights. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800-01 (1966). In Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), however, the Supreme Court required proof that the ac-
cused acted with specific intent. Id. at 103 (interpreting section 20 of the Criminal Code, the
predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 242). Prosecutors frequently claim that this standard precludes
successful federal prosecutions under sections 241 and 242. E.g., Sean P. Murphy, US Tack in
Beating Case Is Called Risky, BosTON GLOBE, May 6, 1992, at 25; Sheryl Stolberg, Convic-
tions in Rights Case Could Be Difficult to Win, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al.
4. During the 25-year period following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (holding that state authorization is not required for law enforce-
ment defendant to have acted under color of law), the Department of Justice rarely elected to
prosecute law enforcement officials accused of using excessive force against citizens. Stephanie
Saul, Not a Federal Case, NEWSDAY, Mar. 31, 1991, at 5 (reporting that of approximately
88,000 police misconduct complaints filed with the U.S. Department of Justice from 1981 to
1990, about half of which involved allegations of brutality, only 537 were presented to a grand
jury). Successful federal prosecutions are also "extremely rare." See Stolberg, supra note 3, at
Al (9800 brutality complaints to the Justice Department in 1991 led to over 3500 investiga-
tions, 129 prosecutions, and 108 convictions.). It is significant in this regard that the Justice
Department is frequently criticized for following "a longstanding policy of not pressing a fed-
eral case," and maintains no data on the extent of police violence nationally. Paul Chevigny,
Let's Make It a Federal Case, 254 NATION 371, 371 (1992); see also Jason DeParle, To Criti-
cism, U.S. Unveils Report on Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A18 (describing a
Justice Department study of police brutality complaints compiled in wake of Rodney King's
beating; congressional critics charged that the report, which reached no conclusions, showed
the Department's indifference to the problem); Ted Gest, Making a Federal Case of It, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 11, 1992, at 22 (noting that even though the Justice Department
decided to prosecute the officers who beat Rodney King, "its record on police brutality will
remain clouded"). The former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, John Dunne,
recently acknowledged the Department's unaggressive criminal prosecution policy, remarking:
"We are not the 'front-line' troops in combatting instances of police abuse." Chevigny, supra
at 371. Consequently, the Justice Department's decision to invoke jurisdiction against the Los
Angeles police officers accused of assaulting Rodney King, see Robert Reinhold, US. Jury
Indicts 4 Police Officers in King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at Al, was unusual. Its
decision was vindicated when a federal jury convicted Officer Powell, who delivered the most
blows, and Sergeant Koon, the supervisor on the scene, of criminal civil rights violations, while
acquitting Officer Briseno, who apparently tried to stop the beating, and rookie Officer Wind.
Seth Mydans, 2 of 4 Officers Found Guilty in Los Angeles Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993,
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Because of prosecutors' abysmal records, the greatest hope for curb-
ing the excessive use of force by police officers lies in section 1983 civil
rights actions 5 against municipalities under Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services.6 Jury verdicts holding municipalities liable for depriving
citizens7 of their constitutional rights serve to effectively short-circuit of-
ficial toleration and condonation of longstanding unconstitutional police
practices. Such verdicts expose municipalities to costly, indeterminate
liability8 during these times of fiscal austerity, making reform of police
practices an economic, as well as a political, 9 imperative.
§ 1, at 1, 18. The federal prosecutors' aggressive courtroom tactics played an important role in
convincing the jury to deliver two guilty verdicts, as did the fact that the federal jury was
multiracial. See id.; Seth Mydans, Points of Evidence, Not Emotion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1993, § 1, at 19; infra notes 259, 266 (discussing the importance of multiracial juries in race-
sensitive cases). The Justice Department's decision to intervene here may signal a more active
federal role in safeguarding citizens' civil rights. See Jeff Gerth, Clinton Satisfied by Jury's
Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, § 1, at 18 (quoting Attorney General Janet Reno: "the
'Department of Justice is going to do everything it can to continue to bring prosecutions to
insure that the civil rights of all citizens across the country are protected.' ").
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute, which Congress originally enacted as sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell establishes a municipality's potential liability under sec-
tion 1983. See infra Part II.B.
7. Section 1983 protects all persons, citizens and noncitizens alike, who are within the
nation's jurisdiction. See supra note 5. The term "citizens" is used in a nontechnical sense in
this Article and is meant to signify all people that are under the statute's protection.
8. When a jury determines that a municipal policy or custom caused a constitutional
injury under section 1983, the municipality not only faces liability to the named plaintiff, but
also becomes vulnerable to undetermined financial responsibility for the damages of all other
citizens who suffer similar injuries as a result of the unlawful police practice. In these potential
cases, municipalities would encounter serious collateral estoppel problems in attempting to
defend on the issue of liability. MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCON-
DUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 14.2(g) (2d ed. 1992); see infra note 338 and accompanying
text. Moreover, failing to reform unconstitutional police practices may have lasting political
consequences and lead to substantial indirect economic costs. See infra note 9.
9. When a municipality permits constitutional violations to continue unabated, the
political consequences can be more serious than the potential exposure to damage awards. A
jury verdict that holds the municipality responsible is much more difficult to defend than a
finding of liability against individual officers. A city can justify allocating part of its budget to
pay money judgments for the few "bad apples" in its police department, but it would be hard-
pressed to explain a Monell violation because it suggests systematic police abuses. Such a
finding of official lawlessness would likely receive public attention and result in calls for imme-
diate change in the police practice. Moreover, when a police force and a city engage in an
unconstitutional practice, the full extent of the injury that results is incalculable. Citizens may
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Despite the importance of Monell-type relief in persuading munici-
palities to abolish unconstitutional police practices, it is now in danger of
being circumvented by an increasingly popular, yet underreported, pre-
trial procedure known as bifurcation. Relying on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b),10 trial judges and defense attorneys in several jurisdic-
tions are moving before trial, and sometimes before discovery, to sever
civil rights claims against municipalities from those aimed at individual
officers. When bifurcating for trial, many judges are relying on a per
curiam Supreme Court decision, City of Los Angeles v. Heller,' to re-
quire the plaintiff to prove that individual officers violated her constitu-
tional rights before she can sue the municipality. The difficulty of
establishing an officer's liability at the first trial, frequently due to suffi-
ciency of proof problems and jurors' pro-police bias,12 may cause a jury
to find in the officer's favor despite believing that the plaintiff has sus-
tained a constitutional injury. Many trial judges are dismissing Monell
claims in these situations pursuant to their overly broad reading of Heller
lose faith in the fairness of the legal system, particularly when the legal remedies aimed at
correcting such unconstitutional practices are so weighted against victims of police abuse as to
become ineffective. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (reasoning that exclusion
of African-Americans from jury duty "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice"). A national survey conducted in 1989 revealed that 80% of African-Ameri-
cans believed that Black defendants and crime victims did not receive equal treatment with
others in their encounters with the criminal justice system. Julie Johnson, Poll Finds Blacks
and Whites 'Worlds Apart, "N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1989, at A18. Such feelings of exclusion may
lead to volatile and pandemic lawlessness, particularly when a community perceives that a
verdict is unjust. Following the jury's acquittal of the four Los Angeles police officers charged
with beating Rodney King, for example, violence resulted in more than fifty deaths, well over
two thousand injuries, and nearly one billion dollars in property damage. Timothy Egan,
Scorned, Los Angeles Police Find Less Pride in the Badge, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al;
see also Marc Lacy, Riot Death Toll Lowered to 51 After Coroner's Review, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1992, at Al (describing the violence in Los Angeles as "the deadliest civil disturbance in
the United States this century"). Similar reactions followed acquittals of Miami police officers
by all-white juries in 1980 and 1984. See Andrews v. State, 438 So. 2d 480, 482 n.4 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (Ferguson, J., specially concurring), rev'd per curiam, 459 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.
1984); James R. Jorgenson, Back to the Laboratory with Peremptory Challenges: A Florida
Response, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 559, 579 (1984).
10. Rule 42(b) provides:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, al-
ways preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). This Article focuses on bifurcation of section 1983 claims filed against
a municipal defendant from those filed against an individual police officer, and does not ad-
dress bifurcation of issues in a single claim.
11. 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam); see infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
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without first inquiring whether the jury found that the plaintiff had been
deprived of a constitutional right. Consequently, a Rule 42(b) trial bifur-
cation order may be extremely prejudicial to a litigant seeking to estab-
lish an unlawful police practice. At best, the plaintiff must assume the
expense and inconvenience of carrying forward two separate trials seria-
tim. Even when the plaintiff succeeds in the first trial, bifurcated trials
allow the municipality to place great pressure on the plaintiff to settle
and forego the second trial altogether. 13 Although it often furthers the
plaintiff's individual interests, settlement prevents a jury from hearing
evidence and ruling on the municipality's challenged practice, thus un-
dermining the reformatory purpose and effect of section 1983 litigation.
The bifurcation of Monell claims also precludes juries from engaging
in "equitable loss-spreading"' 4-they cannot allocate the costs of official
wrongdoing between the individual officer's unlawful acts and the munic-
ipal custom or policy upon which the officer relied. In a single trial, the
jury can divide the costs of a section 1983 violation "among the three
principals[:] ... the victim of the constitutional deprivation; the officer
whose conduct caused the injury; and the public, as represented by the
municipal entity."' 5
The harm is most serious when Monell claims are bifurcated for dis-
covery purposes. Discovery bifurcation makes it virtually certain that
neither a jury nor a judge will ever consider whether the municipality's
custom or policy was responsible for violating a citizen's constitutional
rights. A discovery bifurcation order might substantially lengthen the
process by requiring the plaintiff to conduct discovery and proceed to
trial against the individual officers before commencing discovery on the
Monell claim against the municipality.' 6 Most plaintiffs do not have the
resources, fortitude, and commitment necessary to conduct discovery
again and proceed to a second trial.
13. It is clear from conversations with municipal defense attorneys and plaintiffs' attor-
neys that municipalities have a strong policy in favor of settling Monell claims in order to
avoid the potential damage, both economic and political, that would result if a jury held them
liable for a section 1983 violation. See supra notes 8-9 and infra notes 326, 330-338 and ac-
companying text. While plaintiffs' attorneys may use the leverage of bifurcated trials to force a
more favorable settlement after establishing individual liability, see infra text accompanying
note 382, the evidence presented at a single trial would allow the jury to determine whether the
Monell claim was meritorious, resulting in a more just verdict.
14. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
15. Id.
16. Discovery bifurcation consists of an order for separate trials (trial bifurcation) com-
bined with a stay on all discovery related to the Monell claim until the final resolution of the
section 1983 claims against individual officers. This more intrusive form of bifurcation is com-
mon in New York City. See infra text accompanying notes 279-280.
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This Article argues that automatic bifurcation of civil rights claims
against a municipality from those against individual police officers is an
abuse of the courts' discretion under Rule 42(b). By effectively barring
litigants' claims that municipalities are responsible for unconstitutional
police practices, bifurcation rulings forestall litigation that could other-
wise curb future constitutional violations by police. Today, public
awareness of excessive use of force by police is high, 17 but the likelihood
of successful criminal prosecutions of those responsible for such force
remains woefully slim. Foreclosing civil rights remedies for systemic po-
lice abuses thus calls into question the essential legitimacy of the rule of
law. Current bifurcation practices not only offend public policy; they
also ignore settled civil rights law. Trial courts that routinely bifurcate
Monell claims misapply current Supreme Court precedent on municipal
liability, and thus contravene the historic purpose of section 1983 itself.
Courts should instead decide bifurcation motions after performing a
case-by-case analysis, granting it only as an exception to the general pre-
sumption favoring a single trial for the resolution of disputes.
Part I of this Article reviews the legislative history of section 1983
and Congress's motivation for creating a federal civil rights remedy
against police lawlessness. This Part begins by describing the white ter-
rorist campaign against the newly freed African-Americans and their ab-
olitionist allies after the Civil War. State officials routinely refused to
protect the citizenship rights and personal safety of victims of this mob
violence; indeed, local law enforcement officials frequently fortified the
ranks of white mobs. 18 In response to this campaign of officially sanc-
tioned violence, consecutive Reconstruction Congresses introduced two
17. In 1967, a national poll indicated that only 6% of adults believed that police brutality
existed in the areas where they lived. Gallup Poll, Aug. 8, 1967, para. 16, available in
Westlaw, Poll Library. By 1991, following the videotaped beating of Rodney King, this
number had risen to 39%. Gallup Poll, Aug. 1991, para. 14, available in Westlaw, Poll Li-
brary. In another recent survey, more than two out of three people were either "very" (22%)
or "fairly" (46%) likely to believe that charges of police brutality were well founded, CBS/
New York Times Poll, Apr. 4, 1991, para. 14, available in Westlaw, Poll Library, compared to
only 36% of respondents who felt that way in 1970, see Gallup/Newsweek Poll, Nov. 1970,
para. 19 (9% "very" and 27% "faily" likely), available in Westlaw, Poll Library. Finally,
63% of respondents in 1991 thought that police brutality was particularly likely to be directed
against people of color. See Gallup/Newsweek Poll, Mar. 18, 1991, para. 13 (21% said a
"very great" and 41% said "considerable" brutality), available in Westlaw, Poll Library. The
chief criminal prosecutor of Los Angeles suggested that "[in the wake of Rodney King and
the Christopher Commission, there may be a heightened public and government awareness" of
police brutality. Leslie Berger, D.A. Sends Police Assault Case to L.A. City Attorney, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at B3.
18. See infra notes 53-60, 65-71 and accompanying text.
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constitutional amendments1 9 and a series of civil rights laws between
1866 and 1871.20 Among these laws was the Enforcement Act of 1871,
which contained in its first section the language now found in section
1983.21 The historical imperative behind this legislation clearly demon-
strates that Congress intended section 1983 to offer victims of official
violence a complete legal remedy.
As Part II explains, however, the Supreme Court's early interpreta-
tion of section 1983 radically departed from the law's original intent,
thus preventing its use to remedy constitutional wrongs until it was res-
urrected by the Court's decisions in the 1960s and 1970s. Shortly after
the 1871 statute became law, and for the next ninety years, the Court's
opinions immobilized section 1983, rendering it ineffective against both
an individual officer's constitutional abuses2 2 and a municipality's role as
a "moving force" in causing those constitutional violations. 2 3 After
describing section 1983's resuscitation in Monroe v. Pape24 and Monell v.
Department of Social Services,2 5 Part II reviews the Court's rulings on
municipal liability during the fifteen years since it decided Monell.26 The
Court's recent holding in City of Canton v. Harris27 confirmed that vic-
tims of police violence may proceed with Monell claims against a munici-
pality that has shown "deliberate indifference" to the proper training and
supervision of its police officers.28 Other post-Monell decisions have rec-
ognized the distinct and important respective roles served by separate
civil rights remedies against municipalities and against individual of-
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified in 1868); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (ratified in
1870).
20. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (protecting all persons' civil rights
and providing means for their vindication); Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14
Stat. 428 (dividing certain Southern states into military districts to be governed by the Union
Army); Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (enforcing voting rights provisions of
Fifteenth Amendment); Enforcement (Ku Klux) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (enforcing
Fourteenth Amendment).
21. See Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. at 13.
22. In 1961, the Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), revived
section 1983 as a remedy against individual police officers. See infra Part II.A. The Court
declined to recognize the statute's applicability against municipalities, however, until 17 years
later, when it decided Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See infra
Part II.B.
23. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
26. See infra Part II.C-D.
27. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
28. See id. at 388 ("We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.").
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ficers. 29 More than a decade ago, the Court explained in Owen v. City of
Independence30 that the purpose of municipal claims went beyond pro-
viding "compensation to the victims of past abuses"; they are necessary
"as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, 31 as "an in-
centive for officials ... to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitu-
tional rights," and to "encourage those in a policymaking position to
institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood
of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. 32 These and
other post-Monell cases have firmly established section 1983 as a federal
remedy against a municipality that follows a custom or practice of delib-
erate indifference to constitutional abuses by members of its police force.
Parts III and IV explain the mechanics of the bifurcation procedure
and argue that it represents an "end-around" method for avoiding
Supreme Court law upholding section 1983 municipal liability. Part III
describes the specifications of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b),
which require courts to consider-before deciding to bifurcate any
case-whether the procedure will further convenience while preventing
prejudice and economic hardship to any party. Routine bifurcation of
civil rights cases violates the principle that judicial discretion under Rule
42(b) must be informed by reasoned judgment and contravenes the gen-
eral policy in favor of unified trials.
Part IV analyzes the bifurcation barrier to a civil rights litigant's
recovery against a municipal defendant. It begins with a review of the
Supreme Court's 1986 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Heller,33 the
primary legal authority used to justify bifurcation, and criticizes lower
courts' misplaced reliance on that decision's dicta.34 Although the case
has been overlooked by most scholars, 35 Justice Stevens's dissent fore-
29. See infra Part II.C-D; see also infra note 335 and note 384 and accompanying text.
30. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
31. Id. at 651.
32. Id. at 652.
33. 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
34. See infra notes 243-257 and accompanying text.
35. Since the Supreme Court decided Heller in 1986, section 1983 has generated over 100
law review articles concerning municipal liability. Search of Westlaw, JLR Library (Mar. 19,
1993). Only a scant few of these, however, have analyzed Heller's potential importance. Pro-
fessor Barbara Kritchevsky provided an extensive analysis of Heller, criticizing the decision for
the confusion it engendered in establishing section 1983's state of mind requirement. See Bar-
bara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in Section 1983
Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Rlv. 417, 422 (1992). She argued in favor
of "premising liability on objective criteria for all situations," id., and concluded that Heller
does not preclude municipal liability whenever the individual officer is exonerated, id. at 454-
59. Martin Schwartz and John Kirklin also criticized an absolute reading of Heller that would
require dismissal of claims against the municipality whenever the individual officer is not
March 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
warned that a literal reading of the Court's per curiam opinion in Heller
might lead to an "unprecedented, ill-considered, and far reaching" rul-
ing, one that would become "a tactical weapon of great value" for munic-
ipal defendants. 36 Since Heller was decided, an increasing number of
trial courts are improperly accepting municipalities' arguments that Hel-
ler supports routine bifurcation of civil rights claims and bars a Monell
claim unless a jury first determines that a police officer is individually
liable.3 7 This barrier is augmented by a trend in some federal courts of
applying Rule 42(b) to the discovery stage.38 The resulting inability to
conduct discovery on the Monell claim severely hampers a plaintiff's ca-
pacity to vigorously oppose dismissal of that claim should the individual
officer be vindicated. When such discovery produces evidence that a mu-
nicipality's unconstitutional practice caused a plaintiff's injury, on the
other hand, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in arguing that the Monell
claim must proceed for redress of that practice, notwithstanding the ab-
solution of individual officers.
Part IV goes on to explain that the separate, conditional considera-
tion of municipal and individual claims relating to police violence
presents a formidable barrier to plaintiffs' recoveries for constitutional
violations. Regardless of whether Monell discovery is permitted, claims
against individual officers remain difficult to prove. Most police violence
is witnessed only by other officers, who are unwilling to testify for plain-
tiffs. 39 In addition, most jurors favor the police. 4° This pro-police bias
not only bestows automatic credibility upon defendant officers' testi-
mony; it also favors absolving individual police officers, especially those
found liable. 1 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 7.6, at 346 (2d ed. 1991). For other commentaries that em-
phasize the Heller decision, see Mark R. Brown, Accountability in Government and Section
1983, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 53, 122 (1991) (arguing that "the waters [of supervisory liability]
are muddied" following Heller), and Eric S. Connuck, Constitutional Law: The Viability of
Section 1983 Actions in Response to Police Misconduct, 1990 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 747, 771-72
(describing "the litigation strategy for defendants" provided by Heller; arguing that "the im-
pact of Heller is likely to be significant").
36. Heller, 475 U.S. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. This Article criticizes lower courts' interpretation of Heller as requiring dismissal of
Monell claims when individual liability is not established. The "Heller problem" exists inde-
pendently of the bifurcation problem. Heller requires dismissal of a Monell claim when the
jury's verdict indicates that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional injury. A trial court can
make this determination only by submitting a special jury interrogatory seeking this informa-
tion. Trial courts improperly construe Heller when they believe dismissal is required based
solely on a jury's general verdict in the officer's favor. See infra notes 230-257 and accompany-
ing text.
38. See infra notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
39. See infra Part IV.B.2.
40. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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who were simply following department (i.e., municipal) policy. When
courts adopt an expansive view of Heller and fail to inquire whether the
jury found a constitutional injury, the likely jury verdict for the individ-
ual officer becomes a complete defense to the Monell claims that follow.
Bifurcation of civil rights claims is thus a nearly infallible defense
strategy.
Presenting interviews with judges and attorneys throughout the
country who are familiar with the bifurcation trend, Part V provides evi-
dence of this practice in several urban jurisdictions and describes its im-
pact on civil rights plaintiffs. 41 Despite its importance to civil rights
plaintiffs and defendants, scholars have not written about bifurcation in
these cases, and evidence of its occurrence is rarely reflected in published
opinions. This Part presents the relatively few written decisions,42 be-
cause trial and discovery bifurcation rulings are generally delivered
orally and are usually not published. The interviews document the
trend's prevalence in New York, Los Angeles, and Boston.
This Article concludes that bifurcation rulings will remain a troub-
ling and highly sensitive issue in section 1983 litigation until the Supreme
Court revisits Heller and clarifies the law. While the circumstances may
occasionally call for separate proceedings against individual and munici-
pal defendants,4 3 the routine granting of bifurcation undermines civil
rights claimants' challenges to unconstitutional practices maintained by
municipalities. Bifurcation rulings often preclude civil rights litigants
from presenting evidence that a municipality's failure to train, supervise,
or discipline its police force caused a deprivation of constitutional rights.
Moreover, when a court's bifurcation order defers discovery on a Monell
claim, the municipality's unconstitutional practices may never face judi-
cial and public scrutiny.
Consequently, under either bifurcation practice, municipalities that
fail to train, supervise, or discipline their police forces have less incentive
to implement reforms, and are likely to continue their illegal practices.
Because Monell claims provide the opportunity to eliminate a municipal-
ity's perceived or real condonation of police violence, they must not be
obstructed by such artificial barriers as bifurcation. Permitting Monell
claims to be discovered by plaintiffs and evaluated by juries fulfills the
41. Part V contains interviews with practicing attorneys who are familiar with bifurca-
tion of Monell claims for trial (in Los Angeles and Boston) and discovery (in New York),
interviews with attorneys who have not faced bifurcation motions, and interviews with federal
judges who have decided such motions.
42. See infra notes 276, 289-302 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 385 and accompanying text.
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original intent behind section 1983, as Congress articulated almost one
hundred and tWenty-five years ago.
I. The Historical Imperative Behind Section 1983
The significance of a court's bifurcation order severing a section
1983 Monell claim against a municipality from a civil rights claim
against an individual law enforcement official is best understood upon
consideration of section 1983's historical purposes and the legislative in-
tent behind the provision. Congress included the language of today's sec-
tion 1983 in the Enforcement Act of 1871, providing citizens a federal
civil rights remedy against local officials that deprived them of a constitu-
tional right, because "the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was
not available in practice." 44 More specifically, this "Ku Klux" legisla-
tion targeted state and local law enforcement officials that members of
Congress believed to be either participating directly in violence against
African-Americans and other citizens who supported Reconstruction
policy or failing to protect these citizens' constitutional rights from at-
tacks by white supremacy groups.45 This history illuminates both the
modem law of section 1983 liability and the Supreme Court's application
of that law in Monell. Because the Reconstruction Congress wanted to
provide a complete federal remedy against local law enforcement's in-
volvement in racist violence, it would certainly have approved the use of
section 1983 to target not only the individual officers that directed unlaw-
ful violence against citizens, but also any municipality that showed "de-
liberate indifference" to whether its officials engaged in such an illegal
practice.46
The post-Civil War Reconstruction period marked a fundamental
shift in the federal government's role in protecting African-Americans'
newly won rights of freedom and citizenship. Before the War, traditional
concepts of federalism prevented the federal government from interfering
with the judgments of states and localities as to what legal rights, if any,
African-Americans enjoyed. 47 Consequently, in virtually every jurisdic-
tion throughout the United States, and most prominently in those states
44. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
45. See infra Part I.B.
46. See infra notes 170-177 and accompanying text (discussing City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
47. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (denying African-Ameri-
cans the right to sue as state citizens and holding, inter alia, that states were not empowered to
grant African-Americans national citizenship rights or any other right considered national in
scope); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (striking down a Penn-
sylvania kidnapping law aimed at prosecuting those engaged in "slave-stealing" and the recap-
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where slavery still existed, the states rights doctrine had legitimated the
treatment of African-Americans as "a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who ... had no rights... but such as those who held the power
and the Government might choose to grant them."' 48 State and local
laws and practices withheld from African-Americans the most funda-
mental freedoms, including "a status in court," where they might "com-
plain of wrong" against those who deprived them of personal and
property rights.49
As the South's wartime defeat became imminent, Congress sought
to abolish slavery and to grant African-Americans the right of "universal
freedom. '50 The South's violent resistance to the passage of the Thir-
teenth Amendment provided Congress with the legal impetus and moral
determination to introduce further legislation for the purpose of giving
"practical effect, life, vigor, and enforcement" 51 to the Amendment's
"declar[ation] that all persons in the United States should be free." 52
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Upon returning to session in December 1865, legislators reviewed
overwhelming evidence that returning soldiers and former slaveowners in
the South were engaging in a pattern of brutal assaults and killings of
African-Americans celebrating their post-War emancipation. 53 Despite
turing of slaves who had escaped from other states because it interfered with the national
property rights of slaveowners).
48. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05.
49. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harlan). See
generally Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibi-
tion Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13-32 (1990)
[hereinafter Colbert, Challenging the Challenge] (reviewing colonial and postrevolutionary
laws that denied African-Americans the rights to sue and to testify against white people).
50. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
51. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
52. Id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
53. Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois described one phase of the post-War violence as "a labor war, an
attempt on the part of impoverished capitalists and landholders to force laborers to work on
the capitalist's own terms." W.E. BURGHARDT Du BOiS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA 670 (Russell & Russell 1956) (1935); see also id. at 670-74 (describing the course of
the violence). Professor Eric Foner agreed that the post-War violence was mainly the result of
whites' efforts to reestablish the master-slave labor relationship. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUC-
TION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 120-21 (1988). Foner added that
returning Confederate soldiers often constituted the local "police forces as well as state mili-
tias" and "frequently terrorized the black population." Id. at 203; see also GEORGE C. RABLE,
BUT THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUC-
TION 20 (1984). Senator Henry Wilson described the post-War violence as "years of rebel rule
[in which] more lashings, more scourgings, and more maimings of the black race were perpetu-
ated than during any two years since the suppression of the rebellion." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 254 (1871).
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the blatant violence, most local law enforcement officials simply refused
to arrest or prosecute white offenders for their racially motivated crimes;
they shared a belief that African-Americans had no right to legal protec-
tion from whites' violence. 54 One historian characterized the post-War
violence as "reflect[ing] whites' determination to define in their own way
the meaning of freedom and their determined resistance to blacks' efforts
to establish their autonomy. '55 Congress responded by proposing and
enacting, over President Andrew Johnson's veto, 56 the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.57 This statute guaranteed African-Americans the status of citi-
zenship and federal enforcement of "the same [civil] right[s] ... as [were]
enjoyed by white citizens" 58 by empowering the federal government to
criminally prosecute any person who deprived a citizen of her civil rights
by actions "under color of any law."' 59 In creating this "under color of
law" federal remedy, Congress also intended to punish the elected offi-
cials that had enacted a series of "Black Codes" in every former Confed-
erate state, the purpose of which was to saddle African-Americans with
"onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights.., to such
an extent that their freedom was of little value." 6
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 marked the beginning of
the new federalism. 6' The Act empowered the federal government to
54. CONG. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1866)
(reporting the post-War failure of local and state officials in the South to enforce the criminal
laws when the victim was African-American or was viewed as a unionist). Foner explained
that law enforcement officials refused to prosecute white offenders because to do so would have
been "unpopular and dangerous." FONER, supra note 53, at 204. Donald Nieman stated that
"because Southern whites viewed violence as an acceptable means of labor and race control,
white sheriffs, magistrates, judges, and jurors often proved unwilling to mete out justice to
whites who committed acts of violence against freedmen." DONALD G. NIEMAN, To SET THE
LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-
1868, at 25 (1979). In some instances, southern law enforcement officials joined in white mob
violence against African-Americans. George Rable described an incident in 1866 in which
New Orleans police, "instead of restoring order .... joined their colleagues and the white mob
in assaulting blacks. The police... bec[a]me an indistinguishable part of the mob .... [T]hey
chased, beat and shot any black in sight... and then stood by while citizens beat the wounded
men." RABLE, supra note 53, at 52.
55. FONER, supra note 53, at 120.
56. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-81 (1866) (Johnson's veto message); id. at
1809, 1861 (Senate and House votes overriding Johnson's veto).
57. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
58. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
59. Id. § 2, 14 Stat. at 27; see also id. § 4, 14 Stat. at 28 (requiring federal prosecutors and
courts to enforce the Act).
60. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
61. During the nine years that followed the passage of the 1866 Act, Congress introduced
and presided over the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and passed
major civil rights legislation, thereby establishing and reinforcing the federal government's role
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protect citizens' rights whenever a state's law enforcement officials and
legal apparatus proved unwilling or incapable of doing S0.62 As one sup-
portive senator aptly described it: "I admit that this species of legislation
is absolutely revolutionary. But are we not in the midst of revolution?" 63
B. The Enforcement Act of 1871
Five years later, in response to testimonial evidence of different and
in some ways more extreme southern violence and official lawlessness,
the forty-second Congress passed the predecessor to section 1983 as part
of the Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the "Ku Klux" Act.64
Although the post-War brutality of individual whites and returning Con-
federate soldiers had largely been spontaneous, 65 the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 sparked civilian and government offi-
cials to join in concerted violent activity directed at African-American
organizations and prominent African-American and white supporters of
Reconstruction policy. 66
as the ultimate protector of citizens' civil rights. See statutes cited supra note 20; Reconstruc-
tion Act of 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (defining the process by which Southern states were required
to draw up and ratify new state constitutions); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335
(forbidding racial discrimination in the use of public accommodations).
62. Sections 2 and 4 of the 1866 Act empowered and required federal prosecutors to
bring criminal charges against those who violated the rights created in the Act by actions
under color of law. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 2, 14 Stat. at 27, 28. Moreover, section 3
allowed citizens "who [were] denied or [could not] enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of
the State or locality ... the rights secured to them by the first section" of the Act to bring their
cases in or remove them to federal district court. Id. § 3, 14 Stat. at 27. Federal courts retain
original jurisdiction in civil rights cases today under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) (1988).
63. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. Morrill).
64. Enforcement (Ku Klux) Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
65. Dr. Du Bois described the lawlessness between 1868 and 1871 as "the rise of a new
doctrine of race hatred." Du Bois, supra note 53, at 670. The white supremacists' systematic
violence differed from the post-War terror: "A lawlessness which, in 1865-1868, was still spas-
modic and episodic, now became organized, and its real underlying industrial causes obscured
by political excuses and racial hatred. Using a technique of mass and midnight murder, the
South began widely organized aggression upon the Negroes." Id. at 674.
66. As Professor Foner described, African-Americans' political activity in 1867 included
membership in political groups such as the Union League, "the political voice of impoverished
freedmen." FONER, supra note 53, at 283. The Union League's main function consisted of
political education, which included teaching African-Americans about their new rights to vote,
to receive a public education, to serve on juries, and to seek legal protection from whites'
violence. Id. at 284. In 1867 and 1868, African-American and white Republican officials were
specifically targeted for white mobs' violence, as were African-Americans who exercised their
voting rights. Id. at 425-27. White supremacy groups like the Ku Klux Klan also focused on
African-Americans that had achieved "a modicum of economic success," id. at 429, and those
who were viewed as "impudent negroes" because they refused to act like they had as slaves, id.
at 430.
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During the next three years, white supremacy groups such as the
Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camilia, and the White Broth-
erhood engaged in an unparalleled "wave of counterrevolutionary terror
... over large parts of the South."' 67 Though these groups did not pos-
sess a "well-organized structure," they shared a "unity of purpose and
common tactics."' 68 As Professor Eric Foner explained, "The violence of
1869-71 etched the Klan permanently in the folk memory of the black
community. ' 69 President Ulysses S. Grant responded to the ensuing na-
tional crisis by urging Congress to draft legislation that would provide a
federal remedy to protect those whose "life and property [was] inse-
cure."' 70 In his message to Congress opening the debate on the 1871 Act,
the President recognized state and local law enforcement's failure to pro-
tect the citizenry: "That the power to correct these evils is beyond the
control of the State authorities I do not doubt .... I urgently recom-
mend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually
secure life, liberty and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts
of the United States."'
The bill's proponents modeled its civil rights remedy after the lan-
guage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act's criminal provision.72 Little contro-
67. Id. at 425.
68. Id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text. Dr. Du Bois described the forma-
tion of the Ku Klux Klan as having "provided a new unity [for white supremacists] through
emphasizing the importance of race." Du Bois, supra note 53, at 680.
69. FONER, supra note 53, at 443. "In effect, the Klan was a military force serving the
interests of the Democratic Party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration
of white supremacy." Id. at 425. Professor Foner noted that the Klan's leadership included
the "very best citizens" living in the South, id. at 433, including "planters, merchants, lawyers
and even ministers," id. at 432. Local Klan groups targeted African-American educational
and religious institutions for destruction and attacked individual office holders, voters, prop-
erty owners, and other respected members of African-American communities. Id. at 425-33.
For a detailed account of the Klan's systematic attacks on African-Americans and others who
appeared to represent federal reconstruction policy, see ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TER-
ROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971). The
Klan also took aim at white Republican Party officials and successfully devastated Republican
organizations in several states during this period. FONER, supra note 53, at 427, 442.
70. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1817).
71. Id. (noting that existing statutes provided the executive branch with insufficient
power to address the crisis).
72. Congressman Samuel Shellabarger explained the origins of the 1871 Act's remedy:
The model for it will be found in the second section of the act of April 9, 1866,
known as the "civil rights act." . . . This section of this bill, on the same state of
facts, not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have
been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any
of them may be deprived of rights ....
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 68 (1871).
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versy accompanied passage of this civil remedy,73 undoubtedly because
the legislators recognized it served the same purpose as its criminal coun-
terpart. Each sought to provide federal protection for those who had
been deprived of a constitutional right by a "person" acting under color
of law. Moreover, each was passed as a direct response to law enforce-
ment officials' failure to curb the violent Southern response to the re-
cently ratified constitutional amendments.
As evidenced by Congress's debate on the 1871 Act, the legislators
were fully aware of the pervasive official lawlessness accompanying the
white supremacists' violence, which by 1871 had spread throughout most
of the South.74 Congressman Charles Buckley described the situation in
many southern communities: "Crimes are fearfully common," the
"value of human life ...disregarded," and "[m]urderers go unpun-
ished."' 75 "Terrorism reign[ed]" in this atmosphere.76 Congressman
John Beatty echoed the sentiment of many colleagues when he inveighed
against the southern states for making "no successful effort to bring the
guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and
innocent."'77
73. Senator George Edmunds, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the
time, expressed a commonly held belief about the proposed civil remedy:
[It] is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured by the
Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State law or under
color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights
bill [of 1866], which have since become a part of the Constitution.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871); see also id. app. at 68 (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger) (defending the Act as clearly constitutional).
74. See, e-g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 78 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Perry) ("Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not...."); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174
(1961) (describing and quoting from a 600-page report "dealing with the activities of the
Klan" and the failure of certain Southern states to enforce laws against them compiled by a
Joint Select Committee of Congress).
75. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 190 (1871).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 428. Similarly, Missouri Representative Harrison Havens denounced the "star-
tling crimes and cruel barbarisms" that "proceed[ed] without molestation or interference" and
"occur[ed] every hour, carrying fear and terror to the homes of thousands." Id. app. at 271.
He concluded that there was neither "hope nor pretense of protection from the local govern-
ments." Id. A Congressman from Kansas also used powerful language to describe the official
lawlessness:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and ban-
ishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administra-
tors have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective.
Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the
worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice.
Id. at 374 (statement of Rep. Lowe). Instead of vigorously enforcing local criminal laws, local
administrations gave immunity to criminals; "the records of the public tribunals are searched
in vain for any evidence of effective redress." Id.; see also id. app. at 166-67 (statement of Rep.
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Some Members of Congress condemned state law enforcement offi-
cials for more than mere passivity in the face of white supremacists' vio-
lence; they charged that some had initiated and participated in brutal
attacks upon both Black and white Republican Party officials and voters.
One of the earliest such attacks occurred in 1868 in Camilla, Georgia,
where the local sheriff led a force of 400 armed whites against a Black
election parade, killing twelve of the marchers. 78 Congressman James
Platt of Virginia described police-led brutality during a Republican cam-
paign rally held in his district, "one of the quietest and best reconstructed
in the South": 79
[S]uddenly, without provocation or warning, a policeman, or at least a
man in the uniform of a policeman, drew a pistol and deliberately put a
bullet through the body of a quiet and inoffensive colored man stand-
ing near him. Immediately an indiscriminate and rapid firing com-
menced .... For at least five minutes a steady fire was poured into the
retreating crowd .... [T]he panic was increased by the discovery that
the police force was in full sympathy with the murderers, and were
themselves emptying their revolvers into the terrified and struggling
mass of human beings who were frantically striving to get beyond their
range. 8
Legislators recognized the need for a federal civil rights remedy to
deter white terrorism. Southern Governors and other prominent whites
remained silent, helpless to protect citizens' rights, because "the most
respectable citizens" 81 belonged to white hate groups.82 Congressman
Horace Maynard referred to Tennessee Governor Senter's charge "that
the men who by their official position were clothed with power to prevent
and repress these troubles were in complicity with the organized, armed,
and disguised authors of them."' 83 Missouri Senator Havens similarly ex-
plained local authorities' inability or unwillingness to protect citizens:
In many cases the local officers are in sympathy with the marauders,
and in others they are themselves members of their organization; and
Williams) (describing violence against "loyal Republicans" in North Carolina, and bemoaning
that "in no single case were the perpetrators of these crimes brought to justice, but the...
officers ... connived and winked at these hellish atrocities").
78. Du Bois, supra note 53, at 677; FONER, supra note 53, at 342.
79. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 184 (1871).
80. Id. app. at 184-85. Representative Platt also reported that "from that day to this no
steps have been taken to punish or even discover the murderers. .... No investigation was ever
ordered by the Democratic city authorities, who are charged with the maintenance of peace
and the enforcement of the laws in that city .... " Id. app. at 185.
81. FONER, supra note 53, at 432 (quoting a Bureau of Freedmen agent's description of
the Ku Klux Klan's leadership).
82. Id. at 433. For additional sources regarding the Klan's leadership, see id. at 432-33
nn.36-37.
83. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 309 (1871).
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so, for all the many hundred acts of violence and outrage committed
by these bands, not a single man has been brought to punishment, and
the evil is growing and spreading every hour.84
Until Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1871, therefore,
white offenders had little fear of prosecution for their crimes 5 because
"[m]uch Klan activity took place in those Democratic counties where
local officials either belonged to the organization or refused to take action
against it."'86 Congressman Austin Blair emphasized the near impossibil-
ity of punishing white offenders due to the close connection between state
law enforcement officials and the Klan: "The Klans are powerful enough
to defy the State authorities. In many instances they are the State au-
thorities .... To wait until the State calls for assistance to suppress the
disorders is to wait ... for a voice from the grave."'8 7
The historical context, the debate in Congress, and the statements of
the President and other interested parties reviewed here all clearly
demonstrate that the motivation for enacting section 1983's federal civil
rights remedy against persons acting under color of law or custom was
identical to that which drove the passage of previous civil rights laws and
constitutional amendments during the short-lived Reconstruction period:
federal action was necessary to counter the officially condoned and per-
petrated white "reign of terror" that sought to reverse the legal gains of
African-Americans from post-War federal policy.
84. Id. app. at 271.
85. In 1870, Congress passed federal criminal legislation and authorized the creation of a
Department of Justice to prosecute cases in which citizens' civil and political rights had been
violated. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 2, 9, 12, 16 Stat. 140, 140, 142, 143. Beginning
in 1871, the Justice Department pursued a vigorous and highly successful policy of prosecuting
Klan violence. For a thorough review of federal prosecutors' successes in the South between
1871 and 1873, see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 81-112
(1985).
86. FONER, supra note 53, at 434; see also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 85, at 55 (explain-
ing that law enforcement officials failed to respond either because they were afraid or because
they were "members of the Klan and participated in their crimes").
87. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 72 (1871). Senator Wilson of Massachu-
setts quoted General Thomas K. Smith, Commander of the Southern District of Alabama, as
stating that "the ministers of the law themselves were too often desperadoes and engaged in the
perpetration of the very crime they are sent forth to prohibit or punish." Id. app. at 255; see
also id. app. at 312 (statement of Rep. Burchard) ("The civil authorities are unable or unwill-
ing to repress these outrages. Lawless violence and widespread terrorism prevent the mainte-
nance of order and interrupt the administration of impartial justice through the courts."); id.
app. at 147 (statement of Rep. Shanks) (describing the political effects of Klan violence in
Kentucky: "This Legislature is palsied because the men who compose that Legislature are
held in subjection by [the Klan].").
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II. Judicial Construction of Section 1983
Following swiftly on the heels of Reconstruction, southern whites
regained political power.88 Supreme Court decisions quickly reinstated
the "states rights" doctrine by striking down or diluting most of the re-
cently passed civil rights protections. 89 The Court's narrow interpreta-
tions forestalled section 1983's capacity as an effective civil rights remedy
for nearly ninety years. In 1961, however, as the groundswell of the Sec-
ond Reconstruction period was gathering force,90 the Court partially re-
vived section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.9I
88. Professor Foner defines the Reconstruction period as lasting from 1863 until 1877.
FONER, supra note 53, at xxvii. Foner noted, however, that the Southern Democratic Party
had regained political control of all but three Southern states by the time of the 1876 presiden-
tial election. Id. at 511. Southern Democrats achieved full power the following year after
President Hayes ordered federal troops to leave the South. Id. at 569. The judicial rollback
also began some years earlier than 1877, as the Supreme Court began to eviscerate the substan-
tial legislative accomplishments of Reconstruction in 1872. See infra note 89.
89. The Court's assault on the new civil rights legislation began with the case of Blyew v.
United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1872) (narrowly interpreting the 1866 Act's federal
jurisdiction provisions in situations in which a state failed to prosecute the alleged offenders),
and continued in The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873) (limiting federal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause to national
citizenship rights), United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1876) (affirming the reversal
of white defendants' convictions for racially motivated violence under the 1866 and 1870 Civil
Rights Acts), Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 313-14 (1880) (severely restricting use of federal
jurisdiction provisions), Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 392-93 (1881) (establishing a pre-
sumption that state courts treat as inoperative any state laws and state constitutional provi-
sions that are inconsistent with and predate the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby saddling
plaintiffs with a heavy burden to prove equal protection violation), United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (ruling criminal section of 1871 Act unconstitutional), and The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (ruling that the 1875 Act's public accommodations antidis-
crimination provision was unconstitutional). For a discussion of these cases, see Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge, supra note 49, at 56-61, 66-74.
90. The term and analogy regarding Reconstruction was first suggested by Professor
Vann Woodward. See C. Vann Woodward, From the First Reconstruction to the Second,
HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1965, at 127. Following the Supreme Court's 1954 holding in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that segregation of public schools violated the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, a civil rights movement reawakened the na-
tion's conscience and forced the federal government to reassert its interventionist role as a
guarantor of federal rights. See Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 432-34 (1967). For detailed accounts of the events leading up to the
Second Reconstruction, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988), RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976),
and JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965
(1987).
91. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
[Vol. 44
BIFURCATION IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
A. Monroe v. Pape
The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe revitalized section 1983's
role as a federal civil remedy against individual police officers that de-
prive citizens of their constitutional rights. Prior to Monroe, and during
most of section 1983's statutory life, the Court had narrowly circum-
scribed when a police officer acted "under color of any ... statute,...
custom or usage."'92 Consequently, the Court's "under color of law" rul-
ings had required a litigant to establish that the state had authorized an
official's unlawful act under state law, state custom, or state usage. Ab-
sent evidence of state authorization, the courts considered a police of-
ficer's unconstitutional actions to be irrelevant to section 1983 liability.9 3
Since a state would rarely authorize a police officer to engage in the un-
lawful use of excessive force or to illegally violate a citizen's constitu-
tional rights, however, the Supreme Court's interpretation precluded
section 1983 remedies for victims of constitutional injuries; the injured
parties' only recourse was to rely upon the states' common-law remedies.
The Monroe Court relied heavily on the nearly century-old legisla-
tive history of section 1983, detailing "the activities of the Klan and the
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Justice Frankfurter described the statute's history in the
courts in his dissenting opinion in Monroe: "During the seventy years which followed [section
1983's passage,]... the 'under color' provisions... uniformly involved action taken either in
strict pursuance of some specific command of state law or within the scope of executive discre-
tion in the administration of state laws." 365 U.S. at 212-13 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted). This limited interpretation of the "under color" language meant that police
officers and other officials were not subject to federal jurisdiction for actions that deprived
citizens of their constitutional rights. Beginning with the Court's opinion in United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), however, judicial interpretation of the "under color" clause be-
gan to change. In Classic, the Court held that a state official's alteration of voting ballots was
an act committed "under color" of state law even though it was not authorized by any state
statute or executive command. Id. at 325; see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107
(1945) (allowing prosecution under predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 242 of state officers who beat an
African-American prisoner to death, so long as the prosecution proved specific intent to de-
prive a citizen of a federal right); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1951) (hold-
ing that a "special" police officer cloaked with state authority was acting under color of law
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242 when he forcibly obtained confessions from larceny suspects).
Courts interpret the "under color of law" requirement identically for section 1983 and 18
U.S.C. § 242. See, eg., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85; Dandridge v. Police Dep't, 566 F. Supp.
152, 154 (E.D. Va. 1983); United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F.
Supp. 330, 346 (E.D. La. 1965).
93. From 1871 until Classic in 1941, the Court's decisions limited the meaning of "under
color of law" in cases involving state agents other than law enforcement officials. See, e.g.,
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244-46 (1931) (holding that actions of
state auditor and treasurer may be state action when they are done on behalf of and benefit the
state); Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904) (holding unauthorized acts of state
construction officials are not state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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inability of the State governments to cope with it."'94 The Court identi-
fied law enforcement officials' failure to protect citizens and enforce the
law as "the nub of the difficulty" addressed by the post-War legislation, 95
and highlighted Congress's rationale for passing section 1983: though
state common-law remedies were available "in theory,"' a federal remedy
was necessary for those situations in which "by reason of prejudice, pas-
sion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced
and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and im-
munities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by
the state agencies." '96
The Supreme Court decided in Monroe to reject the narrow defini-
tion of the term "under color of law" that had rendered section 1983
ineffective for the preceding ninety years. Following Monroe, litigants
could use section 1983 to remedy a constitutional injury inflicted by a
police officer whose " '[m]isuse of power possessed by virtue of state law
[was] made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the
authority of state law.' ,,97
Nevertheless, the Monroe Court refused to allow litigants to pursue
civil rights actions against a municipality whose custom or usage caused
the constitutional abuse. After reviewing the forty-second Congress's
"vigorous debate" over the drafting and passage of the 1871 Act, the
Court concluded that Congress had not intended municipalities to be
considered "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.98 The Court
ascribed great significance to Congress's rejection of a proposed addition
to the Act that had been introduced by Senator Sherman of Ohio: the
first version of the amendment would have imposed civil liability upon
"the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish" for acts committed to
deprive citizens of their civil rights;99 in the revised amendment, liability
would have shifted to the municipality whenever a judgment against the
individuals that committed the violence went unsatisfied. °° Congress's
rejection of the "Sherman Amendment," combined with its decision to
exclude any reference to municipal liability in the final version of the
statute, 10' convinced the Court that Congress's "response... to ma[king]
94. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174.
95. Id. at 176.
96. Id. at 180.
97. Id. at 184 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326).
98. Id. at 191.
99. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
100. See id. at 749.
101. Although no part of the 1871 Act refers to municipalities, section 6 provides for the
liability of "any person or persons, having knowledge that any" of the wrongs named in sec-
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municipalities liable ... was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that
the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."'' 0 2
In deciding Monroe, the Court expressly declined to address the.
"policy considerations" of immunizing municipalities from liability even
when their policies or customs were responsible for causing a constitu-
tional injury.103 Almost two decades would pass before the Court would
be persuaded to consider these policy implications and to revisit the legis-
lative record left by the forty-second Congress concerning municipalities'
liability under section 1983.
B. Monell v. Department of Social Services
In the 1978 case of Monell v. Department of Social Services, °4 the
Supreme Court overruled Monroe's finding that Congress had sought to
exclude municipalities from section 1983 liability and held that Congress
did in fact intend local governments to be treated as "persons" within the
statute's coverage.10 5
The Court's reversal followed from a careful review of the "infer-
ence" that it had "drawn [in Monroe] from Congress' rejection of the
'Sherman Amendment'" to the 1871 Act.10 6 The Court began its his-
torical analysis by noting that the Sherman Amendment had been pro-
posed not as an amendment to the uncontroversial section 1983, but
"was to be added as section 7 at the end of the bill."'' 0 7 Senator Sher-
man's original amendment was undoubtedly aimed at holding supporters
and leaders of the Klan, who were "men of property,"' 0 8 personally and
directly "responsible for Ku Klux Klan damage."'1 9 When the House
objected to holding private property owners accountable for Klan vio-
lence, members of a conference committee suggested placing liability on
the public "county, city, or parish" for damage caused by persons "riot-
tion 2 were being committed if they had "power to prevent or aid in preventing" the wrong but
neglected to do so. Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988)).
102. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
103. Id. ("It is said that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability because
... municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause those
defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level. We do not reach those policy
considerations." (footnotes omitted)).
104. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
105. Id. at 700-01. See generally Karen M. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the
Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409 (1978).
106. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664.
107. Id. at 666.
108. FONER, supra note 53, at 433.
109. Id. at 443.
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ously and tumultuously assembled."' 110 Congress rejected the commit-
tee's revised Sherman Amendment, reasoned the Monell Court, because
the legislators were unwilling to impose such general liability on a munic-
ipality without regard for "whether or not it had notice of the impending
riot, whether or not the municipality was authorized to exercise a police
power, whether or not it exerted all reasonable efforts to stop the riot,
and whether or not the rioters were caught and punished."' Legisla-
tors vigorously opposed extending the federal government's power to af-
firmatively require that local municipalities protect the general public;
such an extension would have exposed municipalities to potential liability
for every breach of public safety. 1 2 The Monell Court concluded that
Congress rejected the Sherman Amendment because it had opposed em-
powering the federal government to impose a new legal duty on munici-
palities. As such, the Court found that the amendment's rejection failed
to resolve whether municipalities could be liable under section 1983 for
constitutional injuries. 113
The Court accordingly considered whether section 1983's reference
to "persons" covered municipalities as well as natural persons and found
that "Congress, in enacting ... [the statute], intended to give a broad
remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights."' 14 Reconstruc-
tion legislators had urged that section 1983 be construed "liberally" and
with "the largest latitude" that would be consistent with the Act's reme-
dial purpose to "aid [in] the preservation of human liberty and human
rights.' 15 Applying this liberal construction to the language of section
1983, the Court declared that "it beggars reason to suppose that Con-
gress would have exempted municipalities from suit."' 1 6
110. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666-67.
111. Id. at 668.
112. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871) (statement of Rep. Blair); id.
at 804 (statement of Rep. Poland), quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190. Declaring that this
inference formed the "sole basis" for the Monroe Court's decision, the Monell Court distin-
guished Congress's disapproval of the Sherman Amendment. The Court concluded that Con-
gress rejected the Sherman Amendment because it would have imposed a legal duty upon
municipalities to "keep the peace [even] if those corporations were neither so obligated nor so
authorized by their slate charters." Monell, 436 U.S. at 668. Such a view, said the Court, was
not inconsistent with "congressional creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corpo-
rations that infringed federal rights." Id. at 669.
113. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669.
114. Id. at 685.
115. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. at 68 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Shellabarger).
116. Monell, 436 U.S. at 687 (discussing the illogic of an analogous interpretation of the
Takings Clause to exempt takings by municipalities).
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The Supreme Court's holding in Monell did not condition a local
government's possible liability upon any initial determination that a mu-
nicipal official or agent had deprived the litigant of a constitutional
right."t 7 Instead, the Court stressed that the "touchstone" for exposing a
municipality to section 1983 liability was "an allegation that official pol-
icy [or custom]"" 8 had "cause[d] an employee to violate another's con-
stitutional rights."" 9 Though it did not delineate "the full contours of
municipal liability,"' 20 the Court's opinion left little doubt that when the
"execution of a government's policy or custom... inflicts the injury...
the government as an entity is responsible under section 1983."121
While Monell established a litigant's right to sue a municipality for a
civil rights violation under section 1983, the Court chose to "leave fur-
ther development of this action to another day."' 122 Two years later, in
Owen v. City of Independence,123 the Court elaborated on the public pol-
icy considerations underlying municipal liability.
C. Owen v. City of Independence
In Owen, the Court addressed one of the unanswered questions left
by its decision in Monell: whether a municipality was entitled to use the
defense of official immunity in litigating a section 1983 suit. Ruling that
municipalities are not immune from section 1983 liability, 24 the Court
further elaborated on the Reconstruction Congress's motivations in pass-
ing the statute. 125 Even more importantly, the Court analyzed the strong
public policy rationales for ensuring that municipalities not escape legal
accountability when their policies or customs have been found to cause
117. Indeed, the Court rejected the argument that a municipality could be held liable
under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior-the mere fact that an employee de-
prived a citizen of a constitutional right does not make the municipality liable under section
1983. Id. at 691.
118. Id. at 690.
119. Id. at 692.
120. Id. at 695.
121. Id. at 694.
122. Id. at 695.
123. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
124. Id. at 638. By contrast, the Court refused to extend section 1983 liability to states or
state officials acting in their official capacities in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Although the Will Court declined to rely on the public policy considera-
tions underlying Monell and Owen, its decision turned on issues of common-law immunity,
federalism, and the Eleventh Amendment-considerations that do not apply to Monell ac-
tions-and the Court insisted that its decision was consistent with Monell and its progeny. See
id.
125. See id. at 642-44.
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violations of a citizen's constitutional rights. 126 This policy analysis sup-
ports a litigant's right to pursue a civil rights claim jointly against a mu-
nicipality and against the offending police officer, and is particularly
relevant to this Article's focus on the permissibility of bifurcation in this
context.
The Supreme Court's review in Owen of the legislative debate over
the 1871 Act revealed that for a significant period of time prior to the
Act's passage, municipal corporations had not enjoyed a "tradition of
immunity." 127 To the contrary, municipal governments were then liable
for damages in tort for a variety of wrongs, and had been "treated as
natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory
analysis."12 8 The Owen Court rejected the defendant's claim that it
should be immune from civil rights liability because it engaged in a gov-
ernmental function, stating that Congress "abolished whatever vestige of
the State's sovereign immunity the municipality possessed" when it
passed section 1983.129 The Court similarly ridiculed the defendant's as-
sertion that it should have "good-faith immunity" because it engages in
"discretionary" activities, declaring: "[A] municipality has no 'discre-
tion' to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and
imperative." 130
Compelling public policy considerations supplied much of the impe-
tus for the Court's holding that municipalities have no immunity from
liability for the constitutional violations that they cause. "How 'uniquely
amiss' it would be," reasoned the Court, "if the government itself-'the
social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of liberty,
justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and
goals for social conduct'-were permitted to disavow liability for the in-
jury it has begotten." 13 1 The Court recognized that the "importance" of
section 1983's damages remedy becomes "accentuated when the wrong-
doer is the institution that has been established to protect the very rights
it has transgressed,"' 132 and warned that if municipalities could assert a
good-faith defense, "many victims of municipal malfeasance would be
126. See id. at 650-56.
127. Id. at 638.
128. Id. at 639; see id. at 639-44.
129. Id. at 647-48.
130. Id. at 649.
131. Id. at 651 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
132. Id.
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left remediless."13 3 "[T]he injustice of such a result," the Court held,
"should not be tolerated." 134
The Owen Court emphasized that a verdict against a municipality
furthers a significant "societal interest" 135 beyond that vindicated by a
compensatory award for the individual litigant. For example, it ex-
plained that a finding of municipal liability would "serve as a deterrent
against future constitutional deprivations." 136 The Court was particu-
larly attuned to the beneficial impact that a successful Monell action
would have in encouraging municipalities to modify any "systemic"
practices that result in constitutional injuries. 137 A municipality seeking
to minimize its risk of liability for the actions of a poorly trained or su-
pervised employee, for instance, might initiate a program designed to
"increase the attentiveness with which officials at the higher levels of
government supervise the conduct of their subordinates." 138 The Court
further suggested that a municipality's indeterminate exposure to large
damage awards under section 1983 might lead it "to institute system-
wide measures in order to increase the vigilance with which otherwise
indifferent municipal officials protect citizens' constitutional rights," a
matter that becomes "particularly acute where the frontline officers are
judgment-proof in their individual capacities." 139
The Supreme Court's decisions in Monroe, Monell, and Owen thus
resurrected section 1983's historic purpose to create a federal civil rights
remedy in response to unparalleled official lawlessness and organized, ra-
cially motivated violence. Before turning to a thorough analysis of the
bifurcation procedure, however, we should review the most recent chap-
ter of judicial construction of section 1983. The following discussion
demonstrates that a litigant's right to pursue Monell relief has been reaf-
firmed by post-Owen Supreme Court decisions.
D. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Since deciding Monell and Owen, the Supreme Court has worked to
clarify "the full contours" of municipal liability under section 1983.
From Monell through the Court's opinion in the 1989 case of City of
Canton v. Harris,14° the Court's decisions reflected an awareness that
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 653.
136. Id. at 651.
137. See id. at 652 & n.36.
138. Id. at 652 n.36.
139. Id.
140. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
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"those contours [we]re . . in a state of evolving definition and uncer-
tainty."' 14 1 The Court has curtailed municipalities' exposure to punitive
damages, 142 limited injunctive relief,143 and, through some of its rulings,
made weightier the burden of proof that litigants must bear to establish
municipal liability. 144 The Court has never retreated, however, from Mo-
nell's fundamental holding that section 1983 subjects municipalities to
liability for the civil rights violations that they cause. In fact, it rejected a
municipality's call to impose heightened pleading requirements on civil
rights litigants pressing Monell claims in the recent case of Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit.145  The
Court's decisions have reinforced the statute's availability to victims of
official misconduct by allowing them to proceed against municipalities,
regardless of whether they can prove a claim against individual actors,
when the evidence establishes that a municipality's policy or custom was
responsible for depriving them of a constitutional right. 14 6 Indeed, in
deciding Canton, the Court significantly expanded the potential breadth
of municipal liability by ruling that a city may be liable for following a
"policy of inaction" in failing to train its police officers adequately. 147
The Court's first post-Owen decision, in the 1981 case of City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., '148 immunized municipalities from awards
of punitive damages under section 1983.149 As a matter of public policy,
the Court was concerned that "this expanded liability ... may create a
serious risk to the financial integrity of these governmental entities."' 50
141. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 (1981).
142. See id. at 258-71.
143. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
144. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (establishing a high stan-
dard for proving a municipality's deliberate indifference); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 123-28 (1988) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (determining who is a final poli-
cymaker); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821 (1985) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, J.) (holding that a city's policy of failing to train its officers cannot be inferred from
a single incident of misconduct by an officer without policymaking authority); Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 313 (1981) (restricting who can be sued under section 1983 by holding
that a state-employed public defender does not act under color of law in performing traditional
function as counsel to indigent defendants).
145. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
146. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112; infra notes 166-169 and accompanying text; Canton,
489 U.S. at 378; infra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
147. Canton, 489 U.S. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
id. at 389 (establishing a plaintiffs burden of showing that a "municipality's failure to train its
employees in a relevant respect evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of its
inhabitants").
148. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
149. Id. at 271.
150. Id. at 270. Several Justices have expressed a desire to limit Monell remedies in order
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Balancing this concern against the adequacy of section 1983's compensa-
tory remedies, the Court found no need for punitive damages because
Monell's compensatory relief alone constituted "an obligation properly
shared by the municipality itself"'151 and sufficed to accomplish the "im-
portant purpose" of "deterr[ing] ... future abuses of [police] power."1 52
In Polk County v. Dodson,153 decided the same year, the Court nar-
rowed the list of state officials whose actions could subject a municipality
to liability,154 but reaffirmed Monell's applicability when a municipal pol-
icy was "'the moving force of the Constitutional violation.' "155 In City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons,15 6 the Court justified its ruling that a litigant had
no standing to seek injunctive relief against a municipality by suggesting
that section 1983's damages remedy was "presumably" available to chal-
lenge police practices.1 57 Though these decisions declined to extend the
deterrent rationale of Monell and Owen, they reinforced Monell's appli-
cation against municipalities' unlawful policies and customs.
The Court's 1985 decision in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle58 be-
gan to define the "contours" of section 1983 liability for cases in which a
to prevent municipalities from being exposed to excessively burdensome money damages. See
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 821-24 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
White and O'Connor, JJ.); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 502 (1986) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority's holding "unfairly increases the risk of liability on the
level of government least able to bear it").
151. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 263.
152. Id. at 268.
153. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
154. In rejecting the plaintiff's section 1983 suit against his former public defender, the
Dodson Court explained that every court-appointed attorney "owes a duty of undivided loyalty
to his client." Consequently, she does not act under color of law when exercising independent
professional judgment on behalf of an accused, and cannot be sued as an agent of the state. Id.
at 315.
155. Id. at 326 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
156. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The plaintiff in Lyons had been stopped and choked until he lost
consciousness by Los Angeles police officers for vehicle and traffic violations. Mr. Lyons
sought damages for his injuries and injunctive relief to prohibit all Los Angeles police officers
from using the chokehold in the future. Id. at 98. While it assumed without deciding that
Lyons could proceed with his claims for damages against the individual officers and the city,
the Court rejected his prayer for an injunction because it believed that Lyons had done "noth-
ing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic viola-
tion.., by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without
any provocation or resistance on his part." Id. at 105. In his dissent, Justice Marshall rea-
soned that Lyons, an African-American, had standing to seek an injunction, in part because
his past injury gave him a personal stake, and in part because Los Angeles police officers had
killed at least 16 people, 12 of whom were African-Americans, and injured almost 1000 more
through the use of the chokehold during the preceding five years. See id. at 115-17, 124 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 105.
158. 471 U.S. 808 (1985). Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality of four Justices,
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municipality's policy of inaction results in a poorly trained, ill-super-
vised, or undisciplined police force. Though Justice Rehnquist's plural-
ity opinion criticized the general uncertainties surrounding possible
municipal liability for a "nebulous 'policy' of 'inadequate training,'" it
recognized Monell's applicability to situations in which there was "an
affirmative link between the policy [of inadequate training] and the par-
ticular constitutional violation alleged." 159 While the Tuttle Court re-
jected the notion that a policy of inadequate training in the use of force
might be established from "the isolated misconduct of a single, low-level
officer,"' 60 it relied extensively on the teachings of Monell in noting that
it would uphold such a claim against a municipality when "the depriva-
tion was the result of municipal 'custom or policy.' "161
The Court's 1986 decision in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati 62 clari-
fied Tuttle's meaning by establishing that a municipality may be liable for
the single act of an employee when the actor is found to have final poli-
cymaking authority as to the action taken. 163 Emphasizing that "Monell
is a case about responsibility,"'164 the Court distinguished a low-level
employee's actions from those of a municipal policymaker; the latter's
decisions represent "official municipal policy" when they "cause[ ] a con-
stitutional tort."'165
rejected a jury instruction that permitted an inference that a single, unusually excessive act of
force could subject a municipality to liability based on its deliberate indifference to the train-
ing, supervision, and discipline of its officers. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
159. Id. at 823 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
160. Id. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Justices
who joined either Brennan's concurrence or the plurality opinion agreed that "[w]here the
policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single inci-
dent will be necessary in every case to establish the requisite fault on the part of the municipal-
ity, and the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation." Id. at
824 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.). These seven Justices agreed that a municipality's
liability should not be inferred from an individual officer's act because it "would amount to
permitting precisely the theory of strict respondeat-superior rejected in Monell." Id. at 832
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
161. Id. at 817 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
162. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
163. Id. at 483 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). In Pembaur, the Court held that a
municipality was liable for a county prosecutor's decision to order deputy sheriffs to forcibly
enter a doctor's medical clinic. See id. at 485 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
164. Id. at 478 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
165. Id. at 477 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). The
Pembaur Court disagreed on the definition of a policymaker for section 1983 purposes: the
plurality suggested that a "policymaker" should be a person who, under state law, "possesses
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Id. at 481
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). Two other Justices questioned the breadth of this definition.
See id. at 486 (White, J., concurring); id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment).
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Two years later, in Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis,166 the Court re-
versed an Eighth Circuit panel's ruling that had found a municipality
liable under section 1983 for a supervisory official's decision to lay off a
city employee.1 67 Concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish the
existence of a municipal policy, 16 8 the Court again reinforced Monell's
application when a municipal policymaker deprives a citizen of a consti-
tutional right.169
The Court's most recent significant decision on the matter broad-
ened the definition of an unconstitutional municipal policy. In City of
Canton v. Harris,170 building on prior "inaction" cases, 17 1 the Court con-
firmed the applicability of section 1983 when a municipality acts with
"deliberate indifference" in failing to properly train its police officer em-
166. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
167. See Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 798 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 112
(1988).
168. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 128-29 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
169. The Justices could not agree on whether the determination of who possesses "final
authority" to make municipal policy is a question of fact or law. Compare id. at 124 (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, J.) (arguing that "whether an official had policy making authority is a
question of state law") with id. at 144 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("The identifica-
tion of municipal policymakers is an essentially factual determination .... and is therefore
rightly entrusted to a . . . jury."). The plurality concluded that a city's liability for a
subordinate's decision was limited to decisions approved by the city's policymakers. Id. at 127
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
170. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The plaintiff in Canton based her Monell claim on the munici-
pality's failure to properly train police officers to provide necessary medical care for persons in
police custody. Id. at 382.
171. The Court began to define a municipality's liability for failing to train its officers in
Tuttle, when it held that section 1983 required more than an isolated incident to establish a
municipal policy. 471 U.S. at 824 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.); see supra notes 158-161
and accompanying text. Two years later, in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987),
the Court decided not to decide whether a municipality might be subjected to liability for
failing to train its police officers and, if so, what evidentiary standard would be applied. Id. at
257 (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion in Kibbe (joined by three other Justices) previewed the Court's majority decision two
years later in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Canton established a "deliberate
indifference" standard for proof of municipal liability in "inaction" cases. See infra notes 172-
177 and accompanying text. Although both Kibbe and Canton involved only claims of failure
to train and failure to supervise, the same analysis has been applied to municipalities' failure to
discipline police officers and to investigate citizens' allegations of police misconduct. In one of
the first reported cases, Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1983), the court stated that
"municipal inaction such as the persistent failure to discipline subordinates who violate civil
rights could give rise to an inference of an unlawful municipal policy of ratification of uncon-
stitutional conduct within the meaning of Monell." Id. at 397; see also Depew v. City of St.
Mary's, 787 F.2d 1496, 1497-98 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (addressing mayor and city council members'
failure to investigate citizens' complaints of police brutality despite having knowledge of the
allegations); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986) (addressing failure to
investigate previous complaints of police misconduct), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987).
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ployees. 172 Vacating the jury's verdict against the municipality and re-
manding the case for a new trial,173 the Court declared that its "first
inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability under section 1983 is the
question whether there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy
or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation."' 174 The Court held
that a municipality's policy of inaction may expose it to section 1983
liability when the evidence establishes that "the employee has not been
adequately trained and the constitutional wrong has been caused by that
failure to train."' 175 In thus applying Monell's fundamental principles,
the Canton Court upheld section 1983 liability when the municipality is
the "'moving force [behind] the constitutional violation'"176 and shows
"deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact."' 177
Finally, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit,17 s the Court held that civil rights claimants need not
meet a "heightened pleading" standard in alleging Monell claims. 179 In
disapproving the rule followed by the Fifth Circuit (and several other
circuits) that Monell causes of action must be pleaded in greater factual
detail than other civil claims, the Court reaffirmed in dicta the continu-
ing viability of the Monell-Owen line of cases: municipalities should be
held liable for their own policies or practices that cause constitutional
injuries. 18o
172. Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89; id. at 392 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). As Justice O'Connor observed, the "deliberate indifference" standard had previ-
ously been applied by numerous lower courts in other "inaction" cases. See, e.g., Fiacco, 783
F.2d at 327; Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying a "con-
scious indifference" standard), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Wellington v. Daniels, 717
F.2d 932, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1983).
173. In vacating the jury's verdict against the municipality and in favor of the individual
defendants, the Canton Court "assume[d] that respondent's constitutional right to receive
medical care was denied by city employees-whatever the nature of that right might be." 489
U.S. at 389 n.8. Because Canton established a new standard of proof for municipal liability for
failure to train police officers, requiring "deliberate indifference" (whereas the trial court had
instructed the jury to consider recklessness or gross negligence), the Court remanded the case
in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to meet this standard. See id. at 392.
174. Id. at 385.
175. Id. at 387. The Court specifically rejected the city's "contention that only unconstitu-
tional policies are actionable under the statute," id. at 387. but it required plaintiffs to show
that the need for training was "so obvious" and so likely to result in a constitutional depriva-
tion that the city policymakers were "deliberately indifferent to the need." Id. at 390.
176. Id. at 389 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
177. Id. at 388.
178. 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
179. Id. at 1162-63.
180. See id. at 1162. Even though it narrowly based its holding on the rules of pleading
and interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. at 1162-63, the Leatherman
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In sum, a series of Supreme Court decisions since Monell have con-
sistently reaffirmed that section 1983 provides for liability on the part of
municipalities. The use of any procedural mechanisms to preclude or
hinder the establishment of such liability would thus contravene the
overwhelming weight of Supreme Court authority. As described in the
following Parts, however, a procedural mechanism-bifurcation-is be-
ing used in precisely this manner.
HI. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"' is most com-
monly used in personal injury trials and other civil matters to separate
issues of liability from those of damages. 8 2 Growing numbers of federal
trial courts, however, are using bifurcation in section 1983 civil rights
cases to sever a plaintiff's claim against an individual police officer from
that against a municipal defendant for trial,18 3 and sometimes to defer
discovery on the Monell claim until after the trial of the claim against the
individual officer.184 As described below, when a trial court grants a de-
fendant municipality's Rule 42(b) motion to bifurcate, it typically im-
poses a substantial new burden on civil rights litigants who seek to
establish municipal liability for constitutional violations.' 85 Discovery
bifurcation orders delay and often preclude litigants from establishing a
municipality's "deliberate indifference" to unlawful police practices; bi-
decision signifies the Court's rejection of lower courts' use of procedural tools to hinder Monell
claims.
181. For the complete text of Rule 42(b), see supra note 10.
182. According to Professors Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, "an obvious use" for
bifurcation is to divide these issues for trial in tort cases, in which "[l]ogically liability must be
resolved before damages are considered. Often the evidence pertinent to the two issues is
wholly unrelated. Thus it is not surprising that courts, in many kinds of litigation, have or-
dered this separation, though this has not been done routinely ...... 9 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390, at 296-97
(1972) (footnote omitted). Wright and Miller summarized the court's reasons for bifurcating
the issues of damages and liability for trial in a case that involved a plane crash: the "issues are
substantially separate and distinct, bifurcation reduces burden of preparation for trial on dam-
age issues if determination proves unnecessary, separate determination of liability may resolve
various issues frustrating settlement of cases and prevent need for damage trials, and bifurca-
tion permits efficient consolidation of identical issues [for] resolution at one time." 9 id. supp.
at 103 (Supp. 1992) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 720 F. Supp. 1455 (D. Colo. 1988)).
In addition to negligence cases, courts have used bifurcation of issues for trial in various
other civil matters arising out of contracts, trusts, and insurance agreements, 9 id. § 2389, at
285-87, as well as to decide procedural issues affecting the merits of a claim (for example,
statute of limitations and collateral estoppel), 9 id. at 293-94.
183. See infra Part V.
184. See infra notes 297-302, 361-369 and accompanying text.
185. See infra Part IV.
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furcated trials are likely to prevent a jury from apportioning damages
between an individual and municipal defendant. The Rule and its under-
lying principles, however, neither dictate nor support such an
application.
Rule 42(b) allows a federal trial court to order a separate trial of any
claim or issue when it finds such an order appropriate "in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice [to each party], or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy . . . , always preserving
inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
of the Constitution."'186 When a court orders bifurcation for trial, the
Rule also gives it the discretion to defer discovery of any issue that will
be tried separately.' 87
Several principles control the courts' consideration of Rule 42(b)
motions. First, bifurcation is the exception, not the rule, for conducting
a trial. 188 A single trial is the preferred method for the adjudication of
competing claims and issues because it "tends to lessen the delay, ex-
pense and inconvenience to all parties."189 Although the bifurcation pro-
cedure has been used with "great success" when employed on a limited
186. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Prior to 1966, Rule 42(b) permitted bifurcation only "in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182,
§ 2388, at 279. The 1966 Amendment added language permitting separate trials when they
would be "conducive to expedition and economy." 9 id. at 280. Professors Wright and Miller
suggested that courts had already been relying on this factor prior to the amendment, and that
the Rule's new language was necessary only to maintain separate trials for liability and damage
issues in certain admiralty suits. 9 id. at 279-80; see also Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or
Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 743, 743-44 (1955) (suggesting that Rule 42(b) was needed to provide a "safeguard"
against inappropriate use of the "extraordinarily liberal" joinder rules to create unwieldy
actions).
187. "[I]f a possibly dispositive issue is to be tried separately the court may, though it need
not, limit discovery to that issue for the time being." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182,
§ 2387, at 278 (citing Ellingson Timber Co. v. Great N. Ry., 424 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1970)).
188. Upon amending Rule 42 in 1966, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules stated:
While separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered, it is important that
it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth.
In cases... in which the parties have a constitutional or statutory right of trial
by jury, separation of issues may give rise to problems. Accordingly, the proposed
change in Rule 42 reiterates the mandate of Rule 38 respecting preservation of the
right to jury trial.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42 advisory committee's note (citations omitted). Observing that the Commit-
tee's note is "cryptic," Wright and Miller reasoned that it was "intended to give rather delphic
encouragement to trial of liability issues separately from those of damages, while warning
against routine bifurcation of the ordinary negligence case." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
182, § 2388, at 280.
189. McCrae v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 97 F.R.D. 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also
Wolens v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1521, 1521 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
("[S]eparate trials should not be ordered unless such a disposition is clearly necessary.").
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basis, 190 particularly in negligence cases, 191 the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, which promulgated Rule 42(b), cautioned against its
overuse. 192 Professors Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, leading com-
mentators on federal civil procedure, emphasized that "[t]he piecemeal
trial of separate issues in a single suit is not to be the usual course," and
that a court should order bifurcation only when it "believes that separa-
tion will achieve the purposes of the rule."'193 Consequently, a court
must exercise its discretionary power under the Rule based on informed
judgment; it must avoid granting bifurcation as a matter of policy.194 As
with other discretionary decisions, trial courts must evaluate bifurcation
190. In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 528 F.2d 5, 15 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Compagnie
Francaise D'Assurance v. Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. 16, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); supra note
182.
191. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 2390.
192. See supra note 188.
193. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 2388, at 279; see also Dun & Bradstreet
Corp. Found. v. National Seminars, Inc., No. CIV.A.89-2388-0, 1990 WL 182338, at *3 (D.
Kan. Oct. 23, 1990) (denying defense bifurcation motion because it would create "piecemeal"
litigation); United States v. Mottolo, 107 F.R.D. 267, 270 (D.N.H. 1985) (denying plaintiff's
motion for bifurcated trials on past and future damages in an environmental clean-up action);
Compaignie Francaise D'Assurance, 105 F.R.D. at 36-39 (denying plaintiff's motion to bifur-
cate based on overlap between liability and damage issues and finding that bifurcation would
not promote judicial economy but would allow defendant to evade discovery responsibilities
and cause undue prejudice to defendant); R.E. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. Wedemeyer,
Cernik, Corrubia, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (D. Md. 1984) (denying defense bifurcation
motion, stating that "any prejudice which defendants may encounter.., can be cured with
instructions to the jury"); United States v. IBM Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 656-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(denying defense bifurcation motion, stating that the evidence at a single trial would not "con-
taminate" the mind of the finder of fact in a bench trial and that lack of overlap is not a
sufficient reason to bifurcate absent showing that separate trials would produce affirmative
movement toward disposing of the litigation); infra note 201 (listing the factors that should
guide a court's bifurcation decision); cf Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.) (af-
firming trial court's discretion to bifurcate liability and damages), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072
(1984).
194. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 955
(1978). In Lis, the Third Circuit strongly criticized the practice of routine bifurcation; the trial
court had explained that it summarily bifurcated the liability and damages issues in that case
"because we bifurcate all negligence cases, and I think everybody is more fairly treated that
way." Id. at 823 (quoting the district court's order). The Third Circuit stated that the "rou-
tine order of bifurcation in all negligence cases is a practice at odds with our requirement that
discretion be exercised and seems to run counter to the intention of the rule drafters." Id. at
824. Accordingly, the court expressly "disapprove[d] of a general practice of bifurcating all
negligence cases." Id. Nevertheless, because the trial court's failure "to exercise discretion"
had not prejudiced the appellants, the court denied a new trial. Id. The Lis court reiterated
the principle to be followed in resolving a bifurcation motion: "The decision to bifurcate vel
non is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis and must be subject to an informed
discretion by the trial judge in each instance." Id. (citing Idzojtic v. Pennsylvania R.R., 456
F.2d 1228, 1230 (3d Cir. 1971)).
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motions on an individual, case-by-case basis and refrain from routinely
approving such motions.1 95
Second, because of the general presumption favoring a single trial,
the party seeking bifurcation has the burden of persuading the trial court
that severance is appropriate in the matter at hand.1 96 The moving
party's arguments should demonstrate that separate trials are necessary
to protect her from undue prejudice or inconvenience, and that the pro-
cedure would not cause her adversary any such prejudice or inconven-
ience. 197 Alternatively, the movant may attempt to convince the court
that bifurcation "will be conducive to expedition and economy." 198 Ad-
dressing each of these factors, the moving party must persuade the court
that bifurcated discovery or trials would satisfy Rule 42(b)'s "para-
mount" consideration: to ensure "a fair and impartial trial [and process]
to all litigants through a balance of benefit and prejudice."1 99
Third, in ruling on a Rule 42(b) motion, a court may consider other
factors to determine whether bifurcation would avoid prejudice and fur-
ther convenience, expedition, and economy. For example, a court may
decide that bifurcation would be inappropriate in a case in which there is
an overlap in the probable evidentiary proof of the issues sought to be
tried separately, 2° or when it believes that the moving party would gain
an unfair advantage from separate trials. 20 On the other hand, a court
195. Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 616 F.2d 528, 538 (3d Cir.
1979); Kushner v. Hendon Constr., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93, 98 (M.D. Pa.), afld mem., 609 F.2d
502 (3d Cir. 1979); see supra notes 188, 194.
196. McCrae v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 97 F.R.D. 490, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("A de-
fendant seeking bifurcation has the burden of presenting evidence that a separate trial is proper
in light of the general principle that a single trial tends to lessen the delay, expense and incon-
venience to all parties.").
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
198. Id. Wright and Miller noted that while either party may move for separate trials, a
court may order bifurcation on its own motion because "[i]t is the interest of efficient judicial
administration that is to be controlling, rather than the wishes of the parties." 9 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 182, § 2388, at 279.
199. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. James River Corp., 131 F.R.D. 607, 609 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
200. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1485, 1491-92
(D. Del. 1985) (concluding that bifurcation in the face of overlapping evidence would be "in-
advisable"); Akzona Incorp. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 233-34 (D.
Del. 1984) ("Although a minor overlap of evidence does not militate strongly against bifurca-
tion, it certainly does not weigh in favor of bifurcation.").
201. In Kimberly-Clark, the court set forth Rule 42(b)'s four general factors-conven-
ience, prejudice, expedition, and economy-and discussed seven other considerations upon
which a court may properly rely in deciding whether to bifurcate:
(5) whether the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different; (6)
whether they are triable by jury or the court; (7) whether discovery has been directed
to a single trial of all issues; (8) whether the evidence required for each issue is sub-
stantially different; (9) whether one party would gain some unfair advantage from
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might grant bifurcation when it appears that a single issue "could be
dispositive of the case, and resolution of it might make it unnecessary to
try the other issues, '20 2 or when it believes that "a single trial of all issues
would create the potential for jury bias or confusion. ' 20 3 Professors
Wright and Miller advised courts to bifurcate only in the infrequent case
in which limiting instructions to the jury would not suffice to avoid preju-
dice to a co-defendant, such as "where evidence admissible only on a
certain issue may prejudice a party in the minds of the jury on other
issues." 2o4
Finally, Rule 42(b)'s mandate to "always preserv[e] inviolate the
right of trial by jury"205 requires a court to remain mindful that bifurca-
tion may prevent the trial jury from fulfilling its role as the fact-finder. 20 6
separate trials; (10) whether a single trial of all issues would create the potential for
jury bias or confusion; and (11) whether bifurcation would enhance or reduce the
possibility of a pretrial settlement.
131 F.R.D. at 608-09 (citing Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Col. 1980),
and Gonzalez-Marin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 845 F.2d 1140, 1145-47 (1st Cir.
1988) (denying bifurcation)); see also Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D.
662, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting bifurcation upon consideration of the enumerated
factors).
202. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 2388, at 280. "If, however, the preliminary
and separate trial of an issue will involve extensive proof and substantially the same facts as the
other issues .... a separate trial will be denied." 9 id. at 281. In Barnell v. Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis Inc., 577 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court granted defendant's mo-
tion for a separate trial on the issue of the plaintiff's timeliness in filing a discrimination com-
plaint with the EEOC, stating:
[S]ince the trial of this issue may obviate the need for any further proceedings herein,
a significant saving of time and money may follow from a separate trial on this issue.
Severance under rule 42(b) is an appropriate tool with which the Court can expedite
resolution of statute of limitations issues.
Id. at 978; see also Payne v. A.O. Smith Corp., 99 F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (noting
that the "factors to be balanced against [the] convenience and economy of one trial include
complexity of legal theories and factual proof, risk of jury confusion, and whether advanced
disposition of issues in [the] first trial will dispose of or simplify issues to be raised in [a] second
trial").
203. Kimberly-Clark, 131 F.R.D. at 609; see supra note 201.
204. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 2388, at 281, 282. For example, Wright and
Miller noted the possibility of prejudice to a party when a jury learns that she is insured. Id.
Nevertheless, separate trials would be justified in such instances only when "the issues are so
unrelated that there is no advantage in trying them together." Id. A single trial would not
create prejudice when the issues of liability and damages are related, Wright and Miller sug-
gested, because most jurors assume that the party is insured. Id.; cf infra notes 349-355 and
accompanying text (discussing possible prejudice to civil rights defendants from unified trials).
205. FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) ("The right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.").
206. Bifurcation of individual and municipal defendants in section 1983 lawsuits, for ex-
ample, may prevent the jury from engaging in the "equitable loss-spreading," Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980), that Monell liability is intended to promote, because
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One district court highlighted the importance of the jury's role in making
"an ultimate determination on the basis of a case presented in its en-
tirety[:] Because bifurcation works an infringement on such an impor-
tant aspect of the judicial process, courts are 'cautioned that [it] is not the
usual course that should be followed.' "o207 Professors Wright and Miller
expressed alarm that trial bifurcation may have a severe prejudicial im-
pact upon a plaintiff: "[I]n a forced separation," she may "be put to the
hazard of two juries, each believing the absent tort-feasor the
wrongdoer." 208
Rule 42(b) was amended in 1966 in an effort to provide trial courts
"broad discretion" in managing their case dockets "with expedition and
economy while providing justice to the parties. ' 20 9 When courts follow
the principles explained above in ruling on bifurcation motions, it is
likely that the amendment's objectives will be met. When they fail to do
so, as appears to be increasingly the case in section 1983 actions, justice is
often denied to civil rights litigants who wish to challenge a municipal-
ity's unlawful police policy or custom.
IV. Bifurcation as a Barrier to a Plaintiff's Recovery
Viewed in isolation, bifurcation of civil rights claims increases the
expense and inconvenience faced by plaintiffs seeking redress of constitu-
tional wrongs. Especially in jurisdictions that routinely bifurcate Monell
claims for discovery as well as for trial, most plaintiffs lack the resources
and fortitude to persevere through prolonged and complex discovery and
to proceed through a second trial after completing a first.210 It is un-
likely that a bifurcated Monell claim will ever be submitted to a jury,
even when the individual defendants are found liable. Following such a
it cannot properly apportion fault between the defendants. Moreover, the inherent difficulty of
proving a section 1983 claim against an individual police officer, especially when accompanied
by a judge's misunderstanding of the applicable law, can work to deny a jury trial on a viable
Monell claim. See infra Part IV.
207. Kimberly-Clark, 131 F.R.D. at 608 (quoting Response to Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco
Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336
F.2d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 1964))) (alteration by court); see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
182, § 2390, at 300 (noting that the parties' right to a jury trial indicates that "separation of
this kind should be sparingly used").
208. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 182, § 2389, at 293 (citing Way v. Waterloo, C.F.
& N.R.R., 29 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Iowa 1947)). Wright and Miller also stated that when a
"plaintiff has sued two or more defendants for the same injuries, motions by the defendants
that the claims against each of them be separately tried have usually been denied, even if the
basis of liability was different." 9 id. at 290-92; see 9 id. at 292-93 n.39 (citing cases).
209. 9 id. § 2381, at 253.
210. See infra notes 356-357, 371, 374, 386 and accompanying text.
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verdict, municipal defense attorneys usually offer attractive settlements
in order to avoid indeterminate liability on the Monell issue.211 Most
plaintiffs and their counsel find such offers difficult to refuse. Of course,
those plaintiffs who are unwilling to settle may pursue their Monell
claims through trial. Overall, bifurcation will substantially extend the
length and expense of the proceedings, even for these successful litigants.
Bifurcation becomes an insurmountable bar, however, when trial
courts misconstrue the dicta of the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion
in City of Los Angeles v. Heller2t 2 as requiring them to automatically
dismiss the Monell claim whenever the plaintiff fails to persuade a jury
that the individual officer defendant is liable.213 Under this extreme in-
terpretation of Heller, bifurcation provides ultimate immunity to a mu-
nicipality able to persuade a jury that the officer should not be held
accountable. Moreover, as described below, the circumstances of many
section 1983 cases may lead a jury to find for an officer even when there
is convincing evidence that the plaintiff suffered a constitutional in-
jury.214 Consequently, in jurisdictions that construe Heller broadly, the
vitality of the federal civil rights remedy against municipalities engaging
in unconstitutional practices is in serious question. To preserve this rem-
edy, lower courts must use common sense in reading Heller, and must
look for guidance from other Supreme Court cases treating municipal
liability both before and after Heller was decided.
A. City of Los Angeles v. Heller
The facts of Heller follow an all-too-familiar pattern: Los Angeles
police officers apprehend an African-American motorist whom they sus-
pect of violating a motor vehicles law, and they inflict serious injury on
the motorist.215 Believing that Mr. Heller was driving while intoxicated,
211. See supra notes 8-9, 13 and accompanying text and infra notes 308, 326, 330-338 and
accompanying text.
212. 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam).
213. See infra notes 230-257 and accompanying text.
214. See infra Part IV.B.
215. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 797. The videotaped beating of Rodney King by police oc-
curred after a high-speed chase during which Mr. King was suspected of violating state traffic
laws. Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted, supra note 1, at Al, D22. Moreover, at the
time of Mr. Heller's arrest, a case pending before the Supreme Court involved another Afri-
can-American driver's charges that Los Angeles police officers had used excessive force and
applied a needless and injurious chokehold during an arrest for driving infractions. See City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); supra note 156. The police officers' suspicion that
Mr. Heller had been driving while intoxicated was refuted by subsequent chemical testing:
Heller was never formally charged after test results showed that his blood alcohol level had
been only one tenth of that required to support such a charge. Heller, 475 U.S. at 801 n.2
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For other, similar examples, see Mistrial in Officers'Beating of Motor-
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officers stopped his car and administered a field sobriety test. Heller
passed these tests, but the officers arrested him nonetheless, apparently
because they were "dissatisfied with the results. ' 21 6 Police testified that
Mr. Heller became "belligerent" while being handcuffed and an "alterca-
tion ensued. '217 The Court's opinion states that Mr. Heller's injury oc-
curred during "the course of the struggle," when he "fell through a plate
glass window. '218 Justice Stevens' dissent offers a more complete picture
of the injury: "Heller's flight through the window resulted from [the
officer's] attempt to impose ... the notorious 'chokehold.' "219
On the day before trial was scheduled, the trial court bifurcated Hel-
ler's civil rights claim against the municipality,220 which charged that it
followed a policy of condoning the excessive use of force by police in
making arrests, from his claim against the individual officers. 221 No ex-
planation for the trial bifurcation ruling appeared in the record.222 The
Supreme Court's per curiam decision did not discuss or comment upon
the propriety of the trial court's pretrial ruling. In fact, the Court never
requested legal briefs or oral arguments regarding any aspect of the
case.
2 2 3
The Court's abbreviated opinion affirmed the trial judge's decision
to dismiss Heller's Monell claims after the jury exonerated the sole re-
maining individual defendant. 224 The trial court inferred from the trial
jury's general verdict in the officer's favor that Mr. Heller had not been
ist In '89, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at A20; Seth Mydans, Alarmed by Deaths in Car Chases,
Police Curb High-Speed Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, § 1, at 1.
216. Heller, 475 U.S. at 797 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion). The Supreme Court
accepted the factual findings recited in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the case. Id.; see Heller
v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd per curiam sub nom. City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
217. Heller, 475 U.S. at 797 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion).
218. Id. (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion).
219. Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Mr. Heller's attorney, Steven Yagman, recalled
that the trial judge entered a sua sponte bifurcation order on the day trial was scheduled:
It was the first time I had ever encountered such a motion. I had flown in an
expert who was ready to testify on the Monell issue. Though the judge rejected my
argument that bifurcation deprived Mr. Heller a complete remedy, he surprisingly
allowed the expert to testify before the jury.
Telephone Interview with Steven Yagman (Aug. 13, 1992).
221. Heller, 475 U.S. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id at 801 & n.3. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Justice Stevens criticized the Court for not requiring the parties to brief and argue the
bifurcation issues raised in Heller: "Whenever the Court decides a case without the benefit of
briefs or argument on the merits, there is a danger that it will issue an opinion without the
careful deliberation and explication that the issues require." Id. at 800 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id. at 799.
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deprived of any constitutional right.225 Relying on this inference, the
Supreme Court did not address the Ninth Circuit's concern that such a
"general verdict does not foreclose a finding that Heller suffered a consti-
tutional deprivation. ' 226 Instead, the Court noted very generally that
"neither Monell... nor any other of our cases" provided legal authority
for an "award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the
actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the
officer inflicted no constitutional harm. ' 227 Without any supporting
caselaw or legal analysis, the Court simply stated that because the police
officer had "inflicted no constitutional injury on [Heller], it is inconceiv-
able that [the municipal defendants] could be liable to [Heller]." 228 "If a
person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer," the Court concluded, "the fact that the departmental reg-
ulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force
is quite beside the point. ' 229
225. Following the jury's verdict in the officer's favor, the district judge declared that the
Monell claim had "become moot." Id. at 800 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the record).
The judge refused to submit a special interrogatory that would have allowed the jury to indi-
cate whether it believed that Heller had sustained a constitutional injury for which the individ-
ual officer was not liable. See id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra text following note 254.
226. Heller v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd per curiam sub nom. City
of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986). The Ninth Circuit had reversed the trial court's
dismissal of Heller's section 1983 claims against the municipal defendants and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Id. at 1376. In reaching this decision, the court of appeals found
it significant that the officer's defense was substantially based on the fact that he had been
following the Los Angeles Police Department's "escalating force" policy, which endorsed the
use of the chokehold. The jury's verdict in favor of the officer, the court reasoned, signified
"that Heller was arrested for reasonable cause and that the amount of force used was not
unreasonable or excessive." Id. But this finding was insufficient to warrant dismissal of the
Monell claims: "[Tihe conclusion that the force was reasonable could have been derived either
from Police Department regulations, which incorporate a theory of 'escalating force,' or from
a constitutional standard entirely independent of such regulations. We cannot say which with
assurance." Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Monell claims should survive because a
jury "could have considered Officer Bushey's compliance with the policy as an indication of
either the reasonableness of Bushey's use of force or the existence of immunity based on good
faith." Id.
227. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799. The Supreme Court did not discuss the Ninth Circuit's rea-
sons for reversing the dismissal of the Monell claim. See supra note 226. The Court reaffirmed
the trial court's ruling, emphasizing that the jury was not instructed on a defense of qualified
immunity. Members of a jury act "in accordance with the instructions given them," the Court
reasoned; they neither consider nor "base their decisions on legal questions with respect to
which they are not charged." Heller, 475 U.S. at 798.
228. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
229. Id. The defendant officer in Heller did not assert a defense of qualified immunity; he
claimed that he was only following the orders of and training given by the Los Angeles Police
Department. See infra note 241. A successful qualified immunity defense absolves the individ-
ual officer of liability, even though a constitutional injury may have occurred, when the of-
ficer's conduct did "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
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Taken literally, the Heller opinion's language could dramatically al-
ter a municipality's potential liability under section 1983. A civil rights
claimant might be required to prove liability against an individual police
officer first in order to preserve and eventually prevail on a civil rights
cause of action against a municipality. The Court's pre-Heller decisions,
as well as lower court decisions, however, do not support this reading of
Heller.230 Such a literal application of Heller would result in a near-
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see
also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REv. 187 (1993);
David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism
and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989). When a qualified
immunity defense succeeds, most courts agree that Heller does not preclude recovery against
the municipality. See, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 1992) ("To
read Heller as implying that a municipality is immune from liability regardless of whether the
plaintiff suffered a constitutional deprivation simply because an officer was entitled to qualified
immunity would... represent a misconstruction of its holding and rationale."); Deagle v. City
of New York, No. 90 Civ. 8203, 1992 WL 116368, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1992) (refusing to
dismiss Monell claim after granting officer summary judgment on a qualified immunity de-
fense: "[I]t is still an open question whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether a
municipal policy or custom 'caused' that violation."); Munz v. Ryan, 752 F. Supp. 1537, 1551
(D. Kan. 1990) (finding no inherent inconsistency in holding that official is entitled to qualified
immunity but municipality is liable for official's constitutional torts caused by "the actions of
those persons with final authority on the challenged matter"); cf infra note 302 (discussion of
Ray v. Catone).
230. Professor Kritchevsky pointed out that though "the Heller problem had been debated
in the lower courts in the years before the Supreme Court's decision," the Supreme Court
failed to discuss any of those earlier cases in its decision. Kritchevsky, supra note 35, at 443
n. 139. In fact, the overwhelming majority of pre-Heller decisions in the lower courts supports
a narrow reading that would condition municipal liability along the same lines as Monell-
requiring the plaintiff to establish that a municipal policy or custom was the "moving force" in
causing her constitutional injury. Once these factors were established, the courts upheld Mo-
nell liability regardless of the jury's determination as to the liability of the individual defend-
ants. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686-87 (11 th Cir. 1985) (upholding
verdict against municipality despite jury's exoneration of individual defendants); Garcia v. Salt
Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 309 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that a finding of uncon-
stitutional conduct by individual defendant is a prerequisite to holding a municipal defendant
liable), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988); Vippolis v. Village of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44
(2d Cir. 1985) (reversing jury's verdict against municipality because of lack of proof that a
municipal policy caused the injuries), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); Trezevant v. City of
Tampa, 741 F.2d 336, 338, 340 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding municipality liable for policy result-
ing in unlawful incarceration, even though individual defendants absolved); Wellington v.
Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that municipal and individual claims are
not necessarily dependent but affirming dismissal of Monell claim because there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish a municipal policy); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 228-29
(5th Cir. 1983) (reversing verdict against municipality because there was insufficient evidence
to prove municipal policy or custom); Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1983)
(dismissing Monell claim for failure to prove that municipal policy of inaction caused the
constitutional deprivation); Smith v. City of Oklahoma City, 696 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir.
1983) (upholding municipal liability in cases in which a policy or custom is the cause of a
constitutional deprivation); Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1981)
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complete evisceration of civil rights remedies against municipalities and
contravene the settled precedent described in Part II, which places great
emphasis on municipal liability as a means of instigating police
reform.231
When the Court's per curiam opinion in Heller is read narrowly,
however, its holding is unremarkable. 23 2 It merely reaffirms that estab-
lishing section 1983 liability requires, first, proof that the plaintiff suf-
fered a constitutional injury, regardless of whether it was caused by an
individual's actions or by a municipality's custom or policy, and second,
proof that a named defendant caused the deprivation. When understood
(noting that municipal liability can be established independent of liability against individual
officer), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 604 (1982); Boren v. City of Colorado Springs, 624 F. Supp.
474, 480-81 (D. Colo. 1985) (granting motion to dismiss municipal claim because facts alleged
did not establish a policy or custom of tacit authorization or deliberate indifference); Homing
v. County of Washoe, 622 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Nev. 1985) (considering municipal liability
issue despite jury's exoneration of individual defendants, but finding insufficient evidence to
establish independent unlawful conduct); Rogers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13, 20
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (dismissing claim against municipality because plaintiff failed to allege a pat-
tern of illegal conduct going beyond a single incident), aft'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985);
McKenna v. County of Nassau, 538 F. Supp. 737, 739-40 (E.D.N.Y.) (upholding liability
against municipality after plaintiff withdrew claim against individual defendant), affid, 714
F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1982).
Though most pre-Heller decisions upheld Monell claims whenever the plaintiff's proof
established that a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional injury, a few courts
dismissed such claims when a jury did not find individual liability. See, ag., Wing v. Britton,
748 F.2d 494, 498 (8th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he city could not be liable.., unless [the arresting
officer] caused [plaintifil's injuries by using excessive force .... [A] verdict [in favor of the
arresting officer] made a verdict in favor of the city inevitable."); see also Sanchez v. City of
Riverside, 596 F. Supp. 193, 195 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding Monell claims rendered moot when
the municipality agreed to indemnify the individual officer).
231. See supra Part II.C and notes 148-152 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court's policy considerations in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), and City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)).
As recently enunciated by the Supreme Court, the doctrine of stare decisis requires either
a national consensus that the law was unworkable or a finding that related principles of law or
factual reality had changed so completely "as to have robbed the old rule of significant applica-
tion or justification" before the courts may permissibly institute such a radical shift in munici-
pality liability law. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992); see id. at 2808-
16. Neither of these conditions preceded Heller.
232. As commentators explain, the cursory nature of the Court's decision in Heller miti-
gates against an expansive interpretation. "The fact that the Supreme Court's decision is a per
curiam summary reversal, rendered without full briefing and oral argument, argues for a nar-
row reading." 1 SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 35, § 7.6, at 346. Such a reading would
mean that "the establishment of a municipal officer's individual liability is not a prerequisite to
the imposition of municipal entity liability." 1 id. at 344. Schwartz and Kirklin therefore
concluded that "Heller... should not be read as announcing a broad rule requiring dismissal
of the claim against the municipality in every case in which it is found that the defendant
officer was not a constitutional violator." I id. at 346; see also Kritchevsky, supra note 35, at
454 (same).
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from this perspective, the Supreme Court merely construed the jury's
verdict against Heller to signify that on the facts presented, Heller had
suffered no constitutional injury-either from the officer's actions or
from an alleged unconstitutional municipal policy. 233
The ambiguity in Heller led Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, to record a strong dissent to the majority's dismissal of the civil
rights claim against the municipality. He asserted that no "necessary
inconsistency" would have resulted had the jury returned verdicts in
favor of the officer and against the municipality,2 34 and that even if such
an inconsistency existed, the trial court could have reconciled the ver-
dicts and avoided dismissing the Monell claim by any one of several
methods.235 The dissent begins and ends with sharp criticism for the
majority's choice to decide the case "without the benefit of briefs or argu-
ment on the merits, '236 and to rely "on an anonymous author to explain
what it ha[d] done. '237
Justice Stevens labeled the decision "unprecedented, ill-considered,
and far-reaching" in its potential implications.2 38 He presciently ex-
233. The trial record in Heller contained some testimony concerning the municipality's
potential section 1983 liability. See 475 U.S. at 802 & nn.4-6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is
conceivable that the Supreme Court concluded from that trial record that the municipal policy
did not cause plaintiff's constitutional injury. The trial court's dismissal order, however, was
premature: it should not have concluded from the jury's general verdict that Mr. Heller had
suffered no constitutional injury without first requiring the jury to answer a special interro-
gatory. See infra text following note 254.
234. Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters characterized the majority's dis-
missal of the Monell claim as "simply inexplicable." Id. at 801 (Stevens J., dissenting). They
viewed the trial testimony as establishing that a municipal policy or custom existed pursuant to
which police officers were trained in the use of "escalating force," namely the chokehold proce-
dure. See supra note 226. Based on the trial court's instruction that the jury should consider
the permissibility of the police officer's use of force "in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances," Heller, 475 U.S. at 803 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the dissenters believed that a jury
might well have concluded the officer's conduct was not unreasonable because he was "merely
obeying orders and following established Police Department policy," id. at 803. Consequently,
the dissent concluded that the jury's "general verdict rejecting the excessive force claim against
Officer Bushey did not necessarily determine the constitutionality of the city's 'escalating force'
policy." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 804-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In criticizing the majority's dismissal of the
Monell claim, Justice Stevens suggested that "normal devices for addressing an apparently
inconsistent verdict" should have been invoked. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A trial
court, explained the Justice, has various options, including "construing the verdict in a manner
that resolves the inconsistency; resubmitting the case to the jury for it to resolve the inconsis-
tency; or even ordering a new trial." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Describing bifurcation as a "tactical weapon of
great value," Justice Stevens reflected upon the enormous benefit it represented for municipal
defendants. Henceforth, such defendants would "obtain the benefit of whatever intangible fac-
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plained that defense attorneys could use a bifurcation ruling to construct
a virtually unassailable defense for both the individual officer and the
municipality charged with civil rights violations. 239 Noting that Heller's
counsel had objected to the trial court's bifurcation order, Justice Stevens
described the defense strategy when a qualified immunity defense24° is
unavailable: first concede the officer's "wrongdoing" (i.e., that he had
used the chokehold), and then argue he was only following police depart-
ment regulations.241 Thus the blame and responsibility for the plaintiff's
injuries would be placed squarely in the empty chair of the municipal
defendant.242 In this situation, a jury that believes that the plaintiff suf-
fered a constitutional injury would likely sympathize with the plight of
the individual officer and find in her favor, believing that the municipal-
ity would be held accountable for the unlawful practice it maintained.
The jurors would not know that the defense strategy would absolve not
only the individual officer, but quite likely the municipality as well.
Though some trial courts have validated the defense strategy out-
lined in Stevens' dissent,243 such an expansive reading of Heller is incor-
tors have prompted juries to bring in a multitude of inconsistent verdicts in past years ... [and
would] no longer have to abide the mechanisms that courts have used to mitigate and resolve
apparent inconsistencies." Id. at 807-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 807-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. See supra note 229.
241. Officer Bushey's defense strategy placed responsibility on the municipality for his use
of the chokehold. Bushey, backed by his supervisor, testified that "he was carefully following
official Police Department policy." Heller, 475 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His attor-
ney "repeatedly emphasized that his client's actions were entirely consistent with established
Department policy." Id. at 802-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The defense clearly identified the
city as the responsible party:
[The] carotid hold was a hold that was being taught to the Los Angeles Police De-
partment. . . . In this case, it's not the City that's the defendant. It's Officer
Bushey .... [The] procedures which Officer Bushey followed are exactly what he's
taught and the reasons he's taught to do it .... Officer Bushey was trying to do his
job.
Id. at 803 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting defense counsel's remarks from the record)
(alterations by court).
242. See supra note 241 and text accompanying note 208.
243. When trial courts grant discovery bifurcation, they frequently base their decisions on
a misreading of Heller. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. Numerous courts
dismiss Monell claims upon individual officers' exoneration without first determining whether
the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of St. Charles, 972
F.2d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1992) (dismissing Monell claim after jury refused to award damages
against the individual officer, because any "trial of [plaintiff's] damage claim against the City
would serve no practical purpose"); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1369 (6th Cir. 1992)
("[W]here [the] only city police officer present during [an] arrest committed no constitutional
violation, [the] city could not be liable.., for failing to train its officers properly."); Swink v.
City of Pagedale, 810 F.2d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir.) (affirming district court's dismissal of Monell
claim after a jury verdict exonerated the individual officer), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1025 (1987);
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rect. In the only two post-Heller Supreme Court decisions on municipal
liability under section 1983, the Court affirmed jury verdicts against mu-
nicipalities despite the exoneration of individual defendants. In Prapro-
tnik v. City of St. Louis,244 the Court purposefully avoided deciding the
case before it on the basis of Heller, stating: "[W]e do not address [the
municipality's] contention that the jury verdict exonerating the individ-
ual defendants cannot be reconciled with the verdict against the city."' 245
The following year in City of Canton v. Harris,246 the Court again upheld
a jury's finding of municipal but not individual liability. The Canton
Court relied on Monell's precepts in extending municipalities' exposure
to liability for deliberate indifference to the proper training of their police
officers. 247 The Court did not discuss Heller, and cited the case but
once-for the proposition that section 1983 requires proof that a munici-
pal policy caused the constitutional violation, noting that this require-
ment had "deeply divided" the Justices since Monell.248
Had the Court intended that Heller require a finding of individual
liability as a condition precedent to municipal liability, it surely would
have highlighted and relied upon the earlier opinion, or at least discussed
its potential applicability, in deciding both Praprotnik and Canton. In-
stead, it did neither; indeed, both later cases are incompatible with a
broad construction of Heller. As one commentator concluded: "If mu-
nicipal liability was proper in Canton, Heller cannot mean that exonera-
tion of individual defendants precludes municipal liability. '249
Not only do Supreme Court decisions, both before and after Heller,
preclude application of that decision to require dismissal of Monell
claims when individual defendants are absolved; common sense does too.
Proof that an officer's use of force complied with the training he received
or with a customary police practice should not relieve the municipality
Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 73 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that "a necessary
prerequisite for finding the City liable is a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights by the
defendant officers"), affid mem., 908 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990); cf cases cited infra note 250.
244. 485 U.S. 112 (1988); see supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
245. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 128. The Eighth Circuit had distinguished Heller and recon-
ciled the jury's verdict against the municipality with that in the individual defendant's favor by
finding that the individual defendants did not directly cause the layoff from which the damages
arose. Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 798 F.2d 1168, 1173 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S.
112 (1988). The Supreme Court made its lone reference to Heller in simply noting the fact that
the lower court had distinguished that case. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 117-18.
246. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
247. See supra notes 170-177 and accompanying text.
248. Canton, 489 U.S. at 385-86, 386 n.4 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (citing Heller
as one of four cases since Monell in which the Court had been deeply divided over the proper
causal connection between municipal policy and injury).
249. Kritchevsky, supra note 35, at 440-41; see also supra note 232.
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from potential liability unless it is first determined that the "force" policy
is within constitutional limits. Should its policy exceed constitutional
limits, the municipality would be held responsible "for its own" actions
that caused a constitutional injury, unless saved by a court's expansive
view of Heller.250 Likewise, dismissal of a Monell claim would not be
warranted when a jury concludes that it was not a named defendant, but
rather an unidentified officer, who caused a constitutional injury attribu-
table to a municipality's policy of inadequate training or supervision, for
example. Similarly, when a plaintiff establishes that a constitutional in-
jury resulted from a municipal policy or custom, the municipality would
not avoid accountability solely because the named police defendants were
no longer parties to the action.
Proper reliance on Heller will lead trial courts to dismiss municipal
claims in limited instances. For example, a municipal defendant should
obtain dismissal of a Monell claim through a motion for summary judg-
ment251 when a court decides as a matter of law that there has been no
constitutional violation.2 52 If the court concludes as a matter of law that
the plaintiff did not suffer a recognizable injury, she would lack standing
250. Monell, 436 U.S. at 683. For instances in which courts upheld a jury's verdict against
the municipality despite finding no liability on the part of the individual officer, see Parrish v.
Luckie, 963 F.2d 201, 207 (8th Cir. 1992) ("A public entity or supervisory official may be
liable under section 1983, even though no government individuals were personally liable."),
and Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1058-65 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no incon-
sistency between jury's determination that police officer's actions did not amount to constitu-
tional violation and its decision that city was liable under section 1983 for its policy of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of intoxicated and potentially suicidal detainees
and failure to train officers to detect and meet such needs), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992).
251. Under Rule 56(c), a court must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that in deciding a
motion for summary judgement, the nonmoving party's evidence must "be believed and all
justifiable inferences [must] be drawn in [the nonmovant's] favor." Id. at 255.
252. See, eg., Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th
Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment upon finding that officer's negligence did not
give rise to a constitutional violation and hence that there was no Monell action for failing to
train or supervise the officer); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing
denial of summary judgment upon finding as a matter of law that no constitutional violation
resulted from a jail suicide and thus there was no need to address whether a municipal policy
was responsible for the officers' action); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297,
298 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of Monell action for failure to state a claim upon
finding that no Fourth Amendment or due process violation resulted from a high speed chase);
Fulkerson v. City of Lancaster, 801 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (granting summary
judgment because "no reasonable jury could find that the municipality acted with deliberate
indifference to plaintiff's rights"); infra note 314 (discussion of Fulkerson).
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to sue the municipality.253 In such instances, Heller mandates dismissal
because the plaintiff "has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of
the individual police officer, [and] the fact that the departmental regula-
tions might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
quite beside the point. 254
Courts may also properly apply Heller, although only with extreme
care, to dismiss a Monell claim when a jury's verdict clearly reflects its
finding that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional injury. To obtain
this information, trial courts should instruct the jurors to answer the fol-
lowing during their deliberations: "Do you believe the plaintiff was de-
prived of a constitutional right?" The use of this special interrogatory
would avoid improper dismissal of Monell claims when the jury absolves
the individual officer. It would also allow trial courts to determine
whether a verdict absolving the individual should also absolve the
municipality.
When trial courts condition a municipality's liability under section
1983 on an initial finding that an officer is also liable, they establish "a
reverse respondeat superior principle. ' 255 Such a principle is contrary to
the policy considerations underlying municipal liability. The Supreme
Court's consistent reliance on Monell's basic principles, as well as its lim-
ited use of Heller, makes clear that a municipality should remain subject
to liability when a litigant establishes "a direct causal link between a mu-
nicipal policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. ' 256 When trial
courts apply Heller broadly and dismiss Monell claims upon a litigant's
failure to prove an officer's individual liability, municipal defendants will
rarely be held accountable for their unconstitutional policies or cus-
toms. 2 57 Municipalities receive what amounts to immunity from section
253. Article III of the United States Constitution requires a live "case or controversy."
See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.4 (2d ed. 1984) (describing the constitutional
standing requirement of an "injury in fact").
254. Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
255. Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988). Although the court of appeals in Dodd found (on reargument)
that the individual officer was entitled to qualified immunity, Judge Pratt argued persuasively
that the city could still be held liable because such liability would be "based on different princi-
ples than the liability of its police officer." Id. (Pratt, J., dissenting). To prove his Monell
claim, the plaintiff would have to establish that a municipal policy was causally connected to
his constitutional injury. Id. at 10 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
256. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
257. Schwartz and Kirklin have suggested an alternative approach for litigants seeking to
establish that a municipality's policy or custom is responsible for causing a constitutional in-
jury: by suing only the municipality, and not the individual officer, a litigant may avoid a
court's expansive reading of Heller. 1 SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 35, § 7.6, at 347.
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1983 liability because, as the next section explains, jurors tend to find in
favor of individual police defendants.
B. The Difficulty of Overcoming a Jury's Pro-Police Officer Bias
In jurisdictions that apply Heller expansively, the individual officer's
defense is readily predictable once the trial court orders bifurcation: 258
step one is to select a sympathetic trial jury, preferably one that is
predominantly white or excludes African-Americans; 2 9 step two is to
convince this jury that the plaintiff's proof falls short of establishing that
They warned, however, that "[n]aming only the entity as a party defendant is risky business
when there is uncertainty as to whether the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights
resulted from enforcement of a municipal policy or practice." I id. at 348.
258. Most states and municipalities indemnify police officers charged with section 1983
liability when their actions occur in the line of duty and are not grossly inconsistent with their
training. For example, state law requires New York City to "indemnify and save harmless its
employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against such employees in any state or
federal court." N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50(k)(3) (McKinney 1986). Under the law of Massa-
chusetts, Boston must indemnify each of its police officers for up to one million dollars of
liability for actions "within the scope of his [or her] official duties." MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.
258, § 9 (Law. Co-op. 1992). California's indemnification statute also protects police officers
from liability for any "act or omission occurring within the scope of [their] employment," so
long as "the employee... reasonably cooperates in good faith in defense of the claim." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 825(a) (West Supp. 1993); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-8a (1990) (indem-
nifying state police against civil rights liability when "acting in the discharge of [their] duties,"
so long as the officer's actions were not "wanton, reckless, or malicious" and did not lead a
jury to assess punitive damages); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 1-4-5 (1990) (requiring munici-
palities having a population over 500,000 to indemnify police officers for actions "in the per-
formance of his or her duties .... except where the injury results from the willful misconduct
of the police officer"). When indemnification occurs, the municipality's attorneys will usually
represent the individual defendants at the first bifurcated trial. If they succeed in persuading
the jury that the officers are not liable, the municipality gains an enormous benefit: it can
argue pursuant to Heller that the court should dismiss the section 1983 Monell claim against it.
For discussion of the possible conflict of interest in this dual representation, see infra notes
349-355 and accompanying text.
259. In a previous article, this author detailed the historic role of predominantly white
juries in absolving law enforcement officials and white defendants accused of violence against
persons of color and in convicting African-Americans in race-sensitive cases. See Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge, supra note 49. Jurists and scholars have also recognized the impor-
tance of a jury's racial composition in these cases. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348, 2364 (1992) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) ("It is by now clear that conscious and uncon-
scious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts
presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence."); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1625-35 (1985)
(describing nine mock jury studies showing that white juries had higher conviction rates for
African-American and Latino-American defendants, and concluding that a minimum of three
racially similar jurors is necessary to withstand white majority group pressure); Developments
in The Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1559-60 (1988) (dis-
cussing the harm of racial minorities' underrepresentation on juries). See generally JON M.




the officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.26° While certainly
not a novel defense strategy, this combination has consistently foiled ef-
forts to hold police officers accountable for uses of excessive force in the
rare instances in which criminal prosecutions have been pursued; 261 it is
likely to work in civil rights actions as well.
(1) Jury Sympathy
As Justice Stevens indicated in his Heller dissent, juror sympathy
for individual officers is often decisive when civil rights claims are bifur-
cated.2 62 First, jurors' general sense of fairness mitigates against blaming
an officer for causing a constitutional injury when he merely carried out
department policy as an obedient employee. Second, most jurors are
predisposed to credit police officers' testimony. 263 They see the officer's
job as difficult and dangerous; police officers protect them and other law-
abiding citizens from dangerous people. Jurors are receptive to sugges-
tions that the officer had insufficient time to reflect or deliberate in the
face of a life-threatening situation. 264 The officer, they are told, must
react instinctively when his own (or someone else's) life and safety is at
260. This discussion contemplates that like the officer-defendant in Heller, individual de-
fendants are unable to rely on a qualified immunity defense and will attempt to persuade a jury
that their actions were not unreasonable considering the overall surrounding circumstances.
Heller, of course, does not foreclose section 1983 relief against a municipality following an
individual officer's successful qualified immunity defense. See supra note 229.
261. In New York City, there have been only ten cases during the past ten years in which
police officers were indicted for killing civilians. Of the seventeen officers indicted, only one
was convicted, and that was for manslaughter arising out of a drunk driving incident. At The
Hands of Police: The Court Record, NEWSDAY, Mar. 10, 1991, at 4. In two of the more
publicized cases, three transit police officers were acquitted of criminally negligent homicide in
the killing of Michael Stewart, id., and a New York City police officer was acquitted in a bench
trial for killing Eleanor Bumpurs, a 66-year-old grandmother, while evicting her from her
apartment, Frank J. Prial, Judge Acquits Sullivan in Shotgun Slaying Of Bumpurs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, at Bl.
262. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at
25.
263. In discussing the "troublesome aspects of prosecuting a police brutality matter," for-
mer prosecuting attorneys explained that "juries may accord greater credence to the testimony
of an arresting officer than to a suspect" in these cases. Daniel Wise, Brutality Cases Tough to
Prosecute, N.Y. L.J., May 29, 1992, at 1, 2. The former chief of the district attorney's trial
division in Manhattan added that "many jurors are reluctant to believe that officers would
perjure themselves." Id. As Jon Van Dyke noted, the few reported studies of the racial com-
position of juries found that the inclusion of African-Americans on a panel made the new,
racially integrated jury more likely to scrutinize and to challenge a police officer's testimony.
VAN DYKE, supra note 259, at 34-35.
264. When prosecuting a charge involving a police officer's use of excessive force, former
prosecutors acknowledged that trial juries represent a significant "stumbling block" that pro-
vides a built-in "advantage... to police officers charged with stepping over the line in handling
volatile, difficult-to-call situations." Wise, supra note 263, at 2.
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risk. When possible, the defense portrays the civil rights litigant as a
feared criminal. Many jurors will be receptive to depictions of the liti-
gant as personally threatening and will view his behavior as justifying the
officer's actions.265 During deliberations, whether consciously or not,
most jurors prefer to reach a verdict that supports the police officer; they
do not want to be labeled "pro-criminal. '266
(2) Sufficiency of Proof
Civil rights litigants confront a difficult burden in attempting to es-
tablish an individual officer's section 1983 liability. They must present
evidence sufficient to overcome not only the burden of proving specific
intent,267 but also the jury's pro-police bias. In most situations involving
the use of excessive force by police, few if any civilian witnesses are avail-
able to corroborate the plaintiff's version of how the injury occurred.
Even when civilian witnesses come forward, they are frequently vulnera-
ble to impeachment by traditional cross-examination methods. They are
265. The California jury in People v. Powell viewed a videotape of the defendant police
officers striking Rodney King 56 times with their batons. After they voted to acquit the four
police officers of using excessive force, some jurors explained their belief that Rodney King's
threatening behavior had justified the police action. Retta Kossow, who gave several anony-
mous television interviews immediately after the verdict, stated: "I am thoroughly convinced,
as were the others I believe, that Mr. King was in full control of the whole situation at all
times. He was not writhing in pain. He was moving to get away from the officers and he gave
every indication that he was under PCP." Nina Bernstein, Bitter Division in Jury Room: How
12 Ordinary Citizens Met for 7 Days to Produce the Verdict That Shook LA., NEWSDAY, May
14, 1992, at 5, 116. Although juror Charles Sheehan, described as adamant for acquittal,
declined to be interviewed, his wife explained the basis for the jury's verdict: "If Rodney King
had just submitted to arrest, none of this would have happened." Id. at 116; see also Seth
Mydans, Defense Lawyer at Beating Trial Asserts Driver Prompted Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 1992, at A16. Forewoman Dorothy Bailey recently explained that the jury's verdict was
based on "undisputed, unrefuted testimony" showing that the officers' conduct was appropri-
ate. Nightline: First King Trial Jury Foreman Speaks (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 8,
1993).
266. Obviously, not every juror conclusively or consciously favors the police. A jury's
ability to be fair and impartial in race-sensitive cases, however, depends to a substantial extent
on the jury's racial composition, particularly when the victim is African-American. Colbert,
Challenging the Challenge, supra note 49, at 122-24. In such cases, significant representation
of African-Americans on the jury is necessary to assure that the panel's verdict is based on the
evidence presented, rather than the victim's race or the police officer's status. Multiracial
juries are essential for "overcoming one legacy of slavery: the conclusive presumption that
black persons' testimony is not worthy of belief." Id. at 114; see Johnson, supra note 259, at
1625-35 (reviewing sociological research that establishes the importance of a jury's racial com-
position for the impartiality of its verdict in cases involving African-American crime victims);
see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) ("When any large and identifiable segment
of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown
and perhaps unknowable.").
267. See Murphy, supra note 3, at 25; Stolberg, supra note 3, at Al.
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likely to come from the same community as the plaintiff and to be sus-
ceptible to the same defense stereotyping. 268 Moreover, even if jurors
find these witnesses credible, the jury is likely to conclude that the plain-
tiff's evidence is not sufficiently persuasive to outweigh the credibility of
defense witnesses' testimony, particularly when the defendant officer tes-
tifies. Because most confrontations between police officers and citizens
are neither recorded nor photographed, juries frequently cannot resolve
factual inconsistencies and, consequently, give police the benefit of any
doubt. The fact of pro-police bias was most dramatically demonstrated
by the defense verdicts in the state criminal prosecution of the Los Ange-
les police officers who beat Rodney King: even when a videotape reveals
what appears to be overwhelming evidence of the police using excessive
force, there is no assurance that a jury will credit the picture shown.269
When there are no civilian witnesses, a civil rights litigant could
look for corroboration from the other police officers who were present.
She could expect little help from the defendant officers, whose version of
events would obviously tend to justify their conduct. But other police
officers present would be equally unlikely to serve as plaintiffs' witnesses.
Police officers follow a strictly enforced custom of refusing to offer testi-
mony that would adversely affect another officer. "[E]nforced by peer
pressure, and tacitly sanctioned by the refusal of [Police] Department[s]
to impose on [their] employees any obligation to disclose, even under
questioning, misconduct by their fellow officers,"'270 the code of silence
makes it virtually impossible for police officers who witness a fellow of-
ficer engaging in unlawful violence against a citizen to testify about it.27
268. When a witness is a relation or close friend of the plaintiff, the defense will suggest
that the witness is biased. Should the witness appear hostile to police, or have had any prior
unpleasant experiences, the defense would attempt to expose the witness's hostility on cross-
examination. David Rudovsky described some of the "burdens" that civil rights plaintiffs
face-burdens that adversely affect them before a jury: "They are often poor, or members of
racial minorities, or uneducated or inarticulate; some have criminal records. Jurors tend to
dismiss their allegations. ... David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can The Violence Be Con-
tained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 490 (1992). When, as is often the case, a plaintiff's
witness shares these characteristics, the defense would attempt to expose them during cross-
examination in order to damage the witness's credibility.
269. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text.
270. Brandon v. Allen, 645 F. Supp. 1261, 1266-67 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). The district court
in Brandon found that there was "a code of silence binding patrolmen and supervisors alike
not to testify against or report on their colleagues," and that it "pervaded the Department and
was tolerated and effectively sanctioned by its highest officials." Id. at 1266-67; see also Bran-
don v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 467 n.6 (1985) (describing how officers' and citizens' complaints
were discouraged and squelched (quoting Brandon v. Allen, 516 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (W.D.
Tenn. 1981))).
271. The police code of silence is an unwritten but widely recognized practice under which
police officers refuse to testify against fellow officers and, if necessary, engage in cover-ups in
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Civil rights litigants face other, related proof problems in suits
against individual police officers. The circumstances in which police use
excessive force commonly make it difficult for the plaintiff, or any civil-
ian bystanders, to provide a positive and convincing identification of the
culpable officer. A common defense strategy is to concede that the plain-
tiff was deprived of her constitutional rights, but argue that the wrong
order to protect other officers. ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 213-14
(1971); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY 58, 249 (2d ed. 1975). Law enforcement officials recognize the code's exist-
ence. A Washington, D.C. police officer recently sued two police unions, charging that they
defamed him and caused him emotional distress by systematically harassing him after he broke
the code of silence. See John Murawski, A Cop Shatters the Code of Blue, LEGAL TIMES, Jan.
18, 1993, at 1, 6; see also Letta Tayler & Alvin E. Bessent, Police and the Use of Force, NEWS-
DAY, June 3, 1991, at 7 (describing a police officer in Suffolk County, New York who quit the
force and moved to Florida, "complaining bitterly that he was ostracized and refused police
backup for speaking out about police misconduct"). In New York City, senior police officials
were recently accused of hindering an internal investigation of six officers charged with drug
trafficking. George James, 2d Police Inquiry Begins into Drug-Dealing Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 1992, at B3. Several years earlier, New York's Police Commissioner advocated prison
sentences for police officers who were obstructing a criminal investigation into the use of stun
guns, saying it was the only means of shattering "the blue wall of silence." Selwyn Raab, Five
Police Officers Indicted by Jury in Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1985, at Al, B5; see also
Tim Weiner, Ex-Officer Who Broke Code of Silence Given Probation, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb.
13, 1985, at Al (quoting U.S. Attorney Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.: "There is a custom that has
developed within the Philadelphia Police Department that Philadelphia police officers will ac-
quiesce in the illegal and improper conduct of their fellow officers, and that when called to tell
the truth ... the Philadelphia police officer will remain silent."); Brian McGrory, Across US,
Public's Confidence in Police Officers Takes a Plunge, Bonds of Brotherhood Enforce Code of
Silence, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 1991, at Al; Wise, supra note 263, at 1 (describing problems
for prosecutors resulting from code of silence). Interestingly, prosecutors in the federal trial of
the Los Angeles officers charged with beating Rodney King appeared ready to challenge the
credibility of defense witnesses based on the code of silence. Tactic Unchanged in Beating
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at A18.
Courts too have recognized the pervasiveness of the code of silence. See, e.g., Sorlucco v.
New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing evidence of
police officers' reluctance to report misconduct for fear of retaliation); Spell v. McDaniel, 824
F.2d 1380, 1392 (4th Cir. 1987) (admitting evidence demonstrating that officials engaged in
cover-up of police abuses), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Ambrose, 740
F.2d 505 app. at 521 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court's oral remarks at sentencing hearing) ("[I]t
is a fact, and it was even admitted from the witness stand, that there is a code of silence, and
that most policemen observe it."); Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir.
1982) (finding that a police conspiracy to arrange the wrongful discharge of an officer was part
of a code of silence designed to discourage policemen from testifying against one another);
Bonsignore v. City of New York, 521 F. Supp. 394, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that code
of silence was impressed upon new recruits at police academy), afi'd, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.
1982). Moreover, Chicago civil rights attorneys have successfully prosecuted section 1983
causes of action against municipalities based on the code of silence. See, e.g., Myatt v. City of
Chicago, No. 90-C-3991, 1992 WL 447832, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1992); McLin v. City of
Chicago, 742 F. Supp. 994, 1001-02 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Burton v. Drakulich, No. 90-C-6808,
1991 WL 38701, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 1991); Williams v. City of Chicago, 658 F. Supp.
147, 149-50 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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officer is on trial. Traditional cross-examination techniques will fre-
quently establish that the plaintiff's witnesses had an insufficient opportu-
nity to view the officer who actually committed an unlawful assault. In
cases in which the plaintiff is the only person who can testify to identifi-
cation, it is unlikely that she will ever prevail over the officer in a one-on-
one credibility contest on this issue.272
Trial courts that construe Heller broadly overlook these practical
and substantial proof problems facing civil rights litigants when they rou-
tinely dismiss Monell claims after a jury fails to find an individual officer
liable. To guard against the possibility of an unjust outcome when Mo-
nell claims are bifurcated, a trial court's jury charge should include a
special interrogatory requiring the jury to find whether the plaintiff sus-
tained a constitutional injury.273 When a jury then indicates that such
an injury has occurred, trial courts must permit the plaintiff to present
evidence of the municipality's section 1983 liability.
The following Part presents evidence of federal courts' growing reli-
ance on Rule 42(b) to bifurcate Monell claims from those against individ-
ual officers in section 1983 litigation. These rulings deviate from the
principles used to decide bifurcation motions in ordinary civil cases.
More significantly, they often create a forum hostile to plaintiffs, in
which a court's case management concerns triumph over civil rights liti-
gants' efforts to vindicate constitutional rights violated by individual and
municipal actors.
V. The Current Trend Toward Bifurcation in Section 1983
Cases
The first reported instance of a trial judge ordering bifurcation of the
claim against a municipal defendant from that against an individual of-
ficer in a section 1983 case occurred in City of Los Angeles v. Heller.2 74
Relying on the Supreme Court's abbreviated 1986 Heller opinion,2 75 fed-
eral district judges sitting in Los Angeles, New York, and Boston have
begun to bifurcate Monell claims in section 1983 cases. Because there are
few published decisions treating the issue of Monell bifurcation, 276 the
272. See REISS, supra note 271, at 212; SKOLNICK, supra note 271, at 231-43.
273. See supra text following note 254; see also supra notes 37, 233.
274. 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam); see infra Part IV.A.
275. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
276. For a review of the reported decisions, see infra notes 278, 289-297, 302 and accom-
panying text. There are no reported federal court of appeals decisions. Second Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge George Pratt explained that "appellate courts have had nothing to say about
bifurcation because it is discretionary with the trial judge." Judge George Pratt, Address at
the Practicing Law Institute Conference on Section 1983 (Oct. 31, 1992).
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following discussion relies on conversations with practicing attorneys,
representing both plaintiffs and defendants,, to provide an indication of
the extent to which courts in these jurisdictions are bifurcating such
claims.277 Apparently, the practice is commonplace in these localities,
and there is some evidence that it is employed in other jurisdictions as
well. 27
8
Attorneys surveyed indicate that regional differences exist in the
breadth and meaning of bifurcation orders. Courts in Los Angeles and
Boston normally issue bifurcation orders only after the parties complete
discovery on the Monell claim; they require the municipal claim to be
tried separately, after the trial of the individual claim (trial bifurca-
tion).279 If the jury finds the individual officer liable in such a bifurcated
277. Interview subjects were chosen on the basis of their expertise in the area. The plain-
tiffs' civil rights bar in police misconduct cases is relatively finite and well known in most
jurisdictions. See infra note 371. Most interviewees were selected from published decisions or
on the recommendation of other attorneys. For example, David Rudovsky and Michael Av-
ery, coauthors of the Police Misconduct text, supra note 8, suggested several plaintiffs' attor-
neys in Boston, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. The New York City Corporation Counsel was
particularly helpful in providing a defense perspective and in identifying several plaintiffs' at-
torneys. In addition, the Practicing Law Institute's conference on section 1983 liability, which
was held October 30-31, 1992 in New York City, led to additional interviews with plaintiffs'
and defense attorneys. Finally, the few judges who were willing to speak on the matter were
identified based on the published and unpublished decisions and on interviews with practicing
attorneys.
278. See, eg., Grier v. City of Albany, No. 89-CV-1213, slip op. (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (order-
ing bifurcated trials on Monell and individual section 1983 claims); Marryshow v. Town of
Bladensberg, 139 F.R.D. 318, 319 (D. Md. 1991) (same); Howdyshell v. Wille, No. 90-6672-
CIV, slip op. (S.D. Fla. 1990) (same). Reporting on his experiences in New Haven, civil rights
attorney John Williams indicated that the "majority of judges are bifurcating at the trial
stage." Interview with John Williams, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 1992). New York City
attorneys speculated that their counterparts in Chicago may now be considering the use of
bifurcation motions as a regular practice in defending the municipality against civil rights
claims. Joint Interview with Tom Bergdall, Supervising Attorney, New York City Corpora-
tion Counsel, and Second Supervising Attorney Who Requested Anonymity, New York City
Corporation Counsel, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 14, 1992) [hereinafter Joint Interview].
Describing the trend in the Northern District of Illinois, Chicago civil rights attorney Flint
Taylor reported that bifurcation motions "are not that prevalent and when made are usually
denied." Recently, however, a judge granted such a motion. Telephone Interview with G.
Flint Taylor (Dec. 21, 1992) (referring to Myatt v. City of Chicago, No. 90-C-3991, 1992 WL
447832, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1992)). Taylor believes that bifurcation motions will
tempt some judges to "place practicality over principle." Id. Speaking before the Myatt bifur-
cation decision, Chief Judge James Moran stated that he had never heard of bifurcation being
raised in brutality cases in Chicago, and suggested that most plaintiffs' attorneys do not bother
with Monell claims because individual claims are much less costly to pursue and much easier
to prove. Telephone Interview with Chief Judge James B. Moran, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois (Apr. 16, 1992) (conducted by research assistant Bethany
Conybeare).
279. See infra notes 281-287, 307-311 and accompanying text.
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trail, a trial on the Monell claim usually follows immediately, before that
same jury. In New York City, plaintiffs' attorneys face more intrusive
bifurcation orders that prevent them from conducting discovery on Mo-
nell claims until, and permit it only after, a jury first finds the officer
liable at a bifurcated trial (discovery bifurcation).280
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, Los Angeles civil
rights attorneys have faced trial bifurcation of Monell claims and expan-
sive applications of Heller on a regular basis. Steven Yagman, who rep-
resented Mr. Heller, encounters bifurcation motions in virtually all the
cases on his busy section 1983 docket. 28 1 He estimated that federal
judges in the Central District of California order bifurcation in "ninety-
five percent of section 1983 trials. '282 Moreover, when combined with a
misreading of Heller, Yagman agreed that bifurcation can be lethal to a
plaintiff's case: "If you don't win the first trial, there is no trial against
the municipality. 2 83 Tom Beck, whose Los Angeles practice deals ex-
clusively with section 1983 claims, reported that "trial bifurcation is now
entrenched in federal court, with only one or two exceptions. '2 8 4 Be-
cause the "bifurcation practices of some judges are well-known," Beck
added, "I have stopped arguing against separate trials in most in-
stances. ' '2 85 Michael Lightfoot, another Los Angeles civil rights attor-
ney, stated: "During the past several years, judges have followed Heller
and consistently bifurcated [the trials of] every section 1983 case I've
handled. '2 86 Los Angeles attorney Barry Litt agreed that trial bifurca-
tion "is a typical judicial practice in a section 1983 case." '2 87
During the same approximate period, federal judges in New York
City also began bifurcating Monell claims at trial. Many are now ex-
tending the practice to prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with discovery
on their civil rights claims against the municipality.2 88 Judge Peter Lei-
280. See infra notes 288-306 and accompanying text. Discovery bifurcation necessarily
includes trial bifurcation, and is more intrusive because it also prohibits discovery on the Mo-
nell claim until after trial or other disposal of the individual claims. Another significant differ-
ence between the two forms of bifurcation is that bifurcated trials normally take place before
the same jury, while cases bifurcated for discovery are completely severed; if the second case
comes to trial, it will be before a new jury.
281. Telephone Interview with Steven Yagman, supra note 220.
282. Id.
283. Id. Attorneys in New York and Boston have had similar experiences. See infra notes
302, 308 and accompanying text.
284. Telephone Interview with Tom Beck (Aug. 13, 1992).
285. Id.
286. Telephone Interview with Michael Lightfoot (Aug. 13, 1992).
287. Telephone Interview with Barry Litt (Aug. 13, 1992).
288. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
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sure's opinion in the 1989 southern district case of Ismail v. Cohen289
became the first published decision by a New York federal court ordering
trial bifurcation of Monell claims in section 1983 litigation. Ismail is fre-
quently cited to support the current defense practice. 290
Interestingly, Ismail involved a motion by the plaintiff (not the de-
fense), who sought bifurcation of the Monell claim in order to avoid "the
jury becoming confused and distracted. ' 291 Viewing the bifurcation issue
from the plaintiff's perspective, Judge Leisure ordered separate trials be-
cause he feared that the Monell evidence would " 'contaminate' the mind
of the finder of fact in its consideration of the liability of the other de-
fendant. ' 292 Judge Leisure expressed concern that a single trial would
prejudice the jury's fair evaluation of the plaintiff's evidence against both
defendants.2 93 Moreover, because separate trials would "be determina-
tive" on the issue of the city's vicarious liability, the judge believed that
bifurcation would "promote[] ease of adjudication. '294
In Ismail, the court ordered bifurcation at the plaintiff's request af-
ter discovery on the Monell claim was concluded. The court exercised its
discretion to bifurcate only after making an informed judgment based on
the facts of the case. For example, it considered whether bifurcated trials
289. 706 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 183 (2d
Cir. 1990).
290. The "form brief" used by attorneys for the City of New York repeatedly cites Ismail
as support for discovery and trial bifurcation orders. See, eg., Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Defendants' Motion for Separate Trials and Bifurcation of Discovery at 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
12, Hernandez v. Koehler, No. 87 Civ. 8774 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Form
Brief]. Numerous courts have relied on Ismail to justify discovery bifurcation as promoting
convenience and avoiding prejudice to defendants. See, eg., Ricciuti v. New York City
Transit Auth., 796 F. Supp. 84, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Haight, J.); Fisher v. City of New York,
No. 90 Civ. 8163, 1992 WL 77606, at *2, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1992) (Freeh, J.).
291. Telephone Interview with Robert Herbst, Counsel for Labib Ismail (Aug. 31, 1992).
In Ismail, Herbst thought that the Monell claim was weak, and for this reason moved to
bifurcate and to try the section 1983 action against the officer first, along with state law claims.
Id.
292. Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251.
293. The Court stated its concern that
evidence concerning a defacto policy encouraging discrimination of the City, or that
the City failed to train adequately its officers, could prejudice the jury in its determi-
nation of the culpability of [the individual officer] .... Likewise, if the jury deter-
mines that Officer Cohen is culpable this might unfairly influence its determination of
whether the City had a de facto policy leading to discriminatory treatment [of the
plaintiff].
Id.
294. Id. The plaintiff's state law and other federal civil rights claims were based on vicari-
ous liability theories. The trial court concluded that these issues could properly be resolved in
a separate trial because their proof would not overlap with the Monell issue, which "involve[d]




"would greatly expand the length and scope of the trial and add to the
expense of the parties. '295 The decision contemplated that the Monell
claim would be heard by the same jury that was to determine the individ-
ual officer's section 1983 liability.296 Most significantly, Judge Leisure's
order did not condition Monell relief on a jury finding of individual
liability.
Currently, judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New
York are commonly granting defense motions to bifurcate Monell claims
at the discovery and trial stages of section 1983 cases. 297 They appear to
do so as a matter of routine practice and over the objection of plaintiffs'
counsel. 298 Most New York City-area judges rarely analyze the rationale
for bifurcation in reasoned, written opinions. 299 Nor do their written or-
295. Id. at 252.
296. See id.
297. For examples of discovery bifurcation orders, see Ricciuti v. New York City Transit
Auth., 796 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Haight, J.), Fisher v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ.
8163, 1992 WL 77606 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1992) (Freeh, J.), Kohn v. City of New York, No.
90 Civ. 5730, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1991) (Martin, J.), Deagle v. City of New York, No.
90 Civ. 8203, 1991 WL 267765 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1991) (Freeh, J.), Transcript of Motion, Ray
v. Catone, No. 89 Civ. 0836 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1991) (Glasser, J.), Transcript of Motion,
Campbell v. New York City, No. 88 Civ. 3730 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1991) (Glasser, J.), Her-
nandez v. Koehler, No. 87 Civ. 8774, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1990) (Bernikow, Mag.,
assigned by Martin, J.), and Quick v. Short, No. 87 Civ. 0695, 1990 WL 422418 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 1990) (Martin, J.). Discovery bifurcation was also granted in Hood v. Mack, No. 86
Civ. 7656 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1990) (Connor, J.), Figueroa v. Geoghan, No. 88 Civ. 0807
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Mukasey, J.), and Ferdinand v. City of New York, No. 87 Civ. 0807
(E.D.N.Y. 1989). See Form Brief, supra note 290, at 16-18 (describing these cases).
Other courts have limited bifurcation orders to the trial stage, permitting discovery to
proceed on the Monell claim. See, e.g., Pavlovich v. City of New York, No. 91 Civ. 5030, 1992
WL 230472 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1992) (Leisure, J.); Santiago v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ.
5233, 1992 WL 116605 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 1992) (Sweet, J.); Julio v. City of New York, No.
89 Civ. 8144, 1991 WL 113717 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1991) (Mukasey, J.); Gibson v. Carmody,
No. 89 Civ. 5358, 1990 WL 52272 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1990) (McKenna, J.).
298. See cases cited supra note 297; see also infra text accompanying notes 364-369
(describing the difficulties that bifurcation creates for plaintiffs). On the other hand, New
York City supervising attorneys have observed that some plaintiffs attorneys are consenting to
defense bifurcation motions. Lawrence S. Kahn, Chief Litigation Assistant, New York City
Corporation Counsel, Address at the Practicing Law Institute Conference on Section 1983
(Oct. 31, 1992); Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Second Supervising Attorney).
299. In Kohn, No. 90 Civ. 5730, for example, Judge John Martin ordered discovery and
trial bifurcation at the initial case conference. Telephone Interview with Daniel Alterman,
Counsel for Frederic Kohn (Oct. 13, 1991). Judge Martin also ordered bifurcation before
discovery in Quick, No. 87 Civ. 0695, 1990 WL 422418, at *1, and Hernandez, No. 87 Civ.
8774, slip op. at 2 (Berkinow, Mag., assigned by Martin, J.). Other trial courts also have ruled
on defendants' bifurcation motions without significant argument or submission of legal briefs.
See, e.g., Transcript of Motion at 2, Campbell (No. 88 Civ. 3730); Form Brief, supra note 290,
at 16-17 (describing grant of discovery bifurcation on oral motion in Hood (No. 86 Civ. 7656),
and sua sponte in Figueroa (No. 88 Civ. 0807)). Plaintiffs' attorneys James Meyerson and
Jonathan Moore indicated that they became familiar with judges' bifurcation orders in the Fall
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ders consider whether separate trials will prejudice a litigant or cause
economic hardship or inconvenience. 3°° Unlike the judge in Ismail,
many judges enter sua sponte discovery bifurcation orders during the ini-
tial stages of a case, precluding discovery on the Monell claim until the
individual officer's civil rights liability is determined.30 1 These orders
usually rely on Heller to support both discovery bifurcation and the dis-
missal of Monell claims should individual liability not be proved. When
a jury finds no individual liability, these judges dismiss the Monell
claim;30 2 only in the event that the jury finds against the officer is the
of 1990. Interview with James Meyerson, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 12, 1992); Interview with
Jonathan Moore, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 14, 1992). Meyerson noted that the judge in his
case allowed him a full opportunity to brief and argue against the city's motion. Interview
with James Meyerson, supra (referring to Gibson, No. 89 Civ. 5358, slip op. (McKenna, J.))
For other instances in which courts appeared to consider the consequences of bifurcation or-
ders, see Pavlovich, No. 91 Civ. 5030, 1992 WL 230472, Ricciuti, 796 F. Supp. at 84, and
Santiago, No. 90 Civ. 5233, 1992 WL 116605.
300. See, e.g., Kohn, No. 90 Civ. 5730, slip op.; Transcript of Motion, Ray (No. 89 Civ.
0836); Transcript of Motion, Campbell (No. 88 Civ. 3730); Quick, No. 87 Civ. 0695, slip op.;
Hernandez, No. 87 Civ. 8774, slip op.
301. See cases cited supra note 297.
302. For example, in Campbell, No. 88 Civ. 3730, Judge I. Leo Glasser granted the de-
fendant's motion to bifurcate discovery on the Monell claim. During oral argument, Judge
Glasser construed Heller expansively: "If the officers are found to be not liable, then the city
would ndt be liable." Transcript of Motion at 3, Campbell (No. 88 Civ. 3730). The judge
believed bifurcation was appropriate because "if the jury returned a verdict for the defendant
police officer we never have to concern ourselves with all of that testimony and evidence re-
garding the City of New York." Id. at 5. He never considered the obvious alternative-
submitting a special interrogatory to the jury in order to ascertain whether it believed that the
plaintiff had been deprived of a constitutional right. For similar rulings, see Quick, No. 87
Civ. 0695, 1990 WL 422418, at * I (Martin, J.) ("If plaintiff is unsuccessful in his action against
the individual defendants there will be no need for a further trial against the municipal defend-
ants .... ."), Hernandez, No. 88 Civ. 3730, slip op. at 2 (same (quoting Quick)), and Form
Brief, supra note 290, at 17 (describing Figueroa, No. 88 Civ. 0807: "Judge Mukasey directed
that discovery pertaining to plaintiff's pattern and practice claim be permitted only if plaintiff
prevailed at the trial of the underlying incident.").
In Ray, No. 89 Civ. 0836, Judge Glasser applied his interpretation of Heller to preclude
Monell discovery until after trial of the claims against the individual officer, even though the
defendant prison guard based his defense on qualified immunity. Transcript of Motion at 6-7,
Ray (No. 89 Civ. 0836); cf supra note 229. Responding to the plaintiff's contention that a
good faith defense does not foreclose municipal liability, Judge Glasser stated:
And if the jury finds that the force used against the plaintiff was not excessive and
was justified for whatever reason may appear, either self-defense or for the purpose,
legitimate purpose of maintaining the security or discipline of the institution or what
have you, that would be the end of the matter. Wouldn't it?
Id. at 7. Judge Glasser concluded: "If the jury returns a verdict for the defendant in this case,
I think this case would be at an end. I don't believe that you could thereafter claim that the
City of New York is responsible for conduct which the jury found was not actionable or tor-
tious." Id. at 7-8. Similarly, Judge Louis Freeh granted discovery bifurcation in Deagle in the
belief that it would promote judicial economy: "[MIfDeagle is unsuccessful in his claim against
[the officer], he will no longer have a cause of action against the municipal defendants." No.
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plaintiff eligible to begin discovery and proceed to trial on the municipal
claim.
According to New York City Corporation Counsel attorneys, the
issue of bifurcation had become a "hot topic" by the Spring of 1990,
primarily because the city was "spending enormous amounts of time an-
swering Monell discovery motions. Large plaintiffs' firms were running
up astronomical attorneys fees."' 30 3 Beginning in the Fall of that year,
many New York judges became receptive to the idea of bifurcating Mo-
nell claims for discovery and trial.30 4 New York City civil rights lawyers
soon discovered that some judges ordered bifurcation sua sponte and
without formal argument, while others acted only on defense motions
and with more deliberation. 30 5 Currently, according to a city supervising
attorney, "just about every judge grants these motions routinely or bifur-
cates sua sponte. ' '30 6
In Boston, most federal judges follow the Los Angeles model of rou-
tinely bifurcating Monell claims for trial after the parties conclude dis-
covery. Attorney Howard Friedman, one of a handful of Boston lawyers
who specialize in section 1983 claims, estimated that "of the twelve sit-
ting district court judges, only one or possibly two have refused to grant
bifurcation motions. ' 30 7 As a result, Friedman explained, Monell claims
are rarely heard: "If you lose the first trial against the individual officer,
there will not be a second trial; if you win, the city will indemnify and
settle the case."' 30 8 Michael Avery, a coauthor of the Police Misconduct
90 Civ. 8203, 1991 WL 267765, at * 1. After exonerating the officer on a defense of qualified
immunity, however, Judge Freeh declined to follow his earlier statement and correctly refused
to dismiss the plaintiff's Monell claims. Deagle v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 8203, 1992
WL 116368, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1992) ("[I]t is still an open question whether a constitu-
tional violation occurred and whether a municipal policy or custom 'caused' that violation.").
303. Interview with Trial Attorney Who Requested Anonymity, New York City Corpora-
tion Counsel, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Anonymous
Trial Attorney]; see also infra notes 329-331.
304. At the time, New York's federal judges had just returned from a Second Circuit
Judicial Conference. Although bifurcation of Monell claims was not included in the confer-
ence's program, Telephone Interview with Steven Flanders, Executive Director, Second Cir-
cuit Judicial Conference (Aug. 17, 1992), it is likely that judges informally discussed the
"problem" of section 1983 claims against the City of New York. See infra note 320. Accord-
ing to attorneys for New York City, judges were well aware that plaintiffs' discovery demands
on Monell claims were generating substantial opposition from city attorneys at the time of the
conference. Joint Interview, supra note 278; Telephone Interview with Blanche Greenfield,
Trial Attorney, New York City Corporation Counsel (Nov. 5, 1992).
305. See supra note 299.
306. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Second Supervising Attorney).
307. Telephone Interview with Howard Friedman (Aug. 5, 1992).
308. Id. Friedman recalled that Boston's former corporation counsel, Joseph Mulligan,
emphasized at his retirement that "there had never been a section 1983 judgment against the
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text309 and Boston civil rights attorney, is also familiar with defense mo-
tions for trial bifurcation: "Defendants began fMling these motions maybe
ten years ago, but it is only within the past few years that federal judges
are granting the applications. ' 310 In western Massachusetts, civil rights
attorney Chuck DiMare related that "attorneys for the city routinely ask
to bifurcate, but until recently, these motions were always denied. '311
DiMare predicted: "There will be a shift following a recent jury verdict
in which the trial magistrate's frustration with the Monell claim led to
his stating that he intended to bifurcate all future cases. '31 2
Not all federal judges and city attorneys are following the trend to-
ward bifurcation.313 David Rudovsky, coauthor of Police Misconduct
and Philadelphia attorney, stated: "Apparently, Philadelphia is an ex-
ception to the general bifurcation trend. It is rare that defendants move
to bifurcate, and rarer still for judges to grant the motion. ' 314 His col-
league Jules Epstein said: "I have never had a case where a judge bifur-
city of Boston" during his tenure. Telephone Interview with Howard Friedman (Mar. 19,
1993).
309. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 8.
310. Telephone Interview with Michael Avery (July 28, 1992).
311. Telephone Interview with Chuck DiMare (Aug. 5, 1992).
312. Id.
313. In addition to the practice of federal judges sitting in Philadelphia and Detroit, see
infra notes 314-317 and accompanying text, a district court in Kansas recently denied a munic-
ipality's motion to bifurcate a Monell claim in a section 1983 case involving allegations of
police brutality. See Saviour v. City of Kansas City, 793 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D. Kan. 1992).
Similarly, the practice has not taken root in Chicago, although one judge recently ordered
bifurcation there. See supra note 278.
314. Telephone Interview with David Rudovsky (Aug. 10, 1992). The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has maintained a consistently strong policy against routine bifurcation in
any type of case. See cases cited supra notes 194-196. It has also rejected an expansive inter-
pretation of City of Los Angeles v. Heller. In Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992), the Third Circuit upheld a jury's verdict
that exonerated the individual defendants while holding the municipality liable for "its own
policy, custom or training procedures, [which] directly-and with deliberate indifference-
violated Simmons's constitutional rights." Id. at 1058. The Simmons Court reaffirmed Mo-
nell's holding that "local governing bodies, although not subject to respondeat superior liabil-
ity, may be sued directly under section 1983 for constitutional injuries arising from the
implementation of municipal policies or customs." Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Sim-
mons also offers a lucid explanation of how a plaintiff may prove a municipality's policy or
custom of deliberate indifference, see id. at 1059-63, and the evidence needed to establish the
requisite state of mind, see id. at 1062-63. In Fulkerson v. City of Lancaster, 801 F. Supp.
1476 (E.D. Pa. 1992), a district judge reiterated that Heller does not mandate dismissal of
Monell claims simply because the individual officer is absolved of liability:
In Simmons, and in the case at bar, the individual officer is found not liable based on
the lack of the requisite mental state-gross negligence or recklessness-rather than
based on a lack of any constitutional injury. Therefore, we cannot absolve the City of
Lancaster based solely on our decision that Sergeant Deck was not liable.
Id. at 1485.
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cated the Monell claim.... As far as I know, the judges in Philadelphia
are upholding the idea of a single trial in such cases. ' 315 Alan Yatvin,
another Philadelphia civil rights attorney, added that "city attorneys
have not attempted to bifurcate Monell claims, but the issue arose re-
cently when a judge granted a defense attorney's motion in a pending
section 1983 case in which Amtrak was the defendant. ' 316 In Detroit,
civil rights attorney Richard Soble indicated that he too was "unaware
that bifurcation is being utilized in section 1983 cases heard in the East-
ern District [of Michigan]," and described the practice as "extremely
rare.,
317
Despite the paucity of published authority, practical experience in-
dicates that bifurcation of Monell claims is firmly entrenched in Los An-
geles, New York, and Boston. Federal judges in Los Angeles and Boston
generally use trial bifurcation, while those sitting in New York employ
the more drastic discovery bifurcation model. The remainder of this Part
presents the perspectives of federal judges and practicing defense and
plaintiffs' attorneys on bifurcation in civil rights litigation. The following
discussion demonstrates that unless checked, bifurcation can be expected
to spread to other jurisdictions with heavy section 1983 dockets.
A. Judges
It is easy to see why trial courts welcome bifurcation as a means to
manage a busy calendar and to avoid what they view as prolonged and
unnecessary Monell litigation. Courts' burgeoning caseloads remain a
matter of serious administrative concern, and measures aimed at econo-
mizing scarce judicial resources are indispensable. 318 At an orientation
315. Telephone Interview with Jules Epstein (Aug. 3, 1992).
316. Telephone Interview with Alan Yatvin (Aug. 3, 1992).
317. Telephone Interview with Richard Soble (Aug. 4, 1992). Similarly, a judge sitting in
the less urban Western District of Michigan reported that he had never heard of the issue of
bifurcation being raised in excessive force cases. Telephone Interview with Judge Richard A.
Enslen, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Apr. 14, 1992) (conducted
by research assistant Bethany Conybeare).
318. The federal judiciary sought an increase of $440 million in its fiscal 1993 budget "to
help it cope with a rising work load." More Work, More Money, 24 NAT'L J. 524, 524 (1992).
Congress rejected the request, despite evidence that civil filings increased 9% and criminal
cases jumped 6% during the past year. Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Courts Face Year of Living
Frugally, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at 1. The resulting fiscal strain has forced many courts
to suspend all civil jury trials, including section 1983 cases, until Congress provides more
money. Stephen Labaton, Federal Judges Blame Money Woes for Slowdown, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1993 (reporting that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts ordered a
halt to all civil jury trials, to take effect May 12, 1993); see also Deborah Pines, District Court
Backlogs Up Slightly: Federal Case Filings, Dispositions Increase, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 13, 1992, at 1
(discussing the nature of and possible reasons for increasing caseload); Robert D. Raven, Don't
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for newly appointed federal judges, for example, more experienced col-
leagues devoted an entire day to explaining methods for controlling court
dockets.319 While there is no indication that speakers at these seminars
specifically advise judges to consider bifurcation in section 1983 cases,
they likely cite Rule 42(b) as a valuable procedure for judges interested in
better managing their caseloads and avoiding trials of complex issues.320
One veteran Circuit Judge described his colleagues' attitude when faced
with a section 1983 claim against a municipal defendant: "Most judges
shudder at the prospect of trying a Monell-type case because they are so
complicated." 32'
Bifurcation also appeals to judges who are unsympathetic to civil
rights claims generally, and particularly to causes of action that allege a
municipality's wrongdoing. Most federal judges now reflect the con-
servative philosophy of former Presidents Reagan and Bush.322 To those
hostile to civil rights, bifurcation represents an effective procedure for
preventing litigants from introducing evidence that would establish a
municipality's "deliberate indifference" to systemic police abuses that de-
prive citizens of their constitutional rights.
Wage War on Crime in Federal Courts, RECORDER, Aug. 11, 1992, at 8 (arguing that increas-
ing reliance on the federal government to wage war on criminals has resulted in "an
overburdened federal court system and a serious threat to the principles of federalism").
319. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ORIENTATION SEMINAR FOR NEWLY APPOINTED
DISTRICT JUDGES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 3-5 (Feb. 9-14, 1992) (seminar program).
320. Circuit Judge George Pratt and two other federal judges recalled that bifurcation was
frequently discussed at judges' seminars during the past several years. Interview with Judge
George Pratt, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 21,
1992); Telephone Interview with Judge Who Requested Anonymity, U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York (Oct. 19, 1992); Telephone Interview with Judge Who Re-
quested Anonymity, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Apr. 6, 1992).
Because courts can invoke Rule 42(b) sua sponte, it represents a valuable procedure for con-
trolling a party's pretrial discovery and presentation of evidence, particularly in civil cases that
appear complicated or lengthy.
321. Interview with Judge George Pratt, supra note 320. According to an attorney for the
City of New York, one federal judge hopes that these cases never reach trial because "no one
knows how to try a Monell claim." Interview with Anonymous Trial Attorney, supra note
303.
322. Overall, former Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed more than 60% of sitting
federal judges. They selected nearly 70% of all appellate judges, and their nominees represent
a majority on 10 of the 13 courts of appeals. Neil A. Lewis, Selection of Conservative Judges
Insures a President's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A13. While Bush Administration
officials denied the existence of a political "litmus test" for judicial appointments, one former
official stated: "It's very hard to get named to an appellate court post by this Administration
unless you pass the political smell test .... It's not even very subtle." Id. Presidents Reagan
and Bush consistently named conservative appointees who were generally white, wealthy,
male, and, in President Bush's case, relatively young. Id.
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One district judge in the Second Circuit, who sought anonymity,
admitted that he enthusiastically endorses bifurcating defendants in sec-
tion 1983 cases because "it is a waste of time to try Monell claims" when
municipalities stipulate to indemnify officers found liable on a common-
law respondeat superior claim. 323 Judge Edward Korman agreed that in
such situations, a successful litigant "gets what he wants-the money to
make him or her whole again, and trial on the Monell issue would be
superfluous. ' 324 Judge Korman reported that he favors bifurcation be-
cause it "disposes of the case more easily and efficiently, while being fair
and serving justice for a litigant. ' 325 A colleague from the same circuit,
Judge Michael Mukasey, explained that he has a "tendency to bifurcate"
in two basic situations: First, when he is unsure whether the plaintiff will
be able to establish an individual claim at all, bifurcation might make a
second trial unnecessary; second, when he believes that settlement is
likely on the claims against individual officers.326 Recognizing that bifur-
cation in the second instance could be "detrimental" to plaintiffs who
want to sue the municipality, Judge Mukasey noted that he might make
an exception in a case in which "a long-standing police practice" was
indicated, but reiterated that he usually bifurcates in order to "see if it
happened to you first, and then we'll see if the municipality was
involved." 327
B. Defense Attorneys
Municipal defense attorneys in New York City find that discovery
bifurcation of Monell claims provides relief from their heavy caseloads
and busy court responsibilities as well.3 28 Several defended the city's re-
323. Telephone Interview with Federal District Judge Who Requested Anonymity, Sec-
ond Judicial Circuit (Nov. 5, 1992). The judge explained that when the municipality agrees to
compensate, the litigant's right to recovery is protected. Id.
324. Telephone Interview with Judge Edward Korman, U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of New York (Apr. 15, 1992) (conducted by research assistant Bethany
Conybeare); cf. supra notes 8-9 and Part II.C (discussing deterrent purpose of Monell actions).
325. Telephone Interview with Judge Edward Korman, supra note 324.
326. Telephone Interview with Judge Michael Mukasey, U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York (Apr. 3, 1992) (conducted by research assistant Bethany Conybeare).
327. Id.
328. Defense attorneys in Boston and Los Angeles do not find that bifurcation lessens
their workloads since the trial bifurcation model prevalent in those jurisdictions requires them
to prepare a Monell defense for the possibility that any given trial will proceed to the second
stage. Telephone Interview with Boston Attorney Active in Civil Rights Defense Who Re-
quested Anonymity (Mar. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Anonymous Bos-
ton Attorney]; Telephone Interview with Mary House, Deputy Los Angeles City Attorney
(Mar. 25, 1993); Telephone Interview with Jim Pfeffer (Mar. 24, 1993) (private Los Angeles
defense attorney).
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cent reliance on bifurcation as necessary because Monell claims "were
being used to extort. We were getting crucified by the large Wall Street
firms. '329 A colleague added that bifurcation is an "appropriate re-
sponse to the outrageous discovery demands by some plaintiffs' attor-
neys."'330 Tom Bergdall, a senior supervising attorney for the city who is
affectionately called the "father" of bifurcation, explained, "Many of the
big firms were submitting Monell motions for discovery, which required
lots of our attorneys' time. I thought the motions were unnecessary, du-
plicative, and very expensive."'331
Those municipalities that favor trial bifurcation do so for an even
more important reason: It limits, and frequently avoids, their exposure
to Monell liability. When bifurcated, a plaintiff's Monell claim is "fro-
zen" until a jury decides whether an individual officer is liable. In courts
that broadly construe Heller, a jury finding for the officer will block a
plaintifi's efforts to prove that a municipal practice or custom deprived
her (and other persons) of a constitutional right.332 Even when a jury
finds that the individual officer is liable, the municipality will rarely be
required to defend a police policy or custom at a second trial. Many
litigants apparently prefer not to proceed against a municipality after try-
ing the individual claim in order to avoid reliving an unpleasant, costly,
and inconvenient experience. 333 Unless she expects to satisfy the weighty
329. Interview with Peter J. Cahill, Staff Attorney, New York City Corporation Counsel
(Aug. 14, 1992); see infra note 330.
330. Telephone Interview with Blanche Greenfield, Trial Attorney, New York City Cor-
poration Counsel (Feb. 7, 1992). It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which plaintiffs' attor-
neys may have engaged in "outrageous discovery demands." Attorneys for the city specifically
referred to the "large Wall Street firms" that provided pro bono representation and accumu-
lated "huge" attorney's fees in Monell actions as a major reason for their reliance on bifurca-
tion. E.g., Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Second Supervising Attorney)
(attributing the threat of large fee awards to "certain Wall Street firms who don't know what
else to do but conduct discovery"). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988), defendants must almost
always pay a "prevailing" section 1983 claimant's attorney's fees, even when the case settles.
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). Clearly, these attorneys felt overwhelmed by discovery
requests that they viewed as burdensome, unnecessary, and attempts to "hold the attorney's
fees issue over our head for settlement purposes." Telephone Interview with Blanche Green-
field, supra note 304.
331. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall). Bergdall explained that
he introduced the bifurcation procedure to the New York City Corporation Counsel and rec-
ommended that staff attorneys consider using it in section 1983 cases after learning of its value
for municipal defendants at a civil rights conference at Georgetown Law School in May 1990.
Id.
332. See supra Part IV.A.
333. Telephone Interview with Ellen Yaroshefsky (Dec. 12, 1992); Interview with James
Meyerson, supra note 299; Interview with Jonathan Moore, supra note 299. One litigant, Jo-
seph Skorupski, related that he brought suit against a local police department after its officers,
mistaking him for a robbery suspect, handcuffed, kicked, and beat him and forced a pistol into
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burden of proof to obtain punitive damages against individual city offi-
cials, 334 a municipal claim will at most bring only nominal damages to
the successful plaintiff.335 For these reasons, plaintiffs' attorneys describe
most clients as willing to waive their Monell claims when a negotiated
settlement adequately compensates them for their injuries. 33 6 When set-
tlement seems near, most city attorneys are receptive to "sweetening the
settlement pot" in order to avoid a trial on Monell issues337 and to spare
the municipality from exposure to indeterminate liability in future
cases.
338
his mouth. After three years of litigation, Mr. Skorupski settled the case because "the emo-
tional strain of continuing litigation was putting him 'through hell' and ... he wanted to get on
with his life." Tayler & Bessent, supra note 271, at 7. Similarly, the plaintiff's counsel in Ray
v. Catone, No. 89 Civ. 0836 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1991), opposed the city's bifurcation motion
because he felt that "a bifurcation of issues would cause delay and added expense and prejudice
the plaintiff." Transcript of Motion at 5, Ray (No. 89 Civ. 0836).
334. While punitive damages are not available against municipalities, see City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); infra notes 148-152 and accompanying text, a
section 1983 litigant may obtain such an award against individual defendants upon a showing
that they acted with recklessness or callous indifference to her rights, see Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 34-38 (1983).
335. In Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991), for example, the
defendant municipality and police chief moved to dismiss a Monell claim after individual po-
lice officers were found liable at a bifurcated trial. The district court denied the motion, al-
lowing the Monell action to proceed. Id. at 635. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the
second trial was proper to adjudicate plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against Los Ange-
les Police Chief Darryl Gates in his personal capacity, and recognized that the municipal de-
fendants had allegedly "committed constitutional violations distinct from those committed by
the individual officers." Id. at 640. The court also reaffirmed "the importance to organized
society that [constitutional] rights remain scrupulously observed." Id. (quoting Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978)). Though reinforcing the plaintiff's right to sue "for the
purpose of vindicating those constitutional rights," the court limited the compensatory portion
of the jury's award to "nominal, yet symbolic damages" since the plaintiff had already been
made whole by the award against the individual officers. Id.; cf. George v. City of Long Beach,
973 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of Monell claim because the plaintiff
sought only nominal damages against the officer), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993).
336. Telephone Interview with Howard Friedman, supra note 308; Telephone Interview
with Michael Lightfoot, supra note 286; Telephone Interview with James Meyerson (Mar. 23,
1993).
337. Interview with James Meyerson, supra note 299.
338. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 8, § 14.2(0. For example, suppose that a plain-
tiff's Monell claim is based on a municipality's failure to investigate citizens' complaints about
the use of excessive force by police. At trial, plaintiff's expert witness testifies that the police
department had no mechanism for investigating citizens' complaints at the time of the plain-
tiff's injury, and that most complaints were simply ignored. The city's attorney then cross-
examines the expert witness. Should the jury find the municipality liable on the Monell claim,
the city could not relitigate the same issue in a subsequent trial-the municipality would be
estopped from denying that the policy of failure to investigate existed during the same period
to which the expert testified. A more difficult issue arises when new plaintiffs plead the same
Monell claim relative to a different time period. In such instances, the city would likely be
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Defense attorneys justify their bifurcation practice on four grounds.
First, attorneys for the City of New York suggest that when a police
officer's section 1983 liability is proved, the plaintiff is compensated more
quickly and at less personal expense. Tom Bergdall argued that "the
practice is sound and reasonable. Before bifurcation, plaintiffs' cases
were languishing for years because of Monell discovery alone. '339 In
cases in which a police officer is found liable, Bergdall characterized Mo-
nell as a "distraction. ' '340 "Bifurcation," said Bergdall, "protects a plain-
tiff against the additional expense of voluminous discovery, while
providing for 'make-whole' relief. '341 A supervisor colleague added that
the practice "moves cases along for everyone's benefit, including plain-
tiffs'. In fact, more and more plaintiffs' attorneys are stipulating to bifur-
cating Monell. '342
Second, city attorneys in Boston and New York assert that they do
not seek bifurcation as a matter of policy in section 1983 litigation, but
only after making a case-by-case determination. An attorney for the city
of Boston emphasized that he moves to bifurcate "only when necessary
to prevent a jury from considering evidence showing prior complaints
against the defendant officer. If there are no such complaints, there is no
reason for bifurcation."3 43 While a New York City counterpart justified
bifurcation as necessary to overcome some plaintiffs' attorneys' "black-
mail" discovery demands, he too stressed that discovery bifurcation is
requested selectively and "only after evaluating the plaintiff's specific
Monell claim to determine if it is appropriate."'344
estopped from relitigating the identical issue so long as the plaintiffs could establish that the
department had not implemented new procedures.
339. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall). Bergdall's colleague
Lawrence Kahn and Los Angeles city attorney Mary House also argue that bifurcation avoids
unnecessary delays. Kahn, supra note 298; Telephone Interview with Mary House, supra note
328. No one doubts that a trial (or discovery) process involving only a single defendant would
require less time; left unresolved is whether the practice is consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of Monell actions and Rule 42(b)'s general principles for deciding bifurcation motions.
340. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall). Other defense attorneys
have also suggested that Monell claims tend to confuse a jury when there is a unified trial.
Telephone Interview with Lawrence Kahn, Chief Litigation Assistant, New York City Corpo-
ration Counsel (Mar. 21, 1993) (noting the "complications of Monell claims"); Telephone In-
terview with Jim Pfeffer, supra note 328.
341. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall).
342. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Second Supervising Attorney); see also
supra note 291 and accompanying text; cf infra note 385.
343. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Boston Attorney, supra note 328. Specifically,
the attorney feared that evidence of an officer's "history of internal affairs"-evidence that
would probably be relevant only to the Monell claim-might taint the jury's view of the claim
against the individual officer. Id.
344. Interview with Anonymous Trial Attorney, supra note 303.
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Third, city attorneys generally minimize the policy considerations
underlying Monell claims, and do not believe that municipal liability is
necessary to deter and to abolish systemic police abuses that result in
constitutional deprivations. Most believe that an adequate remedy lies
within the city's legal powers: "If police officers are engaged in such a
practice, we will sit on the Police Department to make sure it is
changed." 34 5
Finally, New York and Los Angeles city attorneys reject the sugges-
tion that they face a conflict of interest when they represent both individ-
ual and municipal defendants. 34 6  The attorneys recognize that
bifurcation permits a municipal defendant to take advantage of this
"weapon of great tactical value ' 347 and pursue a defense theory intended
to gain the jury's sympathy for the officer "doing his job. ' 34 8 They also
acknowledge that bifurcation combined with a successful defense of the
officer would likely immunize the municipality from section 1983 liability
in courts that apply Heller expansively, and admit that even if an officer's
"authorized force" defense fails, it is only the officer, and not the city,
that is found liable. 349 Yet they are reluctant to see any inherent conflict
345. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall). New York City staff
attorney Blanche Greenfield stated that whenever it encounters an unlawful police practice,
the Corporation Counsel will communicate directly with an appropriate police official and
recommend changes in police procedure. Telephone Interview with Blanche Greenfield, supra
note 304. A Boston defense attorney added that "the police department is amenable to chang-
ing their practices.... I'm not sure that Monell is the best way to deal with institutional
problems." Telephone Interview with Anonymous Boston Attorney, supra note 328. Los An-
geles defense attorney Mary House also felt that Monell actions may be unnecessary, explain-
ing that "there are sufficient safety checks in the system to deal with any unlawful practice."
House recalled: "I have changed policies which I thought would lead to constitutional
abuses." Telephone Interview with Mary House, supra note 328.
346. In jurisdictions that agree to indemnify police officers against liability for civil rights
violations, such as New York City and the City of Los Angeles, the municipality's attorneys
almost always represent the individual officers at the same time as they defend the municipality
against claims that it was deliberately indifferent to police practices that deprived citizens of
constitutional rights. See infra notes 349-355 and accompanying text. David Rudovsky noted
that "[i]n some jurisdictions, insurance carriers will provide counsel, while in others, the de-
partment may retain outside counsel to represent the officer or provide funds for the officer to
do so." Rudovsky, supra note 268, at 491 n.106. When the municipality does not provide
independent counsel for the individual officer, it may encounter a conflict of interest. See infra
note 351.
347. Heller, 475 U.S. at 807-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 803 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting defense counsel's remarks from the
record).
349. Surprisingly, some city attorneys were uncertain whether an officer who is indemni-
fied suffers any real injury when she is found personally liable. Joint Interview, supra note 278.
Such judgments may, for example, adversely affect her prospects for promotion or other types
of advancement. Surely, a supervising officer should consider a verdict against an officer when
considering such an application. Paul Schneider, defense attorney for the city of Albuquerque,
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in defending a police officer who asserts that her actions were reasonable
based on accepted police practice350 while simultaneously representing
the city's interests against a charge that the practice tolerated or imple-
mented was unlawful. 351 Acknowledging that they "grapple with these
New Mexico, confirmed that an officer found liable for a constitutional violation is "resented
by everyone" and "is less likely to be given advancement." Interview with Paul Schneider, in
New York, N.Y. (Oct. 30, 1992). New York City supervising attorney Kahn also saw the
likelihood that "a stigma will attach in the eyes of fellow officers and supervisors." Telephone
Interview with Lawrence Kahn, supra note 340. The use of independent counsel whose sole
responsibility is to absolve the officer regardless of the outcome for the municipality would
likely reduce the potential for such damage to the officers.
350. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the officer's
conduct in excessive force cases should be decided by a Fourth Amendment standard of rea-
sonableness-an inquiry into whether the officer conducted herself reasonably based on an
objective consideration of all the surrounding facts. See Connuck, supra note 35, at 748-64.
351. City attorneys' trial bifurcation strategies on behalf of individual officers are often
similar to that raised in City of Los Angeles v. Heller-they argue that the officer was con-
ducting herself reasonably under the circumstances because she was following a customary
police policy, and should accordingly be relieved of individual responsibility. See supra note
349 and note 241 and accompanying text. Such a defense may suggest that a city policy was
responsible for the plaintiff's constitutional injury. In order to successfully defend against the
Monell claim at a second trial, however, the city may be required to refute evidence that such a
policy existed or argue that the officer acted outside the scope of proper city policy. Thus, city
attorneys' representation of both the individual officer and the municipal defendant creates
serious potential for an ethical bind. In particular, bifurcation permits the defense attorneys to
pursue incompatible theories in two separate trials. As some commentators have concluded,
"[t]he conflict is obvious." AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 8, § 14.2(f); cf MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt., para. 7 (1991) (discussing conflicts in dual repre-
sentation: "An impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the
parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that
there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in ques-
tion."). If the officer had independent counsel, it is not clear that bifurcation would further her
individual interest: her most effective trial strategy might be to place the blame on a visible
municipal defendant. E.g., Telephone Interview with Linda Cronin (Mar. 22, 1993) (private
New York City defense attorney who represents individual officers) ("As a general rule, I want
the municipality sitting next to me."). Of course, when a municipality agrees to indemnify and
to represent the officer, it controls the trial strategy and will move to bifurcate in order to
preclude the plaintiff's Monell claim pursuant to Heller.
It appears that few courts have considered the ethical conflict that may arise in bifurcated
trials. In Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 796 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the
court found "a potential conflict" to exist when the city's attorneys represented both the mu-
nicipality and an individual officer who was asserting a qualified immunity defense: The indi-
vidual defendant "can shift liability to the municipality . . . by establishing a good faith,
qualified immunity defense"-a defense "that may be good for the officer but bad for the
City." Id. at 88. Should such a defense succeed, stated the court, "the municipality may still
be liable." Id. at 86. The city could avoid liability, however, by arguing that the officers acted
outside the scope of their employment and were thus not entitled to partial or complete immu-
nity. The court resolved this problem by ordering the city to provide the individual defendant
with independent counsel in the absence of a waiver: "When multiple representation by coun-
sel for a public body creates a potential conflict of interest, the proper course is for the public
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ethical issues all the time, ' 352 New York City supervisors thought that
"this problem does not occur as a practical matter because the officers
agree to the city's policy of indemnification in exchange for legal repre-
sentation. '353  When asked whether their dual representation com-
promises a police officer defendant's right to zealous representation, the
attorneys contended that "it is usually in the officer's best interests to
sever the city defendant. '354 City attorneys strongly defend trial bifurca-
tion by arguing that it protects each defendant against the "substantial
risk of prejudice" that arises from the possibility that evidence of one
defendant's constitutional culpability will "spill over" into the jury's de-
termination of the other's liability. 355 In sum, municipal defense attor-
neys believe that bifurcated civil rights proceedings promote justice for
the defendants, and fairly and adequately compensate plaintiffs who sus-
tain constitutional injuries.
employer to offer its officer employee separate counsel." Id. at 87 (citing Suffolk County Pa-
trolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. County of Suffolk, 751 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1985)).
352. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Second Supervising Attorney). Los An-
geles city attorney Mary House explained that she has sometimes felt personally "uncomforta-
ble" because of conflict of interest problems, but is satisfied that current case law supports her
representation of both the individual and municipal defendants. Telephone Interview with
Mary House, supra note 328.
353. Joint Interview, supra note 278 (statement of Tom Bergdall).
354. Joint Interview, supra note 278. It is easy to understand why some officers would not
raise the issue of an ethical conflict. As a practical matter, indemnification is an offer too good
to refuse. Private defense attorney Linda Cronin believes that New York City's policy of in-
demnification frequently compromises the legal representation that police officers receive from
the city. Telephone Interview with Linda Cronin, supra note 351.
355. Kahn, supra note 298. It is doubtful that a unified trial prejudices a municipality that
agrees to indemnify (and therefore represents) its police officers. In such cases, the municipal-
ity must compensate a victorious plaintiff regardless of which defendant the trier finds to be
liable. Lawrence Kahn and Jim Pfeffer probably spoke for many other defense attorneys when
they expressed fear that unless the trials are bifurcated, juries will become confused and be
unable to follow a court's instructions on the admissibility of particular evidence against only
one defendant. Id.; Telephone Interview with Jim Pfeffer, supra note 328. Although this con-
cern arises in many multiple-defendant cases, it is an exception to Rule 42(b)'s general policy
against bifurcation only when the prejudice resulting from such evidence would be so severe as
to be incurable by limiting instructions. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. Sec-
tion 1983 defendants should be treated the same as other defendants in other civil cases. See
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160,
1162-63 (1993) (rejecting the idea of special judge-made procedures for Monell claims). Jurors
are capable of deciding whether each defendant is liable in section 1983 cases and, if so, the
extent of damages to be awarded. See, e.g., Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 129 F.R.D. 435
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (affirming jury finding both defendants liable but requiring only municipal
defendant to pay money damages), af'd, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
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C. Plaintiffs' Attorneys
Experienced civil rights litigators contend that they include Monell
claims in section 1983 suits not as a pro forma practice, but only selec-
tively, after considering the client's interests and the factual circum-
stances of the case. New York City civil rights attorney James Meyerson
stated: "In a lot of my cases, I do not raise Monell because it is not what
my client wants. When Monell is included, the case becomes a much
more complicated litigation, which may not advance the client's de-
sire."'3 56 Chicago civil rights attorney Flint Taylor explained that "pol-
icy and practice claims ...entail a substantial involvement of time,
effort, and resources and can sometimes unnecessarily complicate the
case, detract from the impact of the incident itself, and confuse or dis-
tract the jury. ' 357 New Haven civil rights attorney John Williams ex-
plained that he too looks to avoid "the extra work in cases where a
municipality indemnifies and you can prove the officer's liability." 358
Many plaintiffs' attorneys also agree with Taylor's observation that be-
cause "[m]any trial judges simply do not understand, or are hostile to,
Monell claims,.. litigators should be aware of these sobering realities
before filing or pursuing a Monell claim in a police misconduct case."'359
Once the decision is made to include a Monell claim, many (but not
all)36° litigators are alarmed and express outrage at the increasing ten-
dency of city attorneys and judges to routinely use bifurcation as a means
of preventing municipal claims from ever reaching trial or even stopping
them before discovery. In the appropriate case, they* argue, Monell
claims provide the opportunity for a plaintiff "to discover, expose, try,
judicially determine, and, thereby, to deter systemic abuses and failures
within police departments."3 61 Los Angeles attorney Barry Litt spoke
for many when he recognized the "substantial difference between
whether an individual officer violates a person's constitutional rights and
whether a municipality's policy caused the injury. ' 362 Most plaintiffs'
attorneys agree that Monell claims are important "because they permit[]
356. Interview with James Meyerson, supra note 299.
357. G. Flint Taylor, Municipal Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases from
Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19 CUMB. L. Rnv. 447, 464 (1989); see also infra text
accompanying note 379 (noting that Monell claims may be unnecessary when the government
indemnifies and recovery is had from individual officers).
358. Interview with John Williams, supra note 278.
359. Taylor, supra note 357, at 464-65; Telephone Interview with Michael Avery (Mar. 19,
1993); Telephone Interview with Howard Friedman, supra note 308; Telephone Interview with
James Meyerson (Mar. 24, 1993).
360. See infra notes 373-382 and accompanying text.
361. Taylor, supra note 357, at 464.
362. Telephone Interview with Barry Litt, supra note 287.
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the plaintifis] to present a more complete and accurate case to the jury,
and to offer the alternative of finding the municipality liable where indi-
vidual culpability is murky or otherwise questionable. ' '363
These attorneys react most strongly to bifurcation orders that defer
discovery on Monell claims until after a trial on claims against the indi-
vidual officers. They perceive these judicial directives as barring them
from ascertaining the extent to which police officers are engaging in an
unlawful practice. New York City plaintiffs' attorney Jonathan Moore
asserted that "bifurcation of Monell discovery is often a roadblock to a
plaintiff gaining vindication for a violation of constitutional rights and
having a meaningful day in court.' ' 364 His colleague James Meyerson
conceded that "there may be Monell claims which are so convoluted, so
complicated, and so distracting as to require separate trials. '36 Never-
theless, said Meyerson, "in the normal police misconduct case, it is never
reasonable to prevent a plaintiff from gaining information that either sup-
ports or refutes a Monell cause of action. ' 366 To support his contention,
Meyerson described a recent case in which he persuaded a trial court to
grant Monell discovery and then withdrew the Monell claim based on the
materials unearthed and depositions taken.367
"Because bifurcation is so facially appealing," Moore suggested,
"the real fight in New York is to avoid bifurcation of discovery. Having
the same jury hear both trials is very important for proper apportion-
ment of damages. ' 368 But his colleagues in Los Angeles, who are gener-
ally permitted to conduct discovery on municipal claims, face a different
problem. Tom Beck expressed a common frustration when he discussed
363. Taylor, supra note 357, at 464; Telephone Interview with Michael Avery, supra note
359; Telephone Interview with Tom Beck (Mar. 23, 1993); Telephone Interview with David
Rudovsky (Mar. 19, 1993). Flint Taylor successfully opposed bifurcation in one case by argu-
ing, among other things, that "the plaintiff must be given wide deference to present his case in
the manner he chooses" and that bifurcation would rob the plaintiff of his "right to present his
strongest case." Plaintiff's Response to Defendant City's Motion to Bifurcate at 1, 2, Myatt v.
City of Chicago, No. 90-C-3991 (N.D. Ill. response filed Aug. 7, 1991). Later in the case,
however, the judge granted another trial bifurcation motion made by a different organizational
defendant. See Myatt v. City of Chicago, No. 90-C-3991, 1992 WL 447832, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 24, 1992).
364. Interview with Jonathan Moore, supra note 299.
365. Interview with James Meyerson, supra note 299.
366. Id.
367. Id. (referring to Gibson v. Carmody, No. 89 Civ. 5358, 1990 WL 52272 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 19, 1990)).
368. Interview with Jonathan Moore, supra note 299. To accomplish these objectives,
Moore recently considered proposing a trifurcated trial: a single jury would first hear evidence
against the individual officer; the second stage (assuming the jury found that the plaintiff suf-
fered a constitutional injury) would consist of the plaintiff's claims against the municipality.
During the third stage, the jury would award and apportion damages. Id.
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plaintiffs' difficulties in suits alleging an unconstitutional municipal prac-
tice: "We get the dirt, but then the judges do not want a jury to hear it so
they bifurcate. Unless the individual officer is found liable, we can never
present the evidence to a jury.23 69
Civil rights attorneys oppose trial bifurcation orders for other rea-
sons as well. Detroit attorney Richard Soble found the practice to have
"horrendous" and "costly" consequences for a plaintiff interested in pur-
suing a Monell claim: "When defense attorneys are provided three op-
portunities to cross-examine a witness, at a pretrial deposition and at two
trials, it becomes much easier to attack a plaintiff witness's credibil-
ity."'370 New York attorney Ellen Yaroshefsky addressed the economics
of financing a section 1983 case: "Most clients are simply without funds
to begin with, and bifurcation doubles the cost and the lawyer's financial
burden in this type of litigation." 371 Finally, Jim Meyerson expressed
another common concern in speaking of bifurcation's "potential to dis-
empower a jury's ability to apportion damages equitably between the in-
dividual officer and the city defendant. '372
While many plaintiffs' trial attorneys see great dangers in bifurca-
tion and argue strenuously against the procedure, others do not oppose
it. Some civil rights attorneys suggest that members of a jury are more
likely to hold a lone officer liable than to subject the municipality in
which many of them reside to uncertain financial exposure.373 They cite
the difficulty of proving, and of financing, a section 1983 suit that alleges
police brutality against a municipality. 374 Some also believe that a recov-
369. Telephone Interview with Tom Beck, supra note 284.
370. Telephone Interview with Richard Soble, supra note 317.
371. Telephone Interview with Ellen Yaroshefsky (Dec. 12, 1992). Florida attorney Bar-
bara Heyer agreed: "A well-financed law firm is necessary to afford the five-year costs which
are incurred to subsidize police brutality claims." Interview with Barbara A. Heyer, in New
York, N.Y. (Oct. 31, 1992). New Mexico defense attorney Paul Schneider also recognized that
"the average practitioner cannot handle these cases because of the cost." Interview with Paul
Schneider, supra note 349. In most jurisdictions, the civil rights bar is limited to a small
number of attorneys. David Rudovsky explained that "most lawyers would not be interested
in a contingent fee case against the police or the city, even with the possibility of court-
awarded attorney's fees if the suit is successful." Rudovsky, supra note 268, at 490. Tony
Amsterdam identified another nonfinancial burden that limits the size of the civil rights bar:
"[Miany who might otherwise be available to [plaintiffs] cannot afford to tangle with the police
because these lawyers depend on the goodwill of the police in other cases." Anthony G. Am-
sterdam, The Supreme Court and The Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 787 (1970); see also Nancy Rutter, Blood Money, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1992, at 34, 37 ("Po-
lice brutality work draws a kind of thick-skinned, cause-oriented lawyer who is unfazed by
criticism and undaunted by loss .... ").
372. Interview with James Meyerson, supra note 299.
373. E.g., Telephone Interview with Robert Herbst, supra note 291.
374. Telephone Interview with Michael Shen (Oct. 23, 1992). Shen, a New York City
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ery is more likely to result when a municipality is sued on a respondeat
superior tort theory, 375 and suggest that their clients care little whether
the eventual damage award reflects the municipality's civil rights viola-
tion or its responsibility for the actions of its employees. 376 Los Angeles
attorney Michael Lightfoot referred to the "enormous time involved"
and reasoned that "most of our clients just want to get something out of
what happened to them. ' 377 Boston civil rights attorney Howard Fried-
man echoed New York City defense attorney Bergdall, quoted above, in
explaining that bifurcation is not a problem in the typical section 1983
case:378 "Where there is government indemnification, Monell claims are
not usually necessary once individual liability has been established. '379
The mixture of opinions among plaintiff attorneys also manifests it-
self in the "Bible" for lawyers trying section 1983 claims, Police Miscon-
duct: Law and Litigation.380  In their brief section on bifurcation,
authors Michael Avery and David Rudovsky urged lawyers trying sec-
tion 1983 claims to oppose separate trials, encouraging them to "make as
strong an argument as possible that justice will be served by a single
trial. ' 381  But immediately thereafter, they suggested that bifurcation
may benefit the litigant by placing her "in a superior [negotiating] posi-
plaintiffs' attorney, also remarked: "We have to be very, very selective in these kind of cases
before agreeing to assume the representation." Id. Leonard Bein, a New York City solo prac-
titioner, added: "You have to worry about the financing costs when you engage in the exten-
sive discovery necessary to establish a municipality's pattern and practice." Telephone
Interview with Leonard Bein (Dec. 2, 1992). One Los Angeles attorney estimated that the
average police brutality case requires $10,000 to $20,000 to finance. Rutter, supra note 371, at
94 (quoting plaintiffs' attorney R. Samuel Paz). Karol Heppe, the executive director of a law-
yer referral service for police misconduct cases, said: "Attorneys can't just take these cases on
principle. We have to make an economic determination." Id.
375. Typical common-law claims include negligence claims against the municipality or
causes of action based on false arrest, assault, and malicious prosecution. Although such
claims derive from state law, plaintiffs may bring them in federal court when accompanied by
section 1983 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. 11 1990) (giving federal courts "supple-
mental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the
court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution").
376. Telephone Interview with Robert Herbst, supra note 291; see supra text accompany-
ing note 336.
377. Telephone Interview with Michael Lightfoot, supra note 286.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 329-330, 353.
379. Telephone Interview with Howard Friedman, supra note 307.
380. AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 8.
381. Id. § 14.2(g). Avery and Rudovsky continued:
Plaintiffs will generally benefit from a joint trial of all issues and should make as
strong an argument as possible that justice will be served by a single trial. The factor
of judicial economy will, for the most part, be in the plaintiffs favor in this regard.
The inclination of courts to rely upon limiting instructions rather than bifurcated or
severed trials will also run in the plaintiffs favor. Moreover, much of the evidence
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tion with regard to the eventual settlement of the case" once individual
liability has been established:
[T]he City may be loath to go to trial on the question of its liability.
Apart from the question of the expense and effort of further proceed-
ings, the city may face substantial political embarrassment in the event
of a verdict against it. Moreover, [such] a verdict... may create seri-
ous collateral estoppel problems for the city in other litigation.382
Plaintiffs' lawyers must judge when it serves their clients' interests
to settle a civil rights claim and forgo a trial against the municipality.
Unquestionably, civil rights attorneys will use a jury's bifurcated verdict
against an individual officer to gain leverage in negotiations with a mu-
nicipality reluctant to expose itself to greater liability at trial. There is an
obvious danger, however, in a bifurcation order that precludes Monell
issues from being tried or discovered: the unlawful police practice may
continue.3 3 In the absence of judicial scrutiny and jury review, munici-
palities have little incentive to acknowledge, challenge, and reform estab-
lished police practices; impervious to legal and financial responsibility for
the harms that Monell violations cause, cities may decide to ignore them
with impunity. 384 It is much easier for the municipality to focus instead
on the unusual, rogue officer whose liability is established at trial.
which plaintiff intends to offer against the municipality may be admissible against
individual defendants on one or another theory.
Id.
382. Id.
383. In some cases, unfavorable publicity and political pressure may persuade a municipal-
ity to change its practices. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, only reversed its
policy regarding officers' use of chokeholds after it had become "a symbol of police oppres-
sion" by causing fifteen well-publicized deaths, and after Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates
aggravated the situation by remarking that "blacks might be more likely to die from choke
holds because their arteries do not open as fast as arteries do on 'normal people.'" Los Angeles
Police Reconsider Using Choke Hold, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 199 1, at A18; see City of Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 100 (1983). In the wake of Rodney King's beating, however, the Los
Angeles Police Department considered reintroducing the chokehold, reportedly because it "is
less dangerous in subduing unruly suspects than blows with a club." Los Angeles Police Recon-
sider Using Choke Hold, supra at A18.
384. Municipalities will, of course, assume financial responsibility when they either indem-
nify police officers against section 1983 liability or are found liable for negligence through state
law respondeat superior claims. Municipalities have paid substantial sums for damages arising
from their police officers' violations of citizens' constitutional rights. In 1990, New York City
paid a record $13.3 million to the victims of police misconduct (this figure does not include
claims against the housing or transit police). Edward A. Adams, Brutality Claims, Payment at
Record Highs, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1991, at 1. The City of Los Angeles also paid significant
money damages for police abuses that same year. John L. Mitchell, $1L3 Million Paid in 1990
to Resolve Police Abuse Cases, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at A3; see also Rutter, supra note
371, at 36 (noting that the City of Los Angeles paid nearly $15 million in brutality cases in
1991). While these liabilities ought to convince a municipality to reform its police practices,
they may have become simply an assumed cost for operating a police force. It is much easier
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Conclusion: The Cost of Bifurcation-Denying Justice to Civil
Rights Litigants
A trial judge properly applies Rule 42(b) in a section 1983 action by
deciding whether bifurcation in the case at hand would further the Rule's
objectives of avoiding undue prejudice, delay, expense, and inconven-
ience for either party. Although bifurcation of Monell claims for trial,
and even for discovery, may be appropriate in some limited instances, 385
for a municipality to attribute such costs to a few bad cops than to admit its own responsibility
for condoning police conduct that deprives citizens of their constitutional rights. As a political
matter, Monell liability is indefensible-a city would find it difficult to continue with police
practices that are imposing substantial present and indeterminate future costs upon its taxpay-
ers. See supra note 9.
385. As Rule 42(b) requires, bifurcation should be the exception rather than the rule for
conducting a trial on section 1983 issues. See supra notes 188-195 and accompanying text.
Courts should not order bifurcation at the discovery stage except under the most exceptional
circumstances and after carefully considering the matter. Courts are capable of monitoring
plaintiffs' discovery requests, defining the scope of discovery, and setting time deadlines to
ensure that the process is not abused as suggested by some defense attorneys. See supra notes
329-331 and accompanying text; see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (directing courts to "rely on summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims" against municipalities
under section 1983). Moreover, the modem trend toward managerial judging strongly sup-
ports such judicial control of discovery. Judges have a variety of legal tools with which to do
so. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0, (g) (discovery conferences and sanctions); see also Edward
F. Sherman, The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIGATION 89 (1982); Robert H.
Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to
Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981). Especially in section 1983 litigation, the overriding
public interest at stake dictates that judges become involved in "organizing and guiding the
case" to protect that interest and ensure "the vindication of constitutional or statutory poli-
cies." Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976). Moreover, Congress expressly encouraged this trend in the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482
(Supp. 11 1990)). The Act requires every federal district court to develop a "cost and delay
reduction program," and endorses "early involvement of a judicial officer in planning the pro-
gress of a case [and] controlling the discovery process." Id. § 102(5)(B), 104 Stat. at 5089.
Of course, trial bifurcation itself is an example of judicial case management, and may be
appropriate in some circumstances. Cf id. sec. 103(a), § 473(a)(3)(B), 104 Stat. at 5091 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1990)) (directing district courts to consider the
"principle" of bifurcation in appropriate complex cases). There may be circumstances in
which trial bifurcation would avoid prejudice to the individual officer, particularly when the
municipality and the officer present antagonistic defenses. Such situations arise when the mu-
nicipality chooses not to indemnify the individual officer and the officer retains independent
counsel. Cf supra notes 349-355 and accompanying text. In such situations, the individual
defendant may seek to sever the municipal defendant for fear that the plaintiff will introduce
extrinsic evidence to prove an unlawful police policy or custom. Though some defendants
might welcome such evidence as proof that the officer was only doing what she was trained to
do, others would be concerned with the possible prejudicial effect of the jury considering evi-
dence involving numerous citizens alleging police brutality-especially when that evidence
consists of prior incidents involving the officer defendants. Telephone Interview with Jim Pfef-
fer, supra note 328; Telephone Interview with Anonymous Boston Attorney, supra note 328.
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a court that routinely orders separate trials or habitually severs and de-
fers discovery on the matter of municipal liability severely frustrates civil
rights litigants' attempts to secure redress for constitutional wrongs com-
mitted by municipalities. Most litigants lack the resources, fortitude, and
commitment necessary to proceed to a second trial on the Monell
claim;386 they are even less able to continue litigation when a court's bi-
furcation order precludes discovery until after the first trial on individual
liability has been concluded. The prejudice to civil rights plaintiffs multi-
plies when, as they frequently do, trial courts misapply Heller and auto-
matically dismiss Monell claims upon the exoneration of individual
defendants in a bifurcated trial. In the jurisdictions that follow this prac-
tice, even the most resourceful and persevering plaintiffs usually cannot
pursue their Monell claims to trial.
In each of these situations, bifurcation prevents litigants from estab-
lishing a municipality's responsibility for tolerating or condoning unlaw-
ful police practices and simultaneously bars juries from considering
evidence of police wrongdoing that could otherwise lead to municipal
reform. Congress originally passed the precursor to section 1983 in re-
sponse to local law enforcement officials' acts of violence and refusals to
recognize and protect citizens' constitutional rights.387 Whenever to-
day's officers engage in similar conduct, judges and defense attorneys
Similarly, when each defendant has independent counsel, the municipal defendant might de-
cide that bifurcation is necessary in a particular case to insulate it from a jury's reaction to
highly inflammatory and prejudicial evidence against a defendant officer. Bifurcation might
also be considered when no overlap exists between the testimony presented against the individ-
ual officer and the expert testimony needed to establish the city's custom or practice, and when
the court is persuaded that the evidence, if presented in a single trial, would unduly confuse a
jury. One point, however, remains clear: in the infrequent instance when the moving party
persuades a court to bifurcate, the court must submit special interrogatories to determine
whether the jury finds a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights in the first trial. See
supra text following note 254.
386. David Rudovsky described the "institutional obstacles" that make recovery difficult
for litigants in section 1983 cases: "They are often poor, or members of racial minorities, or
uneducated or inarticulate; some have criminal records." Rudovsky, supra note 268, at 490.
Because of these characteristics, most juries are likely to view civil rights plaintiffs un-
sympathetically, see id. ("Jurors tend to dismiss their allegations, often awarding them less
than a full measure of compensation."); see also supra Part IV.B.2, and plaintiffs are especially
vulnerable to a city's settlement offer. Moreover, the length of the typical civil rights proceed-
ing alone is enough to weaken the resolve of most litigants. See, e.g., supra note 335 and infra
notes 388-394 and accompanying text. Chicago attorney Flint Taylor successfully opposed
one trial bifurcation motion by arguing that it would have prejudiced his client in this manner.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant City's Motion to Bifurcate, Myatt v. City of Chicago, No.
90-C-3991 (N.D. Ill. response filed Aug. 7, 1991) ("[P]laintiff, a poor and working person,
cannot afford the added expense of conducting what in essence would be two trials, which
would no doubt... take much longer than one unified trial."); see supra note 363.
387. See supra Part I.
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should be aware that bifurcation can deny a federal remedy for constitu-
tional injuries-frustrating the historic purpose of the Enforcement Act
of 1871.
Consider a recent section 1983 case in which a middle-aged busi-
nessman was seriously injured by New York City police officers while he
was peacefully protesting the Catholic Church's positions on AIDS edu-
cation and reproductive choice.388 His interest in pursuing a civil rights
claim against the municipality went far beyond his desire for compensa-
tory relief. As an activist, he sought to establish the city's deliberate in-
difference to unlawful police practices because he believed that this
would deter the police from engaging in similar misconduct and brutality
against other demonstrators.
The circumstances leading to the plaintiff's injury made it difficult
for anyone but police officers to have witnessed the incident. Not sur-
prisingly, each officer who was in the vicinity of the incident testified that
she or he had no knowledge concerning the injury and had neither seen
nor heard any officer act improperly. Plaintiff's section 1983 cause of
action, originally based on the city's failure to adequately train its officers
in crowd control, was amended to include an additional cause of action.
As revised, it alleged that the municipality should be held responsible for
being deliberately indifferent to police officers' maintenance of a code of
silence by refusing to testify adversely to other officers. 389 Plaintiff
claimed that the code was instrumental in causing the individual officers
to believe that they could deprive him of his constitutional rights without
fear that a fellow officer would offer damaging evidence. Absent such
police corroboration, he argued, officers know they are unlikely to be
found liable for unconstitutional conduct.
At the initial pretrial conference, and without requesting argument
or legal briefs, the trial judge bifurcated the Monell claim sua sponte.
During the requested reargument, the court conceded that cross-exami-
nation of the defendant officers on the code of silence would probably be
a proper impeachment technique in the initial trial. It also acknowl-
edged that this line of questioning would likely overlap with the evidence
necessary to establish the municipality's awareness of and indifference to
the practice at the second trial. Nevertheless, the court held firm to its
bifurcation order.
388. Kohn v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 5730, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1992).
Approximately one year after the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiffs counsel asked this author to
serve as a consultant regarding the individual and Monell civil rights claims in the case.
389. See supra notes 270-271 and accompanying text.
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Because of the order, the plaintiff faces a serious risk that a jury
might not find any officer liable for having violated his civil rights.390
The jury might well conclude, for instance, that the plaintiff's proof was
not sufficiently convincing to identify the actual officers who caused his
injury.391 Without instructions from the court explaining a municipal-
ity's potential liability for tolerating a "blue wall of silence, '392 the jury
could also find that the officers should not be held liable even if they are
stonewalling to protect one another, and even if their silence is ultimately
the legal cause of plaintiff's constitutional injury. If the trial court fol-
lows the New York trend and broadly construes Heller,393 it would dis-
miss the Monell claims following a jury verdict in the officers' favor and
preclude plaintiff from conducting Monell discovery regarding the code
of silence.
Suppose that the jury's verdict establishes the officers' liability.
Though the plaintiff is dedicated to proving his case, three years have
already passed since his injury. Following the ordeal of the first trial, he
may find it more and more difficult to remain committed to proceed
through discovery and trial on the Monell claims. The plaintiff is aware
that Monell discovery involves substantial costs, inconvenience and de-
lay; he is also aware that despite the burdens of continuing, he can hope
to obtain only nominal additional damages on the Monell claims, with a
small possibility of recovering punitive damages against the responsible
police officials. 394 Consequently, he might be reluctant to endure the per-
sonal hardships of a second trial. The city attorneys, however, might
also be uneager to defend against a Monell claim, although for different
reasons. They would want to avoid the potential adverse consequences,
both economic and political, that would follow if the jury finds the mu-
nicipality liable for having tolerated the police code of silence or im-
proper training of its officers. The city would likely offer to settle the
Monell claim, and the plaintiff would likely accept-despite knowing
that the city's responsibility for tolerating the police practices will not be
directly challenged, and may well continue unabated.
Routine bifurcation of Monell claims in section 1983 actions misap-
plies Rule 42(b) and undermines the statute's deterrent purpose. Deter-
390. The trial court stated that the city may be held liable under a state law claim based on
respondeat superior should the jury conclude that a police officer, even if unidentified, caused
plaintiff's injury.
391. Cf infra Part IV.B.
392. Raab, supra note 271, at B5 (quoting the Police Commissioner of New York City);
see supra notes 270-271 and accompanying text (describing the code of silence).
393. See supra notes 297, 302 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 334-335 and accompanying text.
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rence is curtailed when a jury absolves the individual officer and the
municipality thereby obtains what amounts to immunity from Monell
liability through plaintiff attrition or judicial misapplication of Heller.
Deterrence is even more severely diminished in jurisdictions that pre-
clude discovery on bifurcated Monell claims pending the outcome of tri-
als against individual officers, because litigants are effectively barred from
investigating whether municipalities have tolerated police abuses and
should therefore be held accountable. Even when plaintiffs succeed in a
bifurcated trial against individual officers, deterrence is diminished.
Though bifurcation will not relieve the municipality of its financial obli-
gation in instances in which it agrees to indemnify individual officers, or
when it is found negligent under common-law theories, a municipality's
own constitutional violations will rarely be subjected to judicial scrutiny
and condemnation.
Consequently, bifurcation prevents juries from striking just appor-
tionments of damages between individual officers and the municipalities.
Although municipalities that indemnify their officers will only partially
escape financial responsibility, bifurcation allows all municipalities to es-
cape their share of the blame. One might argue that liability for these
individual claims acts as a sufficient incentive for municipalities to re-
form unconstitutional police practices, but common sense and, indeed,
Supreme Court decisions from Monell to Canton indicate otherwise. Bi-
furcation thus places litigants in a pre-Monell situation-they may pur-
sue section 1983 relief against the individual officers but not the
municipality, and municipalities are free to continue their systemic indif-
ference to citizens' constitutional rights.
Courts must refrain from routinely bifurcating Monell claims, at
either the discovery or trial stages. Rule 42(b) must be applied, as in-
tended, on a case-by-case basis, with attention paid to the impact of bi-
furcation on the civil rights claimant. Rather than furthering the
objectives of Rule 42(b), bifurcation of section 1983 claims frequently
creates substantial practical burdens that few plaintiffs or their attorneys
can overcome. Most importantly, police abuses of citizens' constitutional
rights are likely to continue as long as they remain outside judicial or
jury review. When police believe they are immune from public accounta-
bility, we can expect that some will continue to engage in official lawless-
ness, like that used against Rodney King.
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